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**Communism
Versus
Creation**

By

FRANCIS NIGEL LEE

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FRANCIS NIGEL LEE

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DEDICATION

to the Christian children and the youth of the Republic of South Africa and the rest of the Free World. May they and their parents never forget that eternal vigilance is the price of continued freedom.

“And Jesus . . . said, Verily I say unto you, Except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter the kingdom of heaven. . . . But whoso shall offend one of these little ones which believe in me, it were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and that he were drowned in the depth of the sea.”

—Matthew 18:3, 6.

PREFACE

On the completion of this work—which I have somewhat modified in this second edition by Americanizing the South African English spelling and punctuation, by augmenting the explanatory notes, and by simplifying the text—my gratitude extends first and foremost to my *heavenly Father*, the Supreme Philosopher, Whose work in creation and conservation I have here sought to uphold without apology and without compromise against the onslaught of the Communists. “For of Him and through Him, and to Him, are all things: to Whom be glory for ever” (Romans 11:36).

Secondly, my thanks must be rendered to those instrumental in making it humanly possible for me to write the work: to *my dear wife*, whose loving hands have once again graciously come to my aid in typing both the rough and final drafts, as well as this second edition; to the *librarian and staff* of the Jagger Library of the University of Cape Town in the Republic of South Africa, in very kindly rendering me all possible assistance in gaining access to the necessary philosophical sources; to *Prof. Dr. A. H. Murray*, Chairman of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Cape Town, for the much appreciated time and trouble he has taken in advising me how to improve the manuscript; and to that indefatigable fighter against Marxism, my highly respected friend, *Dr. J. D. Vorster*, Actuary General of the Dutch Reformed Church, National Chairman of the South African Council to Combat Communism and brother of the Prime Minister of my fatherland, the Republic of South Africa, whose influence and encouragement in more than one respect lie at the root of this present thesis.

Finally, a word about the *methodology* here followed. The subject is unfolded under ten chapters—respectively dealing with the

background and origin of Communism, and the communist doctrines regarding the origin and nature of: God, matter, the universe, life, man, labor, society, religion, and knowledge.

In chapter one, a *historical outline* of the background and origin of Communism is given. In each subsequent chapter, *the subjects* to be discussed are first of all briefly stated, next expounded from the Communist viewpoint, then subjected to a critical philosophical analysis, then briefly summarized, and thereafter opposed by the Christian philosophical viewpoint.

After the ten chapters, a *general conclusion* is drawn, demonstrating the total and radical antithesis between materialistic Communism and Christian philosophy in general and the antithesis in the fields of ontology, genesiology, anthropology, epistemology, and axiology in particular. This is then followed by a brief *epilogue*, which sets the whole thesis in Biblical perspective.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Francis Nigel ("Nik") Lee is a South African scholar, born in Kendal in England in 1934, but who grew up in South Africa, the land of his father's birth.

His scholastic achievements include the B.A., LL.B., and M.A. (Philosophy) degrees, taken at the University of Cape Town, his M.A. thesis being on "Marxist Genesiology." He also holds the degrees Cand. Litt. and Dip. Th. (*cum laude*) from the Dutch Reformed Seminary at Stellenbosch in South Africa, as well as the L.Th., B.D., M.Th., and Th.D. degrees at the University of Stellenbosch. His B.D. (*cum laude*) thesis was on "The Sabbath before Sinai," his M.Th. (*cum laude*) thesis was written in the Afrikaans language on "Muhammad in the Bible?", and his Th.D. thesis was a dogmatological-exegetical study of "The Sabbath and the Divine Covenant," after he passed his doctoral examinations (Th.Drs.) *cum laude*. He is currently doing research towards his D.Phil. thesis on "Communist Eschatology."

Dr. Lee was thrice an Ernest Oppenheimer Memorial Fellowship scholar, the founder-chairman of the Students' Philosophical Society and the 1956 Best Speaker of the Debating Society of the University of Cape Town, a past chairman of the Calvinistic Students' Organization of Stellenbosch, a licensed preacher of the Dutch Reformed Church of South Africa and a Barrister-at-law of the Supreme Court of South Africa. He is married and has one daughter, is the author of numerous articles and brochures, and is currently Professor of Philosophy and Departmental Chairman at an American college.

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I

BACKGROUND AND ORIGIN OF COMMUNISM

“The time will come when they will not endure sound doctrine,” the Apostle Paul wrote to his young reader Timothy, concerning the apostasy of the world’s last days. And truly, nowhere is this biblical prophecy more apparent than when we consider communism and its background.

A. Forerunners

Into the making of communism have gone many factors, both historical pre-conditions and personal forerunners. Restricting this survey to the more immediate factors, i.e., factors operating from about the middle of the eighteenth century, among the historical pre-conditions, the more obvious are: first, the unforgettable terror of the French Revolution of 1789 and the subsequent scourge of the two Napoleons;¹ second, the appalling working conditions of nineteenth-century Western Europe;² third, the widespread apostasy from the Christian faith in Church, State, and culture;³ and fourth, the extreme backwardness of and political suppression in Russia.⁴

Among the many personal forerunners must be mentioned: firstly, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and his philosophical idealism and dialectics;⁵ secondly, St. Simon,⁶ Robert Owen,⁷ Charles Fourier,⁸ and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon⁹ and their socialistic utopias; thirdly, George Adam Smith¹⁰ and David Ricardo¹¹ and their classical economics; fourthly, David Friedrich Strauss¹² and Bruno Bauer¹³ and their religious apostasy; fifthly, Charles Darwin and his evolutionism;¹⁴ and sixthly, Ludwig Feuerbach and his materialism.¹⁵

As Engels admitted: "We German socialists are proud of the fact we are derived, not only from St. Simon, Fourier and Owen, but also from Kant, Fichte, and Hegel."¹⁶ And as Lenin correctly remarked: "Marx's dialectic was taken from Hegelian German philosophy, his economics from the classical British school, and his radical politics from the French Revolution."¹⁷

The decade prior to the birth of Marx and Engels saw the birth of David Friedrich Strauss in 1809 and of Proudhon, Darwin, and Bruno Bauer in the following year, as well as the publication of many influential books. In the space of a few short years Hegel produced his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, his *Philosophical Propaedeutics*, and his *Science of Logic*, the latter appearing in 1812.¹⁸ The following year Owen published his *New View of Society*, and two years later his *Observations on the Influence of the Manufacturing System*, while in 1817—the year before the birth of Karl Marx—St. Simon's *Industry* and Ricardo's *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* made their appearance.¹⁹

B. *Marx and Engels: the formative years*

Karl Heinrich Marx Levi, the founder of communism, was born in May 1818 at Trier²⁰ in the Rhineland, Germany, the son of a middle-class free-thinking Jewish lawyer of rabbinical descent.²¹ Apparently for reasons of social prestige and economic advantage, the family all became members of the Lutheran State Church when young Karl was six. So Marx grew up in a typically "respectable" bourgeois home—a home which was only respectable but not religious, yet a respectable home, a home under the influence of Baron Ludwig von Westphalen, whose daughter, Jenny, Marx subsequently married.

Two years later, in November 1820, the co-founder of communism, Friedrich Engels, was born in Barmen, also in the Rhineland. Barmen had once been a gay if pietistic town, but by the nineteenth century it had become so industrialized and most of its inhabitants so wretched, that alcoholism and rescue missions to alcoholics both abounded.²² Engels' upper middle-class father was a

rabid pietist who prohibited all novels in his home, whereas the young Engels was a gay Rhinelander who loved poetry and literature.²³ Engels Senior loved the Christian Bible, but Engels Junior loved the atheistic Shelley. In such circumstances, a clash between father and son became unavoidable, and to the very end of his life Engels would remain hostile towards the Christianity which he considered had poisoned his youth.²⁴

The next ten years, the years of the childhood of Marx and Engels, were studded with events destined to exercise a decisive influence on the two thinkers in their later lives. In 1821, Hegel's dialectical *Foundations of the Philosophy of Right* appeared (later to be criticized by Marx), as well as two socialist works, namely Owen's *Social System* and St. Simon's *Industrial System*. The following year saw the publication of Fourier's *Treatise on the Domestic Agricultural Association*, and the year after that saw the birth of the radical Bible critic, Ernest Renan, whereas the following year (1824) St. Simon's *Industrial Catechism* was released, followed by his *New Christianity* in 1828 and his *New Industrial World* in 1829.²⁵

The next decade opened with the death of Hegel in 1831, who had long dominated Church, State, and philosophy in Germany. His followers immediately divided into conservative Right-Hegelians and radical Left-Hegelians, which latter group included David Friedrich Strauss, Bruno Bauer, and Ludwig Feuerbach. Friedrich Engels, now in his teens, had become a gay, dashing, and athletic soldier—and an infidel! For Strauss' radical *Life of Jesus* (1835) had started Engels' process of rationalistic criticism which would ultimately lead to his avowal of communism.²⁶

Meanwhile Karl Marx, now aged seventeen, had gone to the University of Bonn to study law in 1835, but proceeded to the Hegelian-dominated University of Berlin the following year to study philosophy and history. In 1837 Marx wrote to his father: "I got to know Hegel from beginning to end."²⁷ Coming from such a lukewarm home and always having moved in the lukewarm environment of the "Aufklärung" or German Enlightenment [*sic!*], it is not surprising that he soon distinguished himself as a militant atheist and

an ardent materialist. His revolutionary bent soon manifested itself in friction with the authorities and a drunken brawl resulting in his being gaoled for the night.²⁸

C. *Marx and Engels' early writings*

In 1838 Marx's father died. Marx Junior, deciding on an academic career, directed all his energies towards acquiring his Ph.D. He wrote his thesis on *The Difference between the Natural Philosophy of Democritus and the Natural Philosophy of Epicurus*, and his doctoral degree was conferred on him by the University of Jena in 1841; whereafter, at the instigation of his Left-Hegelian friend Prof. Bruno Bauer of the University of Bonn, Marx applied to that University, which he himself had attended in 1835, for an academic appointment.

But that was not to be. For Bauer, who had long since given up the divine authority of all the Pauline epistles, caused eyebrows to be raised even further by his *Criticism of the History of the Gospel of John* in 1840 and his *Criticism of the History of the Synoptic Gospels* in 1841. His fatal move, however, came when he and Marx attacked the revered Hegel in their anonymous pamphlet, *The Trump of the Last Judgment on Hegel*. The authorities immediately discovered the identity of the authors, removed Bauer from his professorship and thus blasted all Marx's hopes of ever receiving an academic appointment in Germany.²⁹ The two had also planned to start a *Journal of Atheism*, a venture which now was never to materialize, resulting in Marx's even more vehement profession of that anti-Christian "religion."

At that time (1841) Engels had proceeded to Berlin University, intending to study philosophy, where he joined up with the Left-Hegelians and the followers of Bruno Bauer and where he released his Hegelian attack against *Schelling on Revelation*.³⁰ In that same year Ludwig Feuerbach's *Essence of Christianity* had appeared, which had a profound effect on both Marx and Engels, although they had still not yet even met one another. As Engels later wrote of both himself and Marx at that stage: ". . . we all became at once

Feuerbachians. How enthusiastically Marx greeted the new conception . . . one may read in *The Holy Family*.”³¹ Feuerbach it was who finally converted Engels to atheism. Shortly thereafter Engels met Moses Hess, whose book, *The European Triarchy*, which advocated the elimination of commercial competition as the root of international hatred, and which had been published the same year, converted him to communism.³²

The following year (1842) Engels proceeded to Manchester in England, where he established a cotton factory. It was there that he became a historical materialist, confronted as he was by the brick-makers’ strike and the bloodshed of 1843, the filthy slums, and the rampant diseases. And it was there that his fervently chauvinistic Irish mistress Mary Burns (whose sister also became his mistress and later his wife) made him into a revolutionary in politics and an anti-monogamist in anthropology.”³³

Meanwhile (1842), the academically minded Marx had made a few pennies by writing articles for the *Rheinische Zeitung*, a bourgeois³⁴ newspaper published in Cologne. Although he was appointed as the (vitriolic!) editor in 1843, it was soon suspended the very same year at the request of the “reactionary” Russian government. But undaunted, he happily married Jenny von Westphalen, daughter of his old friend the Baron, and in late 1843 the couple proceeded to Paris.³⁵

In Paris, which at that time was seething with socialism, Marx soon met the anarchist³⁶ Bakunin, who had introduced Hegelianism into his own country, Russia; the communist Proudhon, whose book, *What Is Property?* profoundly impressed Marx; and the disciples of Fourier, St. Simon, and “True” German Socialism. Here, together with the Left-Hegelian Ruge, he published the annual *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*, to which annual Engels sent a contributory essay, his *Outline of a Critique of Political Economy*. This Engels sent from England for publication that same year (1844). Marx, greatly stirred, immediately began to correspond with Engels, who visited Marx in Paris that August.³⁷ From that visit there grew one of the closest friendships, most prolific correspondences,³⁸ and most

productive partnerships of mutual influence that the world has ever seen. "Engels," wrote Marx, "is always one step ahead of me,"³⁹ and Engels in his turn remarked at his friend Marx's funeral, "His name shall live forever."⁴⁰

Writing of this commencement of their lives' work together, Engels later described⁴¹ ". . . how the two of us in Brussels in the year 1845 set about jointly to expound the opposition between our view . . . and the ideological view of German philosophy. . . . To Feuerbach, who after all in many respects forms an intermediate link between Hegelian philosophy and our conception, we never returned." The idealistic and evolutionary dialectics of Hegel were now turned upside down into the materialistic and revolutionary dialectics of Marx and Engels, and the Feuerbachian degradation of God was further developed into the Marxists' exaltation of man.

At this time (1844-1846) the two friends began to write and publish many works of a socio-philosophical nature. The most important of these are Engels' *Conditions of the Working Class in England* and their joint works, *The Holy Family*, directed against Marx's erstwhile friend Bruno Bauer, and *The German Ideology*, which latter, however, was not published until 1933,⁴² and hence did not influence Lenin. Just prior to this, in 1845, Marx had also written his rough and short *Theses on Feuerbach*, which were not circulated, however, until their posthumous publication by Engels in 1889, and several other early writings. These latter works included his anti-Semitic polemic *On the Jewish Question*, his *Moral Criticism and Critical Morality*, his *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, probably written between March and August of 1843⁴³ and his *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* of 1844, alias his "Paris Manuscripts" or "National Economy and Philosophy," which were first published only in 1932.⁴⁴ Although they hence had little direct effect on communism proper as previously canonized in Marxist Leninism, the *Manuscripts* are nevertheless very important as they reveal Marx's views in his initial productive stage.⁴⁵

D. *Marx and Engels: mature writings*

In 1845 Marx was expelled from France at the request of the Prussian government. Settling in Brussels, he helped to organize a *German Workers' Union* (none of the members of which were working men!). Two years later in 1847, he also wrote a blistering attack on Proudhon's *The Philosophy of Poverty*, which attacks Marx ironically and dialectically called *The Poverty of Philosophy*.

In London in November 1847, such groups as the above union joined a discussion and propaganda group known as the *International Communist League*, with Friedrich Engels as secretary, who, together with Schapper, drew up and signed its Rules and Constitution. And when Engels' pamphlet *Principles of Communism* (1847) was found to be too catechetical for propaganda purposes, Marx was asked to draft a dynamic statement of principles.⁴⁶ The statement, known as the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, was drawn up in German in January 1848 by Marx and Engels and first published in London one month later. It has ranked as the classic document of communism ever since.

Very shortly after this, Marx and Engels and others published their *Demands of the Communist Party of Germany*.⁴⁷ Then, on February 24, 1848, an unsuccessful revolution broke out in France, causing the Belgians, fearful of a similar revolution in their own land, to deport Karl Marx. Traveling to Paris, he participated in a second abortive insurrection there in June, appealing to the Germans to join the revolt. Going to Cologne in Germany, he pleaded for an anti-parliamentary bourgeois(!) uprising in his famous "Address of 1850" for the General Council of the then moribund International Communist League (which address was later praised by Lenin as a "magnificent and valuable mistake"⁴⁸ for the deceptive tactics therein employed).

Marx next ran a series of articles, later published as his *Wage, Labour and Capital*, in the *Rheinische Zeitung* from April 4th almost until its prohibition in May 1849. Then, while Engels soldiered in the Baden insurrection, Marx returned to Paris. Caught participat-

ing in a street demonstration on June 13th, Marx was banned by the authorities and went to settle permanently in London, where he studied and wrote books full-time for the rest of his life, and was only prevented from starving to death by the regular handouts of his generous friend the not so “petty bourgeois” factory owner Friedrich Engels.⁴⁹

In 1850 Marx also wrote the *Class-Struggles in France, 1848-50*, which included a valuable introduction written by Engels. Then, after the December coup d’etat in France in 1851, Marx immediately published an evaluation thereof in his *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. In the same year, Marx was appointed European correspondent (until 1862) of the New York *Herald Tribune*, a Fourierist American newspaper, in which, writing extensively on conditions in England and Europe, he revealed himself as violently pro-German and pro-Turkish, as well as anti-Slavic, anti-Russian and anti-Semitic. Then, during the ’fifties, Marx and Engels wrote much of a contemporary politico-historical nature. Marx’s *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany in 1848* and Engels’ *Germany: Revolution and Counter-Revolution, 1851-2* were soon followed by Marx’s *Revelations about the Cologne Communist Trial* of 1853, his articles on *India* for the *New York Times* from 1852-1859, and his *The Crimean War* of 1853-1856.⁵⁰

In 1859 the famous evolutionist Charles Darwin (1809-1882) published his classic work, *The Origin of Species*. This, coupled with the uniformitarian geology⁵¹ of Charles Lyell (1797-1875), gave Marx and Engels the “scientific” basis and ammunition with which to assail the “ideological”²⁵ fortress of the Christian world-view, and they gladly acknowledged their indebtedness to these two natural scientists.⁵³

In the same year, Marx wrote his first systematic work, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, the “Preface” of which is especially important for an understanding of his philosophy of historical materialism.⁵⁴ This work proved to be the forerunner of his *Capital*, his later and classic statement of his theory of economics.

In September, 1864, only three years after Czar Alexander II abolished serfdom in backward and semi-feudal Russia, French and

English trade unionists were already meeting freely in London to hold their congress of the *International Working Men's Association*. After being elected as one of the fifty-five members of the General Council of the I.W.M.A., with the respectable beginnings of which he had absolutely no connection,⁵⁵ Marx gave his famous "Inaugural Address." Thereby the I.W.M.A. unsuspectingly became the *First International* of the world communist movement,⁵⁶ and the next year (September 1865) Marx read the General International Congress his *Value, Price and Profit*.

In 1867, the first volume of Marx's monumental *Capital* was published. Although constructed on the old and outmoded labor theory of value⁵⁷ and other classical economic theories of George Adam Smith and David Ricardo, Marx's *Capital* will always remain an economic work of major importance. It is particularly valuable as a historical description of the appalling labor conditions of the European working classes of that time.⁵⁸

In 1869, Marx delivered his famous address: "The Relations between the Irish and English Working Classes," and in 1870 the first temporarily successful proletarian⁵⁹ revolution in an industrialized society, the "Paris Commune," was launched in that city under the insurrectionistic anarchist Louis Auguste Blanqui and the Proudhonists, and only crushed by violence after a seventy-day dictatorship of the proletariat. Thus did the ideas of Marx and Engels come to their first maturity.

E. *Lenin: the formative years*

In the same year, 1870, Vladimir Lenin, the son of a school inspector, was born in a middle-class family in the Russian town of Simbirsk⁶⁰ on the Volga; born in a non-proletarian, almost totally non-industrialized and backward country only nine years after its emergence from serfdom. Yet surprisingly, Marx's *Capital* was actually translated into Russian in 1868 even before it was translated into English; and Hegelian, Feuerbachian, and even Proudhonian ideas had already influenced the nihilistic⁶¹ Russian terrorist movement, the Narodniks, one of whose members, Lenin's elder brother,

was hanged for his part in a plot to murder the Czar. So with Russian Czarist oppression, Hegelian dialectics, Proudhonian socialism, and terroristic nihilism, the stage was already set for Lenin to avenge his brother's death, in spite of the backwardness of the pre-industrial Russian Empire. And Lenin would soon read his elder brother's books, including those written by Marx, and absorb them into his very being.⁶²

F. *Marx and Engels: later writings*

After the overthrow of the Paris Commune in 1870, Marx wrote his *Civil War in France*. Its great value lies in the light it sheds on the nineteenth-century Marxist view of post-revolutionary society; for Engels regarded the Paris Commune as a perfect example of the dictatorship of the proletariat⁶³ and Lenin too, though critical, gave it not inconsiderable appraisal.⁶⁴

Meanwhile, in 1875 the predominantly Marxist German Social Democrats and the predominantly Lassallean Workers' Union of Germany met at Gotha in Germany and, contrary to Marx's wishes, united as the German Social Democratic Party on the basis of what became known as the "Gotha Program." Marx's immediate reaction was to write his last important work, an eschatologically⁶⁵ orientated *Critique of the Gotha Program*, which critique has subsequently been acknowledged by both Lenin and Stalin as one of the most important documents in communist literature.⁶⁶

In the meantime Engels continued writing his own books, pamphlets, and tracts. Indeed, his most important and voluminous works were almost all written as soon as Marx's literary output ceased. Following on Engels' *The Housing Question* of 1872 and his *Social Relations in Russia* in 1874-1875, he applied himself to the study of dialectics. In 1878 he wrote a lengthy work against the German "bourgeois vulgar materialist"⁶⁷ Herr Dr. Eugen Dühring, expanded from polemical articles which appeared in the newspaper *Vorwärts* from 1876 onwards, which polemical articles he later published in 1880 under the title: *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*. The expanded version, however, later came to be known as *Anti-Dühring*

or *Mr. E. Dühring's 'Revolution in Science,'* about which Lenin later wrote: “. . . here are analyzed the most important questions in the domain of philosophy, natural science and social science . . . a wonderfully rich and instructive book.”⁶⁸

Continuing his study of dialectics, Engels wrote his very important *Dialectics of Nature* on and off from 1873-1886.⁶⁹ In this work he elaborated and illustrated the three dialectical laws of contradictory unity (thesis), transformation (antithesis), and negation (synthesis), which play such an important role in modern communist theory. This work also includes a self-explanatory article entitled “The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man,” the chief cornerstone of communist anthropology as far as its genesiology⁷⁰ is concerned. At this time Engels also wrote a pamphlet on *The British Labour Movement* (1881), and several pamphlets condemning Christianity,⁷¹ such as *Bruno Bauer and Early Christianity* (1882) and *The Book of Revelation* (1883). Thus did he avenge his childhood which, in his opinion, had been made so miserable by the Christian religion which his father had then inflicted on him.

On Marx's death in 1883, Engels gave his famous “Speech at the Graveside of Karl Marx,”⁷² after which he settled down to write his chief anthropological work, his evolutionistic: *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State*, completed in 1884.⁷³ Collating some of Marx's written papers, he published them in 1885 as the *Second Volume* of *Capital*. Then, in 1886, he published his own illuminating survey of early nineteenth-century European thought, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, in which he described the demise of (thetical) Hegelian idealism and (antithetical) “vulgar” materialism, and the rise of (synthetical) dialectical materialism,⁷⁴ and which work he, as its author, rather immodestly described as “the most detailed account of historical materialism which, as far as I know, exists.”⁷⁵ And in a subsequent edition of this work in 1889, he added Marx's thitherto unpublished *Theses on Feuerbach* (of 1845) as an appendix.

In the same year (1889), after the formation in Paris of the

Second International, which embraced many social philosophies,⁷⁶ Engels returned to England, where, on the occasion of his seventieth birthday in 1890, the General Council of the Communist Party conveyed to him the wish that he might live to see the proletariat enter the promised land of communism.⁷⁷ However, this was not to be. For after his republication of Marx's *Civil War in France*, with his own "Introduction" thereto in 1891, and after his compilation and publication of Marx's remaining economic manuscripts as the *Third Volume* of *Capital* in 1894, Engels died of cancer of the throat in the following year⁷⁸—one year after Lenin, whom he had never met, had himself become a communist.

G. *Lenin: the rise to power*

Although Lenin had been reading his hanged elder brother's Marxist books for some time and with a vengeance, it was only at the age of twenty-four in 1894, three years after his becoming a barrister, that he himself became a convinced historical materialist. This came about after reading the Russian Marxist Georgi Plekhanov's *Defence of Materialism* and after meeting Plekhanov during Lenin's journeys through Western Europe the following year. Returning to Russia as a zealous convert, Lenin lost no time in uniting Marxist groups there into a *League for the Emancipation of the Working Class*. This resulted in Lenin's organizing strikes the following year, 1896, culminating in his being exiled to Siberia until 1900.⁷⁹

The conditions of exile were extremely mild; however, they were ideal for study. For Lenin was able to spend much time during that period scrutinizing philosophy, particularly epistemology⁸⁰ and the Hegelian dialectic, which latter he later described as "that gem in the rubbish of Absolute Idealism."⁸¹ It was most opportune that Lenin then undertook those studies, for thus he was able to champion epistemological realism⁸² and to refute the "heretical" phenomenalism⁸³ of Ernst Mach and Richard Avenarius and the religionism⁸⁴ of Bogdanov and Lunarcharsky which had then begun to infect Russian Marxism. This refutation established Lenin as a recognized

Marxist leader, and was propounded in his chief philosophical work, a boring, repetitive, and unsystematic book called: *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*.

Returning to Russia from exile in 1900, the "Spark" or "Iskra Period" commenced, *Iskra* being a Marxist journal published by Lenin. Then he joined the previously founded *Russian Social Democratic Labour Party* (R.S.D.L.P.), which was then dominated by the politically bourgeois and economically trade unionistic "Economists"⁸⁵ on the one hand, and the Legal Marxists on the other. The latter faction Lenin supported until the breach with Martov (see below). But whereas the agrarian and terroristic Narodniks continued to operate outside the Party and on a diminishing scale, Lenin and the Legal Marxists were very Party-conscious and ever in the ascendancy.⁸⁶

After writing his important revolutionary pamphlet, *What must be done?* Lenin went to the *R.S.D.L.P. Congress* in Brussels the following year. When that Congress was later transferred to London, at the *Twenty-Second Session* Lenin split the Legal Marxists into two factions, the *Bolsheviks* or "majority group," which indeed secured a majority vote at Brussels, although they were substantially nearly always in the minority within the Party, particularly subsequently,⁸⁷ and the *Mensheviks*, the so-called "minority group." Lenin's faction, the *Bolsheviks*, wished to restrict party membership to a hard core of trusted cadres. They deviated from Marx by artificially accelerating the revolution by welcoming the non-proletarian peasants as allies and advocating revolt even before Russia had become proletarianized. Martov's group, the *Mensheviks*, although equally opportunistic, were, however, more orthodoxly Marxist and championed a wider party membership with less stringent discipline, coupled with a greater hesitation to shed blood. Trotsky took a third and more consequential position, being even more bloodthirsty and doctrinaire than Lenin and his *Bolsheviks*, opposing their opportunistic pro-peasant policies and stressing the necessity of revolutions in economically developed Western Europe; yet he equally vehemently rejected the *Menshevik* collaboration with the bourgeois.⁸⁸

Although Lenin fought them in his weekly paper *Zverda (Star)*, founded in 1910, and his daily paper *Pravda (Truth)*, founded in 1912, he nevertheless opportunistically co-operated with the Trotskyite and Martovite factions in an uneasy truce,⁸⁹ until he equally opportunistically seized power in 1917, the year in which he had just written his unfinished blueprint for the take-over called: *The State and Revolution*, a most important document on the eschatological and even semi-utopian⁹⁰ aspects of communism.

After his November 7th coup in 1917, which brought communism to power in Russia, Lenin emerged as the new head of state and found it expedient to reconcile himself with Trotsky, whom he then appointed as Chief of Police, and which latter lost no time in liquidating all the enemies (and even some friends) of the revolution. Yet when the 100% communist *Third International* or *Comintern* was established in 1919, which was subsequently abolished in 1943 and replaced by the *Cominform* in 1947, the control was more Russian-chauvinistic than Trotsky would have wished. Hence, after Stalin's seizure of power in the nineteen twenties and Trotsky's expulsion from Russia in 1929, Trotsky helped to organize the more truly international and doctrinaire⁹¹ *Fourth International*, until his murder in Mexico City at the hands of supposedly Stalinist agents in 1940, while working on Stalin's biography.⁹²

From 1905-1920, Lenin had been attacking Christianity mercilessly. Speeches from this period were later published in 1954 under the title of *On Religion*.⁹³ In 1920 Lenin published his totalitarian⁹⁴ brochure: "Left-Wing 'Communism'—an Infantile Disorder," a blistering attack against all brands of leftist socialism outside the control of the Communist Party of Russia and the Russian-controlled Comintern, and in 1922 he wrote an important philosophical article: "On the Significance of Militant Materialism," in which he insisted that party bias is desirable and even necessary in all epistemological matters.⁹⁵

Lenin finally died in 1924 as a result of a stroke, leaving behind him some unpublished *Philosophical Notes*, being excerpts from and comments on Hegel's *Logic*, *Philosophy of History*, and *History of*

Philosophy, on Feuerbach's *Leibniz*, on Lassalle's *Heraclitus*, and on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*,⁷⁷—apparently written between 1912-1916, but only published posthumously in 1929-1932. The *Philosophical Notes* often show distinct Hegelian tendencies, especially in that very important part of the *Notes* known as: "On Dialectics."⁹⁶ Throughout, the emphasis is on the Hegelian dialectic. For "without Hegel," wrote Lenin,⁹⁷ "Marx's *Capital* is unintelligible."

H. *Authority of the Marxist writings*

A final word is perhaps necessary as to the weight of actuality of the writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin.

Although the three thinkers have given different emphases to the various aspects of their system, Marx to sociology, Engels to natural science, and Lenin to revolutionary technique, and although all admitted that their insights were deepened with the passage of the years⁹⁸ and that their writings were not to be regarded as a fixed program but rather as a guide to practice and to action,⁹⁹ the views of the three men have nevertheless reached a tight synthesis in Bolshevik communism.

All three writers have been "canonized" as authoritative by the Comintern, Stalin, and Khrushchev.¹⁰⁰ Consequently, their views on philosophical problems are still regarded as authoritative by Russian, Chinese¹⁰¹ and all other Communist movements.

I. *Summary*

Summarizing, the following emphases may perhaps be distinguished in the development of the chief philosophical documents of communism:

- a. 1838-1847, Marx I and Engels I: Philosophical humanism (*The Holy Family*; *Paris Manuscripts*; *The German Ideology*; *Principles of Communism*);
- b. 1848-1858, Marx II and Engels II: Dialectical revolutionism (*Manifesto*; *Address of 1850*; *Class-Struggles in France*; etc.);
- c. 1859-1875, Marx III: Classical economics (*A Contribution to*

the Critique of Political Economy; Value, Price and Profit; Capital; etc.);

- d. 1872-1876, Marx IV and Engels III: Socialistic eschatology (*The Housing Question; Socialism: Utopian and Scientific; Critique of the Gotha Program; etc.);*
- e. 1877-1884, Engels IV: Natural science (*Anti-Dühring; Dialectics of Nature; The Origin of the Family; Private Property and the State; etc.);*
- f. 1885-1894, Engels V: Historical materialism (*Ludwig Feuerbach, etc; Engels' "Introductions" to Marx's Capital, Vols. II and III; etc.);*
- g. 1896-1900, Lenin I: Epistemological realism (*Materialism and Empirio-Criticism; etc.);*
- h. 1900-1912, Lenin II: Atheistic revolutionism (*On Religion; One Step Forward, Two Steps Back; What Must Be Done?; The State and Revolution; etc.);*
- i. 1912-1924, Lenin III: Dialectical Partisan Bias (*Left-Wing "Communism"—An Infantile Disorder; On the Significance of Militant Materialism; Philosophical Notes; On Dialectics).*

Yet these various emphases are certainly not watertight compartments and they clearly overlap with one another, both chronologically and otherwise. For the communist philosophy is an integrated and totalitarian world-view. It is the result of the combination of Hegelian dialectics with Darwinian evolutionism and with the materialistic atheism of Engels, as further socialized and economized by the historical materialism and humanistic idealism of Marx, and as further revolutionarily short-circuited by the dialectical if nihilistic opportunism of Lenin.

* * *

It is to a consideration of some of the views of Marx, Engels, and Lenin on the subject of the origin of all things to which we must now proceed. After this, we will be able to make our choice as to which party to support in the battle of communism versus creation.

II

COMMUNISM AND THE "ORIGIN" OF GOD

*"The fool hath said in his heart: 'There is no God'," wrote the Psalmist of old;¹ yet the Marxists boldly make this assertion. Wrote Lenin, ". . . every idea of every God . . . is an unspeakable abomination. . . ."*²

A. *Positivistic³ natural scientific methodology⁴*

According to Marx, Engels, and Lenin, hereinafter referred to collectively as "the Marxists,"⁵ the tremendous advances made by natural science during the last few centuries have completely outdated the old idealistic and especially the Christian world outlook.

According to Engels,⁶ for example, the scientific advances which, step by step, led to a total breach with the old conservative outlook, were: the astronomical hypotheses of Kant and Laplace, the rise of uniformitarian geology and palaeontology, the chemical analysis of organic matter, Grove's mechanical theory of heat, cellular biology, and evolutionism, the comparative element in anatomy and climatology and animal and plant geography, physical geography in general, morphology and embryology, and the assembling of the material in its interconnection. On the basis of all these theories Engels concluded positivistically that "the old teleology has gone to the devil. . . . God is nowhere treated worse than by natural scientists who believe in him. Materialists simply explain the *facts*. . . ."

From this citation, it is clear that Engels believed that he and others like him had understood the *facts* of natural science, and that these facts, clearly believed by Engels to be indisputable, had sent "the old teleology . . . [and its God] to the devil." For, as Engels

elsewhere asserted,⁷ “nowadays, in our evolutionary conception of the universe, there is absolutely no room for either a creator or a ruler.”

The implication of all this is clear. Natural science has indisputably disproved the very existence of God.

B. *Dogmatistical⁸ atheism*

On the basis of the facts of natural science, the Marxists unqualifiedly rejected the very existence of God. As Engels has stated,⁷ “in our evolutionary conception of the universe, there is absolutely no room for either a creator or a ruler,” for “the last vestige of a creator external to the world is obliterated”⁹ and “nothing is final, absolute, sacred.”¹⁰ Marx too would assure us that “man is the highest being for man,” and that “atheism is humanism mediated by the abolition of religion.”¹¹ And Lenin categorically affirmed that “beyond the ‘physical,’ beyond the external world . . . there can be nothing”;¹² whereas “God is primarily a complex of ideas which result from the overwhelming oppression of man through external nature and class slavery.”¹³

Belief in God is not only unscientific, however; it is also positively harmful. “We must fight religion,” wrote Lenin¹⁴ for “that is the Abc of the whole of materialism, and consequently also of Marxism.” “Marxism is materialism. As such it stands . . . unsparingly and hostilely opposed to religion. . . .” Marxism is “unqualifiedly atheistic and decidedly hostile to every religion,” he continued, adding that it is “a mark of servility to fideism,” to religious faith, to take the view that “religious opinion is a private affair,”¹⁵ for “every religious idea, every idea of every god, even every flirtation with a god, is an unspeakable abomination, . . . is the most dangerous abomination, the most repulsive ‘infection.’”¹⁶ The only possible justification of the idea of God in the eyes of Marxists was the use of His name as a profane term of abuse.¹⁷

C. *Origin of the Idea of God*

Lenin suggested in his campaign against the God-builders “that

the non-spatial and non-temporal beings which are invented by the clergy . . . are the products of a diseased mind . . .,"¹⁸ whereas Marx felt that "the omnipotence of God is nothing but the fantastic reflection of the impotence of people,"¹⁹ and Engels asserted that the Hegelian "absolute idea is nothing more than the fantastic survival of the belief in the existence of an extramundane creator."²⁰ Thus, according to Engels, "the Christian god is only a fantastic reflection, a mirror image of man," and "this god is, however, himself the product of a tedious process of abstraction, the concentrated quintessence of the numerous earlier tribal and national gods."²¹

Man therefore created God. But this necessarily presupposes the question as to who or what then created man.

D. *Self-creation and divinity of man*

Karl Marx, in referring to man, insisted that "a being . . . is only his own master when he owes his existence to himself," adding that "socialist man . . . has the evident and irrefutable proof of his self-creation, of his own origins."²² And Engels likewise maintained that man's "normal state is . . . one that has to be created by himself."²³ It is, however, not as an individual that man created himself, but rather as a social being. It is rather "from the moment that man (collectively) is able to produce things, . . . that he knows things-in-themselves";²⁴ and quite frankly, continued Engels and Lenin, "the Christian God, *if* he existed and created the world, could do no more."

E. *Critique of above*

The substance of all these Marxist arguments is, of course, based on certain unproven and unprovable dogmatistical assumptions.

Firstly, it is simply not true, as Engels suggested,⁶ that "materialists simply explain the facts," if he would hereby imply, as he obviously did, that non-materialists do not simply do this. For this raises the whole question as to *what* "facts" are, *who* establishes them, *which* facts are relevant and *when* the facts are observed.

What then are "facts"? The word "facts," derived from the Latin

facta, i.e., “things which have been made” (and nowadays generally signifying supposedly indisputably established scientific data), necessarily implies a *person* who has made such things, such facts, such data. This does not necessarily imply God as the maker of facts, though by definition only a perfect maker can make a perfect thing or fact; and if there is such a perfect maker, that person must be divine, must be God. From the Christian point of view, the point of view embraced by the writer in his evaluation of the Marxists, everything made by the personal and perfect God is indeed a perfect fact. But even at a sub-divine or human level, a “fact” still implies a person who has made that fact.

Again, from the Christian point of view, it is only if the “facts” made by a human person agree with the perfect facts made by the perfect (divine) Person, that those “facts” will be true facts. This can, from the Christian point of view, only be the case if the perfect (divine) Person guides the imperfect human person in the latter’s appraisal of the “facts.”

Marxists would not hold with Christianity that the human person who observes the “facts” is an imperfect sinner, but the Marxists would agree that the individual observer’s insight is *limited* and is in that sense imperfect. For even Engels²⁵ rejected the view that “a single philosopher should accomplish that which can only be accomplished by the entire human race in its progressive development,” stressing that “absolute truth” is unfortunately “unattainable along this path or by any single individual,” and that “one is always conscious of the necessary limitation of all acquired knowledge.”

However, once this is admitted, it necessarily follows, even from the Marxist standpoint, that the “materialists (who) simply explain the *facts*” are *limited* materialists. But if the materialistic fact-maker (who simply explains the *fact*!) that there is “absolutely no room for either a creator or a ruler”⁷) is *limited*, it necessarily follows that his facts must be limited too. For how can a limited investigator prove or disprove the existence of a by definition unlimited God without unlimited aid?

Here the materialist may object that if he and his facts are lim-

ited, the same applies to the Christian fact-collector too. This is undoubtedly true and acknowledged as true by the latter, but unlike the materialist, the Christian's point of reference as to what ultimately constitutes a true fact is not his own insight into reality, but God the perfect Person's determination of what really are true facts and the human investigator's harmony therewith by his acceptance of God's supranatural²⁶ revelation which yields him an acceptable explanation of the observed facts. But the naturalistic²⁷ materialist who denies God's supranatural revelation but yet admits his own human and individual limitations is, other things being equal, in a much less secure position epistemologically to establish what really are facts than is the Christian.

But apart from the above issue as to *who* (e.g., Christian or materialist) collects the facts, there is also the further problem as to *which* facts are collected (e.g., all available facts or only the facts of natural science). And here again the materialist is very selective as to his field. For Engels admittedly confined his fact-finding investigation largely to the field of natural science—*anatomy, climatology, embryology, etc.*⁷ Looking at logic, psychology, history, sociology, aesthetics, law, ethics, theology or philosophy with the limitations of the methodology of the natural sciences, Engels concluded that the facts (of *natural* science!) leave “absolutely no room for either a creator or a ruler.”⁸ And as Marx also remarked²⁸ “Science is not a real science unless it sets out from sense experience,” and “the economic conditions of production . . . can be *accurately substantiated in the manner of the natural sciences.*”²⁹

From the Christian viewpoint, the Creator is, of course, readily knowable in terms of the facts of faith as opposed to the facts of natural science. Certainly the Creator evidences Himself in the realm of the facts of natural science, but only proves Himself in the realm of faith, just as natural creations evidence themselves to the eye of faith, but only prove themselves to the eye of the natural scientist. It is a matter of gathering one's facts in all fields and gathering the relevant fact in the relevant field. It is just as absurd and unscientific to attempt to prove or disprove the existence of the non-material

God and the angels from the material facts of natural science as it is to attempt to prove or disprove the existence of the material cell and the atom or even the historical existence of Karl Marx or his writings from the non-material facts of theological science.

Here again the open Christian investigator, as opposed to the Christian pietist³⁰ who foolishly and deliberately ignores every realm except the theological and the ethical, is in a much better position to ascertain the true facts of polylateral reality than is the closed materialistic investigator who (like the pietist!) confines his fact-collecting to one or two fields only—in this case, the natural field.

Only by intensively investigating the multiple fields of reality and avoiding all false monisms³¹ by absolutizing one field at the expense of others, can the investigator approximate to a knowledge of facts as they really are. Only if this were fully done and God had not been found anywhere, could one logically conclude that *all* the facts leave “absolutely no room for either a creator or a ruler.”⁷ But long before this immense task were accomplished, God would certainly and necessarily be found and proven at least in the realm of theology and of faith, and thereafter, He would be evidenced to the eye of faith in the other fields too. Then it would indeed be found—though in a completely non-Marxist sense—that there would indeed be “absolutely no room for a creator” in all created reality, “seeing the heaven and heaven of heavens [which He created!] cannot contain Him.”³²

However, even from the superficial Marxist viewpoint the very denial of all non-material reality is but a non-material idea, and presupposes the reality and truth of at least this one idea and hence of an extra-material realm; and even Engels had to admit³³ that “natural scientists [who] believe that they free themselves from philosophy by ignoring it . . . are no less in bondage to philosophy.”

But not only is it important to determine *who* it is that collects the facts and *what* facts are collected, but also *when* the facts are collected. “Modern research into nature,” wrote Engels,³⁴ “dates, like all more recent history, from that mighty epoch which we Germans term the Reformation . . . in the latter half of the fifteenth

century. . . . The dictatorship of the Church over men's minds was shattered; it was directly cast off by the majority of the Germanic peoples, who adopted Protestantism, while among the Latins a cheerful spirit of free thought, taken over from the Arabs and nourished by the newly discovered Greek philosophy, took root more and more and prepared the way for the materialism of the eighteenth century. It was the greatest progressive revolution that mankind had so far experienced."

Undoubtedly the period from "the latter half of the fifteenth century" onwards indeed "prepared the way for the materialism of the eighteenth century," but to absolutize this materialistic trend to the exclusion of the Christian, rationalistic, humanistic or naturalistic motives as if it were the *only* real trend of this period, and to elevate it to the one and only principle of interpreting all ages of history at the expense of all other principles is, to say the least, methodologically and epistemologically short-sighted. It is simply not true to say, as Engels incorrectly does³⁵ under the influence of this materialistic trend, that "the real unity of the world consists in its materiality," for the real unity of the world rather consists in its *total* createdness, in both its spiritual and material createdness.

How much broader is the historical perspective of the Christian investigator who, anchored in the prehistorical and precreational counsel of God, and aware of the development of all things towards the pluriform harmony of the new world order, necessarily avoids such materialistic monism by taking account of all possible spiritual and material factors in their wide diversity in every age as a revelation of the manifold wisdom of God. For example, the Christian approach, while equally stressing the individual's economic role in society, also stresses the historical, ethical and aesthetic significance as equally important aspects of the individual in no wise subordinate to the socio-economic, whereas Marxism reduces all human individuals to materialistically evaluated labor units; for to the Marxist it is "a question of bringing the science of society, that is, the sum total of the so-called historical and philosophical sciences, into harmony with the materialist foundation, and of reconstructing it there-

upon,” as Engels himself declared.³⁶

The resultant dogmatistical atheism of the Marxists is another point which simply cannot stand. For whether God does or does not exist is a matter which cannot be categorically affirmed or denied without revelation, which the Marxists outrightly reject. And yet they quite unwarrantedly insist that God *cannot* exist.

Unable to establish a strong case for their dogmatistical atheism from their philosophy, the Marxists have largely *assumed* atheism to be a proven fact and deliberately avoided argumentation on this point. For example, to Lenin, every idea of transcendence is “a philosophy of the priest pure and simple,”³⁷ and to both Marx and Engels “the charges against communism made from a religious, a philosophical, and, generally, from an ideological standpoint, are not deserving of serious examination.”³⁸

This being so, it is not at all clear on what epistemological grounds revelation-rejecting Marxists who themselves admit³⁹ their own epistemological limitations could so categorically affirm that “there is *absolutely* no room for either a creator or a ruler”;⁷ that “the *last* vestige of a creator . . . is obliterated;” that “*nothing* is final, absolute, sacred”;¹⁰ that “man is the *highest* being for man”;¹¹ that “beyond the ‘physical’ . . . there *can* be nothing”;¹² that “God is primarily a complex of *ideas*” resulting from oppression.¹³ Whence did they derive their certainty for such assertive claims? The only ground for these categorical affirmations would seem to be their own self-confessed limited understanding of the theories of only one (i.e., the materialistic) school of natural science to the exclusion of all other human or divine ideas.⁴⁰

Again, it seems strange that the Marxists with their uncritical atheism and their desire to avoid all philosophical argumentation on this point have nevertheless by no means avoided trying to discredit theism by their own sweeping claims and indeed also by trying to ridicule their opponents and even God Himself. If, as the Marxists claimed, there is no God, why did they then bother to blaspheme¹⁷ such a non-entity? Can it be that this blasphemy is born of their frustration at being unable to overcome the tension between their actual created-

ness and their vehement denial thereof? If this non-existent God is, as Lenin maintained,¹⁶ an “unspeakable abomination,” why was His name quite capable of being spoken by the Marxists? And how can that which is non-existent be an abomination? Again, if there is no God, He would be no danger to the Marxists. Why then was it necessary for the Marxists to be “unqualifiedly atheistic?” Why then was Lenin in particular so “decidedly hostile,”¹⁵ so reactionary, towards that which he denied has ontical existence?

Moreover, the statement of Lenin¹⁸ that God and other spiritual beings are the products of the diseased minds of the clergy is quite obviously untrue, for the very existence of the clergy, diseased in mind though some of them may be, presupposes the existence of the laity’s consciousness of and need for such non-spatial and non-temporal beings, irrespective of the latter’s ontical⁴¹ existence or not. If the laity did not believe this, they would hardly follow the clergy in the first place. So whatever the origin or existence of such beings, it could not have been the clergy which invented them. Even on the Marxist hypothesis of historical materialism, the clergy could be nothing more than the superstructural reflection of an existing infrastructural and widespread need.⁴²

Rather more profound than Lenin’s theory on this point is that of Marx that “the omnipotence of God is nothing but the fantastic reflections of the impotence of people,”¹⁹ and that of Engels that the (Hegelian) “absolute idea is nothing more than the fantastic survival of the belief in the existence of an extramundane creator.”²⁰ Apart from the word “fantastic,” the Christian philosopher would largely agree with these statements, at least in the sense that all ideas of God or gods or idols, however warped, ultimately rest upon a factual basis of true divine revelation which certainly presupposes a degree of human impotence.⁴³

Less profound, however, is the contention of Engels that “the Christian god is only a fantastic reflection, a mirror image of man,” and that “this god is, however, himself the product of a tedious process of abstraction, the concentrated quintessence of the numerous earlier tribal gods.”²¹ Certainly there *is* a reflection between God and man,

but it is God Who is the Source of the light and man who is His reflection. For man is God's image⁴⁴ and therefore reflects something of His glory. Hence man reflects God, and not vice-versa; it is Engels, not the Bible or even Hegel, that is here "standing upon his head."⁴⁵ However, the other statement implying the abstraction of monotheism from an earlier polytheism, though widespread in the nineteenth century, is not only unbiblical, but also illogical. For such a view cannot satisfactorily explain the parallels in all the various religions of the world between the essence of phenomena like faith, prayer, sacrifice, supranaturalism, immortality, the priesthood, holy days, god(s), etc. Even viewed impartially as mere phenomena, all these institutions point to a common historical origin in the remote past rather than to a later, and if so, a still unconsummated!, monotheistic quintessence. No, the "tedious process of abstraction" is from proto-monotheism to later (*isolated*) tribal polytheism, not vice-versa.⁴⁶

This simple truth, at least as regards the later development of tribal faiths, was almost stumbled upon by Marx where he wrote⁴⁷ that " 'spectres,' 'bonds,' 'the higher being' " are "the conceptions apparently of the *isolated* individual." Hence "once the essence of man and Nature . . . has become evident in practical life, in sense experience, the search for an *alien* being, a being outside man and Nature (a search which is an avowal of the unreality of man and Nature) becomes impossible in practice."⁴⁸ This is indeed the experience of the Christian philosopher, who, saved from the tension between man and Nature when he previously worshiped an idolatrous alien being, when he previously absolutized and served some or other created being (e.g., himself, his wife, money, sex, a graven image, etc.) instead of The Being (God) Who created them all, now experiences the perfect Christian synthesis between the essence of man and nature in man as the product⁴⁹ but yet as the lord of nature⁵⁰ and the very terrestrial viceroy of God⁵¹—a synthesis which the Marxists have not been able to achieve on account of their denial of the God of the essence of man and nature in Whom even they (albeit unwillingly) must necessarily live and move and have their very being.⁵² Thus,

not the Marxist, but the Christian it is to whom the essence of man and nature has become evident in practical life.

Apart from the question as to the origin of the idea of God, however, there arises the related problem as to who created man. For even if "communism begins where atheism begins," as Karl Marx wrote,²² "atheism is at the outset still far from being communism . . . a being . . . is only his own master when he owes his existence to himself . . . [and] . . . socialist man . . . has the evident and irrefutable proof of his self-creation, of his own origins." Similarly, Engels informed us²³ that man's "normal state is . . . *one that has to be created by himself.*" But this is too vague. For if individual man is even now limited as the Marxists admit,²⁵ and if he really did evolve from something even more limited,⁵³ he could hardly then have created himself, or even have *altered* and improved himself from what he was. For the cause must be at least as great as the effect.

Even the attempt to promote collective or *social* man to the role of self-creator is inadequate. Engels and Lenin have both argued²⁴ that "from the moment that man [collectively] is able to produce things, . . . he knows things-in-themselves," adding that "the Christian God, if he existed and created the world, could do no more." This explanation too is inadequate, because it implies that human or divine omniscience is only achieved "from the *moment*[!] that man [or God] is *able*[!] to produce things," and because it further implies that there was no omniscience before that moment, and that non-human or non-God thus became human or God only at a certain moment. But this objection does not hold against Christian philosophy, because creation merely implies a temporal externalization and objectification of the divine counsel eternally produced and comprehended in the mind of the unchangeable God.⁵⁴

The Marxists' vagueness as to the precise nature of man's divine self-creation, coupled with their awareness of individual man's limitations,²⁵ inevitably leads to their unconscious devotion to socialized mankind on the one hand and to nature on the other, leading to a humanistic naturalism or naturalistic humanism. As Marx

remarked,⁵⁵ “. . . *society* is the accomplished union of man with Nature, the veritable resurrection of Nature, the realized naturalism of man and the realized humanism of Nature . . . the *essence* of man and of Nature, man as a natural being and Nature as a human reality. . . .”

Yet all this Marxist naturalistic humanism and humanistic naturalism sounds suspiciously like a mild form of pantheism,⁵⁶ which is indeed only one step removed from atheism. The Marxists initially insisted that “to talk of a Supreme Being shut *out* from the whole existing world, implies a contradiction in terms.”⁵⁷ But now their refusal to recognize the Supreme Being *apart* from the natural world has ironically led to their elevation of the natural world (and man as the acme of nature) to the position of the Supreme Being. From denying the Creator’s transcendence⁵⁸ they have ricocheted into stressing the creature’s immanence⁵⁹ and indeed, in a certain sense, even its transcendence. So that Lenin has written⁶⁰ that “we may regard the material and cosmic world as the supreme being, as the cause of all causes, as the creator of heaven and earth.”

So nature is consequently deified. “. . . nature is infinite,” declared Lenin,⁶¹ “it *exists* infinitely. . . .” To which Marx would add⁶² “. . . the absolute *idea* is nothing in itself, . . . only Nature *is* something.” And this “Nature” is apparently even credited with the power of life and death. For, in anticipation of the outbreak of world revolution, the aged Marx wrote to Engels in 1877:⁶³ “If Mother Nature is not particularly unfavourable towards us, we shall still live to see the fun.”

Marx himself was thus fully aware of man’s propensity for worshipping (false) gods. Particularly was this the case in respect of the Jew. For Marx insisted⁶⁴ that “money is the jealous God of Israel; the bill of exchange is the real god of the Jew.” And “the *divine power* of money [“to bring about fraternization of incompatibles”] resides in its *essence* as the alienated and exteriorized social life of men.”⁶⁵ Of this Marx was conscious. Perhaps he was not equally conscious of his own implicit faith in the divine power of the determinative principles of dialectical and historical materialism and

of Engels' loose way of affirming what he regarded as "eternal truths."⁶⁶

Engels, though acutely aware⁶⁷ (as was Lenin⁶⁸) that Dühring's mechanical materialism must necessarily lead to the recognition of a God transcendent of nature, was not altogether able to prevent himself from highly exalting his friend Karl Marx. "Marx stood higher," wrote Engels,⁶⁹ "than the rest of us, Marx was a genius." When Marx died, Engels⁷⁰ said that: "mankind is shorter by a head, and the greatest head of our time at that." "The greatest mind in our Party had ceased to think, the strongest heart that I have ever known had ceased to beat."⁷¹ Even then Engels "could not fully realize that this brilliant mind has ceased to impregnate the proletarian movement of both worlds with its mighty thoughts. We owe all that we are [*sic!*] to him; and the movement as it is today is the creation[*sic!*] of his theoretical and practical thought."⁷² Marx's death was an "immeasurable [!] loss,"⁷³ and at his graveside Engels solemnly pronounced that "his name shall live forth through the centuries and so too his work."⁷⁴

So Marxism degenerated into the deification of man. From the Christian point of view, this outcome was inevitable. As previously with Muhammad, so too with Marx. From the denial of the deity of the Sinless man, it is but one step to the deification of the man of sin;⁷⁵ from the dethronement of God, just one pace to the exaltation of man. As Marx remarked:⁷⁶ "Philosophy makes no secret of it. Prometheus's admission: 'In sooth, all gods I hate' is its own admission, its own motto against all gods, heavenly and earthly, who do not acknowledge the consciousness of man as the supreme divinity. There must be no god on a level with it." There is one God—Mankind, and Karl Marx is His Prophet. And indeed, his writings have certainly been "canonized" by his followers as inspired and authoritative scriptures.

F. Summary

Summarizing the above, it was seen that the dogmatistical atheism of the Marxists, supposedly based on the "*facts*" of natural science

[only!], is unsatisfactory on account of the unnecessary and voluntary Marxist limitations imposed on the collection of such facts: (a) by denying the admittedly limited human person the help of the perfect divine Person in understanding the facts; (b) by limiting the terrain where the facts are to be collected solely to the natural scientific field or by interpreting all non-natural scientific data in terms of positivistic natural scientific methodology; and (c) by collecting such facts almost entirely from one historical era alone.

Devoid of strong philosophical argument, the Marxists have sought to ignore, ridicule and blaspheme the existence of God. Without adequate epistemological reasons, the Marxists have vehemently and dogmatically asserted that God *cannot* exist. Not distinguishing clearly between the religion(s) of man on the one hand and the existence of God on the other, the Marxists have variously and contradictorily attributed the origin of the idea of God to the diseased minds of the clergy, to the reflection of human impotence, to the quintessence of numerous tribal gods, and to the isolation of the individual from his fellow man and from nature, none of which explanations was found to hold water.

Irrespective of God's existence, the contingent issue of man's "creator" was even more unsatisfactorily explained by the Marxists. For it was seen that neither individual nor collective man could ever have created himself as the Marxists assert that he did; and that these their assertions only led to a form of naturalistic humanism with distinct overtones of pantheistic nature worship and assumption of eternal truths, and ultimately even to the deification of man, the exaltation of Marx, and a canonization of all the Marxist scriptures.

The Marxists have not delved critically or deeply enough to discover the true God, but by faith alone, with the simple gullibility of an infant,⁷⁷ they have indeed made a false god in their own imperfect image by absolutizing their limited positivistic epistemology.

G. *Christian view of God*

Our Christian philosophical outlook is in radical contradistinction

to Marxism on all these points relating to the latter's doctrine of God. Over against the Marxists' apriori,⁷⁸ their positivistic naturalism which would dogmatically leave "absolutely no room for either a creator or a ruler," Christians experientially admit the obvious impossibility of humanity knowing the supra-human God except by God's intelligible revelation to humanity and humanity's recognition thereof as such. This communicative revelation was given in the Word of God made book about the Word of God made flesh, both necessarily incarnated in human form to enable humanity to understand them.

To the dogmatistical and "scientific" atheism of Marxism, Christian philosophy opposes its pre-dogmatic and pre-scientific⁷⁹ theism; to the Marxists' human theory that man invented the idea of God, Christian philosophy opposes the divinely revealed truth that God created man; the Marxist theory of human self-creation is to be challenged by the Christian fact of the divine creation of man; Marx's view of "the consciousness of man" as the "supreme divinity" is to be rejected in favor of the unique divinity of God irrespective of the consciousness of man; and of the Marxist scriptures of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are to be opposed by the Christian Scriptures of the Lord of all the centuries.

For all these reasons we regard the teachings of Christianity as a much more satisfactory account of the being or non-being of God than the teachings of Marxism.

* * *

Communism versus creation. Is there really a God? The Marxists deny Him, but the importance to be attached to their denial reminds one of what Engels⁸⁰ wrote to Schmidt in 1895: ". . . in 1843, I saw the eggs of the duck-bill [platypus] in Manchester, and with arrogant narrow-mindedness mocked at such stupidity—as if a mammal could lay eggs—and now it has been proved!"

And how is God to be proved? To quote Engels once again: "The proof of the pudding is in the eating."⁸¹ The Marxists were just not hungry.

III

COMMUNISM AND THE ORIGIN OF MATTER

“. . . [the] things which are seen were not made of things which do appear,” wrote the writer of the *Epistle to the Hebrews*,¹ thus clearly indicating that visible matter did not appear from other visible matter, as the Marxists so incorrectly maintain: for if there really is no God and no kind of spiritual reality whatsoever, it is evident that all reality must be non-spiritual or material; that is to say, all must be matter.

A. *Nature of matter*

With reference to the *nature* of matter, Engels wrote² that “the materialist world outlook is simply the conception of nature as it *is*. . . .” And as materialists, it is materiality that the Marxists point to as the vantage point or principle of unity of being, of that which is, “of nature as it is.” For as Engels declared: “The real unity of the world consists in its *materiality*, and this is proved . . . by a long and protracted development of philosophy and natural science.”³

B. *Vulgar materialism*

Even though confining their observations only to *natural* science, the Marxists were well aware, however, that any theory of “static materiality” would only open the door to theism. For they not only observed materiality, but also motion everywhere. And to separate matter from motion, while seeking cosmic unity only in the material, as the “vulgar materialists” Blücher, Molenschott, and

Dühring had done with their “mechanical materialism,” would only and inevitably lead to the presupposition of an external God as the Prime Mover.⁴ Hence, they sought to combine matter and motion in “Dialectical Materialism.”

C. *Definition of matter as autodynamic*⁵

This “vulgar materialism” which separated matter from motion was accordingly opposed by autodynamic or “dialectical materialism” which denied that the two can be separated from one another. All matter is autodynamic, that is to say, it moves by itself, by virtue of energy inherently present within itself, without any impulse from any extra-material reality. As Engels formulated it in his brilliant dictum:⁶ “Motion is the mode of the existence of matter. . . . Matter without motion is just as unthinkable as motion without matter.”

Now matter is always in motion precisely because it is necessarily subject to certain contradictory dialectical laws. As Engels remarked: “Motion itself is a contradiction: even simple mechanical change of place can only come about through a body at the same moment of time being both in one place and another place, being in one same place and also not in it.”⁷

D. *Dialectical laws of matter*

The contradiction in all material or motive reality as observed by the Marxists is claimed to be of a dialectical nature and can be formulated in terms of four⁸ basic laws, which Marxists claim permeate and predetermine all being, viz., the universe,⁹ nature,¹⁰ mathematics,¹¹ logic,¹² science,¹³ revolution,¹⁴ society, and even ideas,¹⁵ etc.

The first dialectical law of matter in motion is that of unity of contradictory opposites. This was already touched upon above⁷ in Engels’ statement that motion (which, it will be remembered, is regarded as inseparable from all matter) was a contradiction, in that it implied that the said matter in motion must simultaneously be in more than one place. And this view is echoed by Lenin’s pro-

nouncement that: "Motion is a contradiction, a union of contradictions."¹⁶

This dialectical law is extended by Engels¹⁷ to life as such (which he maintains contains the seeds of death). He also employs it to explain the "absurd contradiction and real absurdity" of "the square root of minus one." The same "law" is tersely stated by Lenin¹⁸ as "the theory of how *opposites* can be and commonly are *identical* (how they become so)."

The second dialectical law of matter in motion is that of transformation from quantity to quality. ". . . in Nature," argued Engels,¹⁹ "qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or quantitative subtraction of matter or motion. . . ."

Engels illustrated this law particularly from the realm of chemistry,²⁰ with examples from the boiling-point and freezing-point of water and the hydrocarbon series. ". . . the state of water," he wrote,²¹ "changes at 0°C from the liquid into the solid state, and at 100°C from the liquid into the gaseous state, so that at both these turning points the merely quantitative change of temperature brings about a qualitative change in the condition of the water." And speaking of hydrocarbons, he declared that: "Each new member of . . . [the] series comes into existence through the addition of CH₂, one atom of carbon and two atoms of hydrogen, to the molecular formula of the preceding member; this quantitative change in molecular composition produces at each step a qualitatively different body."

The third dialectical law of matter in motion is that of the negation of the negation, and is best illustrated by examples cited by Engels: "Let us take a grain of barley . . . it germinates; the grain as such ceases to exist, it is negated, and in its place appears the plant which has arisen from it, the negation of the grain. . . . But . . . as soon as these have ripened the stalk dies, is in its turn negated." Another of his examples is that of butterflies, which "spring from the egg through a negation of the egg; they pass through certain transformations until they reach sexual maturity, they pair and in turn are negated, dying. . . ."²²

This law is also illustratively applied by the Marxists to the realms of mathematics and logic, geology, history, and philosophy.²³ In the field of history the law is applied to paint the standard picture of historical materialism as seen by the Marxists: "All civilized peoples begin with the common ownership of the land. With all peoples who have passed a certain primitive stage, in the course of the development of agriculture this common ownership becomes a fetter on production. It is abolished, negated and . . . transformed into private property. But at a higher stage . . . the demand that it also should be negated, that it should once again be transformed into common property, necessarily arises."²³

A fourth dialectical law of matter in motion, the law of upward movement, is sometimes added, which is actually a consequence of the third. Wrote Engels, ". . . if we take an ornamental plant which can be modified in cultivation, for example, a dahlia or an orchid: if we treat the seed and the plant which grows from it as a gardener does, we get as the result of this negation of the negation not only more seeds, but also qualitatively *better* seeds, which produce more beautiful flowers." Or from the field of mathematics: "Let us take any algebraical magnitude whatever: for example, a . If this is negated, we get $-a$ (minus a). If we negate that negation by multiplying $-a$ by $-a$, we get a^2 , i.e., the original positive magnitude, but at a higher degree."²⁴

E. *Critique of above*

First of all, when Engels remarks² that "the materialist world outlook is simply the concept of nature as it is," we must immediately ask him: but how "*is*" nature? When Marxists deny the very possibility of the existence of "a Supreme Being shut out *from* the whole existing world,"²⁵ it is clear that they regard all being as confined *to* the existing world or cosmos (i.e., to the whole existing material universe and not only to our earth), and that they also regard each part of the universe as on the same level of being with all the other parts by denying any part of being a "supreme" position over against others. And with this denial of the independent Supreme Being,

Marxists necessarily proclaim the independence of what from the Christian viewpoint is only dependent created being, thus absolutizing the relative and deifying the universe, and thus distorting the relation of the cosmos' unity to its diversity.

From the Christian viewpoint the true unity of the very diverse parts of the cosmos lies in its createdness, which embraces the whole of God's superintendence from the cosmos' genesis to its consummation. But the Marxists' denial of this createdness destroys their understanding of true cosmic unity, and leads them to search for a vantage point from which to unite the cosmos by absolutizing a relative common denominator *of such phenomena as they have managed to observe*, as opposed to all other aspects of reality of which they and others like them are ignorant. And this they do by absolutizing the *material* denominator.

Moreover, Engels' statement that "motion is the mode of the existence of matter"⁶ hardly overcomes the difficulty involved in the Marxists' materialistic monism. Even if it were true that matter is always in motion and that motion always involves matter (which it is not²⁶), this would hardly prove Marxist autodynamism, but only disprove anti-Christian deism.²⁷ For such perpetual motion of matter may just as easily be attributed to the inworking of an external other force, whether a Supreme or merely non-supreme, non-material force, as it may be to matter itself. And seeing that Marxists themselves admit that motion is transferable from one particle of matter to another,²⁸ it is not clear why motion should not be equally transferable from non-material being to material being.

The Marxists seem to accept the Cartesian²⁹ theory of matter in motion without question, otherwise it is not clear why they should maintain that specifically "*motion is the mode of existence of matter.*" For matter exists in time and space just as much as it does in motion. As Engels remarks, ". . . the basic forms of all beings are space and time, and existence out of time is just as gross an absurdity as existence out of space."³⁰ But if this is so, it is not clear why specifically *motion* should be autodynamically connected with matter, rather than time autotemporally and space autospatially unless, of

course, this represents a conscious or unconscious attempt to eliminate the Supreme Being of Christianity Who necessarily exists in motion.

Accepting, however, for argument's sake, the Marxists' theses that "the real unity of the world consists in its materiality"⁴ and that "motion is the mode of the existence of matter," one must next enquire of the Marxists: "But what *is* matter?" Even in Engels' day the problem of the epistemological interpretation of ontical matter was vaguely realized where he wrote: "Being, indeed, is always an open question beyond the point where our sphere of observation ends. The real unity of the world consists in its materiality. . . ."³¹ But the determination of what really is material had become far more problematic in Lenin's day as a result of new discoveries and theories in the field of natural science, particularly in the thermonuclear field, which led to the concepts of the "unity of matter" and the "disappearance of matter."³² This persuaded Lenin to describe "the sole 'property' of matter" as "the property of being *objective reality*, of existing outside of our cognition."

Of course, from this point of view, the Marxists are no longer materialists but, like many theistic philosophers, realists. For the latter would be the first to make peace with the materialists if materialism *only* involved the acceptance of the ontical existence of extra-cognitive objective reality. On this basis, God, the angels, the immortality of the soul, etc., are all objective reality existing outside and independent of our cognition. Yet the Marxists' denial of the existence of such non-material objective reality only highlights their own vagueness as to what in fact is material and as to the true nature of the wide difference between the real and the material, the material in fact being only one possible species of the genus of reality.

However, even on the Marxist premises, whatever matter may be, there is a basic tension, if not a dualism, between matter and motion, inseparable though they are claimed to be. As Engels maintained: "Motion itself is a contradiction: even simple mechanical change of place can only come about through a body at the same moment of

time being both in one place and another place, being in one same place and also not in it.”⁷

Now by “contradiction” the Marxists do not mean the Hegelian dialectical evolutionary unfolding and preservation of the absolute at a higher level of being via thesis and antithesis and then into a true synthesis of the two, but the dialectical revolutionary leaps from thesis to antithesis and the former’s annihilation rather than a true synthesis between the two. Hence from a Christian philosophical viewpoint, which accepts the perfect pluriformity within the created cosmos and rejects all false monisms, it is just as unclear why motion should be “a contradiction” as it is why all objective reality should necessarily be material. But it is equally clear to the Christian philosopher that contradictions must necessarily arise if one attempts to subsume all reality under a relative denominator such as an exclusively material one, as the Marxists do.

As regards the “law of unity of contradictory opposites,” it is not at all clear why the elements Engels mentioned in his examples should be called *contradictory* (a logical, not a natural scientific term), or even “opposites.” A moving piece of matter does not necessarily move from one place to its *opposite* place, for it may hardly be established which of all the possible directions it may take is the “opposite,” still less which is the “contradictory” direction. Again, death is not the opposite of life, but the absence thereof. And mathematically, the square root of minus one, however absurd, is hardly contradictory, for if it *contradicts* anything, it hardly does so more than the square root of minus two does, and it is also quite unclear what *opposites* it is supposed to unify.³³

A second objection to this law would not be against its principle of “contradiction,” but against its *unity*.³⁴ If by unity is meant the unity of all created being, then of course there is unity even between those phenomena which man considers “opposites.” But it is clear that it is not *such* unity that is intended by the Marxists; for if it was, the law would have dealt not with the *unity* of opposites, but rather with the *materiality* of opposites, i.e., with the Marxist materialistic attempt to reach unity. No, by unity is intended here an

identification of opposite tendencies; a unity, however, which nowhere exists in practice. For the moving matter is never simultaneously in two identical places, it has always *left* its old place before it arrives at its new place, irrespective of how close the two places are to one another. And even a dying man, however far gone, is always very much alive until the actual moment when death *arrives*, however difficult it may be to pinpoint. Indeed, one would have thought Marxism required a sudden and dialectic *leap*³⁵ from one place to another and from life to death.

A third objection must surely be the shortsightedness and superficiality of the observations which led Marxists to their formulation of this law. Clearly it does service to explain the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat within the unity of capitalistic society, but it may be inquired what becomes of this law when applied to the lack of the class struggle claimed under communism. For if the law *then* no longer applies, or no longer functions in the same way, it was never truly a *cosmic* law at all.

A final objection must be brought against Lenin's view that "motion is a contradiction, a union of contradictions,"¹⁶ especially when it is realized that the contradiction is not the Hegelian explication of what is implicit in the premises. If *autodynamic* motion is only the union, it must be non-autodynamic movement which brings about this union, and thus there is no escape from the Prime Mover of theism. Again, if the universe really is *eternal*, as the Marxists maintain, its "contradictions" should long ago have been united in motion or by motion, which is even now not yet the case. Conversely, if *autodynamic* motion exists *before* the union of the contradictory principles, Lenin fails to give a comprehensive enough definition of motion because he restricts it to the union stage. Again, if capitalism is to be *destroyed* by its proletarian contradiction, there is no *union*, and hence there should be no matter or motion in communist society, which is absurd. And because this is absurd, this first dialectical law cannot be true.

From the Christian philosophical viewpoint there can be no unity of contradictions. Any apparent contradiction is always the

result of sin twisting the world's harmony and man's understanding. But sin is not eternal, and does not affect the *essence* of either the universe or man, as does the first dialectical law of the Marxists.³⁶

With reference to the second "law of transformation from quantity to quality," it must be objected that very little has been proved by this law other than that chemistry is governed by inflexible laws. With this the Christian philosopher surely has no quarrel.³⁷ But the examples presented by Engels surely do not establish that quantitative additions or subtractions have altered the qualitative essence of the examples. The ice and steam still consist of qualitatively the same molecules, and they are qualitatively just as much H₂O as was the water. The hydrocarbon compounds, while chemically qualitatively quite distinct from one another, are not formed from one another by a mere addition or subtraction of certain atoms or molecules, but by distinct chemical processes governed by distinct chemical laws *qualitatively* different from mere quantitative addition or subtraction of atoms. The various compounds evidence no more than a wonderfully symmetrical design as regards their chemical formulae when arranged in series and, if this evidences anything, it evidences an intelligent Designer.

A second objection must surely be that the examples from chemistry^{20f.} which led Engels to formulate this law, even if they were germane to that field, could hardly warrant that law's summary application in the enormously more complicated fields of the humanitarian sciences in general and the social sciences in particular. Yet this is precisely what Marx³⁸ and Lenin³⁹ did. There is a vast difference between the behavior of lifeless chemicals and living protoplasm, between the latter and the higher animals and finally between animals and man. But seeing the Marxists have not hesitated to apply their positivistic principles of natural science to evaluate God, as seen above,⁴⁰ it is hardly surprising that they do not hesitate to do the same in respect to an infinitely lesser being, man. Once again, the Marxist monistic attempt to subsume all phenomena under the absolutized materialistic denominator of one observed relative category has distorted the truly pluriform nature of created being.

It must be objected with regard to the dialectical “law of the negation of the negation” that it is not clear why this law should be called that of “negation.” For in the first example above,²² the grain of barley and later the stalk are hardly negated. Not all barley seeds germinate, in fact, far more seeds, fish eggs, acorns, etc., are produced than ever germinate. And this very fact “negates” the universal applicability of the Marxist law of the negation of the negation. Again, the butterflies are not “negated” *because* they reproduce, but only *after* they reproduce. Hence the Marxists are here employing the false rule: *post hoc, ergo propter hoc* (after this, therefore on account of this); and when the law is applied to human reproduction, it completely fails. For human reproduction bears no relation whatsoever to self-negation; if any thing, it implies self-affirmation and self-expression. Millions of humans never reproduce, and they may variously either outlive *or* predecease their reproducing fellow human beings. Lenin may be partially correct that “oats grow according to Hegel.”⁴¹ Oats may, but human beings do not.

Hence, a second objection must be levelled against the application of this “biological law” to human societies. If amongst civilized peoples common land ownership has been “negated” by private enterprise and that again by communistic ownership, it must follow that backward communistic Albania is more “civilized,” is at “a higher stage,” than is the capitalistic United States of America! But still more, not only are all the Marxist stages—primitive communism, slavery, feudalism, capitalism and socialism—now found co-existing in this same world today, but some of them are sometimes found together in the same country, e.g., slavery and capitalism in Saudi-Arabia; slavery and socialism in Tibet; “primitive communism” (amongst the Bushmen) and capitalism in South Africa; feudalism and primitive communism (the *obshchina*) in pre-Soviet Russia, etc. Clearly, many “negations” have not yet been “negated,” even though the “negation of the negation” often co-exists side by side with the initial “negation.”

A third objection—going back to the realm of nature [for, as

Engels claims, “nature is the test of dialectics”⁴²—is that even the living grain of barley does not really negate itself in dying and in producing a living plant. The living grain is not negated, for then it would be a non-living grain, and from a non-living grain no living plant could ever be produced. The living principle in the germinating seed is the same as that in the later germinated plant. There is living continuity. Only the outward form is changed. A barley seed will always produce a barley plant “according to its kind.”⁴³

A final objection, which utterly shatters this third Marxist law of matter in motion, is made by Engels himself: “I must therefore so construct the first negation that the second remains or becomes possible. In what way? This depends upon the particular nature of each individual case. . . . Each class of things therefore has its appropriate form of being negated in such a way that it gives rise to a development.”⁴⁴ This is a tremendous admission. For it is a recognition of the fact that the dialectical law cannot be made workable without a *Marxist* selection of the phenomena to which it is to be applied. It also unwillingly admits the unworkability of Marxist materialistic monism in the confession that the law “depends upon the particular nature of each individual case,” and thus unwittingly admits the pluriform nature of material reality.

The “law of upward movement,” of course, is particularly used to illustrate socialism as a negation of capitalism, and communism as a higher and better brand of socialism. But, like all the other dialectical laws, it cannot stand. Taking Engels’ examples,²⁴ merely leave the ornamental plant to nature without the (*supranatural*) gardener—remembering with Engels that “*nature* is the test of dialectics”⁴²—and we find it returning to its previous basic stock. And as for *-a*—if such a quantity can at all be regarded as “natural”—if it is increased by addition instead of by multiplication, the value of the law becomes problematical. Again, it is questionable whether *-a* can seriously be posited as the negation of *a* or *a*² as the negation of (the negation) *-a*. As Engels stated: “I must therefore so construct the first negation that the second remains . . . possible.”⁴⁴ Engels has negated objective nature in order to formulate very se-

lectively his law of the negation of the negation. But when verified, the not to be negated nature only negates Engels' negative law.

Moreover, that matter always tends to develop upwards in the long run is not observably true. For in spite of technological progress, there is also the fall of civilizations such as Rome, the Aztecs, the British Empire, etc. Again, it is doubtful whether—without divine revelation⁴⁵—it can be proved that the long-range moral graph is upward bound, that man's overall direction is upward, that living standards everywhere are permanently improving. The Marxists' very rejection of a supratemporal viewpoint limits their gaining a comprehensive long-range insight into world trends. By faith alone they are religiously optimistic, religiously teleological. By faith alone, but not by empirical or philosophical observation.

But even if these dialectical laws of matter and motion had been found to be consistent, insuperable difficulties would still arise. For if the first law (of the unity of contradictory opposites) was a true law, unless guided by an external intelligence, it would have to operate in respect to the other three dialectical laws too, and thus nullify them. And yet there is *order*, predictability in the universe. Even Lenin and Engels, while denying intelligent design, had to admit that there was "law, *order*, causality and necessity in nature."⁴⁶ A barley seed could not yield any other kind of plant than a barley plant, etc. It *necessarily* could only produce barley. For universal *laws* require this. Engels may have formulated these laws incorrectly (dialectically), but he clearly saw law and order in the universe, particularly in the fields of chemistry, of physics, of natural science. But the very existence of laws implies *fixed behavior*, and this is the death of fluid dialectics. Again, fixed laws invariably imply an intelligent Lawgiver, and this is the death of atheism.

F. Summary

Summarizing, it has been seen that the Marxists' denial of the possibility of the existence of the Supreme Being in connection with matter and motion led them to absolutize matter in motion as their universal principle of being and thus to distort pluriform reality

by subsuming it under the forced unity of a materialistic monism.

Rejecting vulgar materialism, the Marxists insisted on the inseparability of motion and autodynamic matter, in an attempt to avoid theism. Yet it was seen that even autodynamic or dialectical materialism does not disprove theism, but only raises the question as to how motion is related to matter, and as to why specifically motion rather than space or time should be so related.

It was further seen that advancing physical science had made the whole issue very problematical as to precisely what constitutes matter, and it was shown that Lenin was forced to identify his materialism with realism, thus again making Marxism vulnerable to theistic criticism.

Next, the first dialectical law of the relation of matter to motion, the law of the unity of contradictory opposites, was scrutinized. It was seen that this law, which describes motion as contradictory, does not establish autodynamism in matter, and neither do the examples adduced to illustrate the law contain true contradictions or even opposites. Again, the Marxists were vague as to the meaning of unity in this law.

The second law sought to establish that all matter alters qualitatively only as a result of quantitative changes in its composition. Again it was seen that the Marxist illustrations are not inapplicable to the humanitarian spheres, but do not even establish what is claimed for them in the chemical field from which they were adduced.

The third law, that of the negation of the negation, was similarly unconvincing, in that no real "negation" was involved in the barley, butterflies, and human societies adduced as examples of this law. And Engels' own admission that the examples given must be pre-constructed so that the second negation becomes possible, is a glaring example of a *petitio principii*, that is, a search for principles, which begs the question; whereas his admission that everything "depends on the particular nature of each individual case" signals the death of the very monism he was so diligently trying to construct.

A fourth law sometimes adduced, that of upward movement, was again found to be extremely limited in its application and not really

deduced from a comprehensive study of all empirical data.

Finally, it was seen that the very emphasis on natural laws by the Marxists presupposes order and *fixed* behavior irreconcilable with dialectical movement; and indeed also presupposes a constituting Lawgiver too.

The Marxists have not established what matter in fact is. Still less have they proved its autodynamism.

G. *Christian view of matter*

From our Christian philosophical standpoint, we reject the Marxist doctrine of the independence of all being. We distinguish between the utterly independent being of God the Creator on the one hand, and the utterly dependent being of creation on the other, created from nothing and dependent upon the constant preservation thereof by the Creator.

We equally reject the Marxist doctrine of the necessary materiality of all (created) being. We regard all matter as but one part of the created totality, for we also regard non-material spirits (angels and devils), material-spiritual beings (earthly life), and disembodied spirits (the souls of dead men) as just as much a part of the created totality as is matter.

Further, we affirm that the true unity of this diverse universe lies in its createdness, not in its materiality. We cannot agree with the autodynamic Marxists that "motion is the mode of existence of matter," and we regard all matter as such as intrinsically motionless in itself. The continual movement of observable matter we attribute to secondary God-given laws of motion as well as to both the miraculous transcendent movement and the permanent immanent omnipresence of the divine Christ, by Whom "all things consist."⁴⁷

Believing in the possibility of miracles, we would not agree with the Marxists that the movement of matter is always governed by fixed laws, but we would agree that this is usually the case. The discovery and progressive formulation of these laws is not the province of the Christian philosopher, but of the Christian physicist, so here we maintain our silence. However, it may perhaps be observed in

general that any apparent contradiction between the operation of the various laws is either only apparent, or, if real, is the result of man's finiteness and sin's disturbance of the cosmic order, but never the result of inherent and essential contradictions in the created order of the cosmos as such. Even then, orderliness is still largely preserved by God's common grace in spite of sin, for: "Thy word is settled in heaven. Thy faithfulness is unto all generations: Thou hast established the earth, and it abideth. They continue this day according to Thine ordinances."⁴⁸

* * *

To move or not to move, that is the question. If mere matter can move in so many manifold ways all of its own accord, it must be enormously intricate, even divine. Communism versus creation. Materialistic communism or miraculous creationism. Which is it to be? The alternative to materialism, the miraculous Creator in Whom "we live *and move*, and have our being"⁴⁹ somehow seems infinitely preferable.

IV

COMMUNISM AND THE ORIGIN OF THE UNIVERSE

"In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth," proclaims the opening verse of the Christian Bible,¹ thus clearly implying the existence or essence of the divine Creative Reality before that of the created reality of the universe. But Lenin,² quoting Feuerbach and Engels with approval, made a counter-proclamation: "the material, perceptible universe to which we ourselves belong is the only reality." Yet even if this latter claim were true and provable—and it has been established above³ that this can hardly be the case, the question would still remain: how did this material and perceptible universe then begin?

A. *The eternal flux*

According to the Marxists, the universe is in a state of eternal flux, of perpetual motion, as reflected in the words of Engels: "In the beginning was the deed."⁴ Now this statement, taken firstly from Goethe, and ultimately, with a sarcastic twist, from the Bible's account of the "beginning,"⁵ was used in respect of Marxist epistemology, and not, of course, in respect of their cosmogony. But as regards the latter, it is indeed claimed that all being is just one ceaseless deed, and a ceaseless deed with no absolute beginning at all. It is claimed that "the whole of nature . . . has its existence in *eternal* coming into being and passing away, in ceaseless flux, in unresting motion and *change*," and has been demonstrably "*shown* as moving in *eternal* flux and cyclical course."⁶

B. *Time and space*

Now if all is "*change*" and yet "*eternal flux*," the problem of the relation of time to eternity is automatically raised. What is time? And here it must at once be stated that Engels nowhere gives us a definition of time, but only presupposes its eternal existence, and nowhere really distinguishes between time and space, which latter he also eternalizes, and thereby raises the further problem of spatial infinity. Yet Engels nevertheless held that "the basic form of all beings are space and time, and existence out[side] of time is just as gross an absurdity as existence out[side] of space."⁷

C. *Origin of universe*

Even though he denied that the universe had an absolute beginning, Engels believed that this present world and galaxy had a relative beginning. Whereas the Ionic philosophers began with the conception of a universal dispersion of matter,⁸ and whereas, according to Engels, Copernicus with his anti-Ptolemaic heliocentric view of the solar system "shows theology the door,"⁹ the real astronomical Copernican revolution began with Kant¹⁰ and his theory of a "primordial nebular mass . . . in which gravitation and radiation of heat led to the gradual formation of the separate celestial bodies."⁸

This, Engels felt, was the true explanation "of the origin of all existing celestial bodies from rotating nebular masses,"¹¹ whereas "the innumerable suns and solar systems of our island universe, bounded by the outermost stellar rings of the Milky Way, developed by contraction and cooling from swirling, glowing masses of vapour."¹²

Turning his attention to that part of the universe known as the solar system, viz., the sun "as well as [the] planets and satellites," Engels maintained, probably correctly,¹³ that "the form of motion of matter at first prevailing is that which we call heat." This was followed by "progressive cooling" and "the interplay of the physical forms of motion" of the smaller bodies of the solar system, "the satellites, asteroids and meteors first of all," while "the planets cool more slowly" and the sun, "the central body, slowest of all."¹⁴

D. *Origin of earth*

As to the origin and development of specifically the earth, Engels wrote of "the transition of the gaseous ball, from which the earth has developed, into liquid and subsequently into the largely solid state."¹⁴ Then the stage is reached "when the planet acquires a firm shell and accumulations of water on its surface," when "its atmosphere becomes the arena of meteorological phenomena . . . and its surface becomes the arena of geological changes in which the deposits resulting from atmospheric precipitation become of even greater importance compared with the slowly decreasing external effects of the hot fluid interior."¹⁴

E. *Marxist geology*

Marx admitted in just so many words that according to his view geology, or *geognosis* as he called it, makes it unnecessary to appeal to creation to account for the development of the earth, adding that "the idea of the creation of the earth has received a severe blow from the idea of geogony,"¹⁵ i.e., from the idea of the naturalistic birth of the earth.

Assisted by the new science of palaeontology,¹⁶ "geology arose," declared Engels,¹⁷ "and pointed out not only the terrestrial strata formed one after another and deposited one upon another, but also the shells and skeletons of extinct animals and the trunks, leaves and fruits of no longer existing plants contained in these strata."

Next followed Engels' interpretation of these phenomena: "The decision had to be taken to acknowledge that not only the earth as a whole but also its present surface and the plants and animals living on it possessed a history in time."¹⁷

So, according to Engels, the new fact that the earth's "present surface . . . possessed a history in time,"¹⁷ simply had to be acknowledged. "At first," wrote Engels,¹⁷ "the acknowledgement occurred reluctantly enough. Cuvier's theory of the revolutions of the earth was revolutionary in phrase and reactionary in substance. In place of a single divine creation, he put a whole series of repeated acts of creation. . . ." Whereas Marx¹⁸ felt that "geologists, even the

best, like Cuvier, have expounded certain facts in a completely distorted way."

The great hero of geology, felt the Marxists, was the geologist Lyell. He it was, according to Engels,¹⁷ who "first brought sense into geology by substituting for the sudden revolutions due to the moods of the creator the gradual effects of a slow transformation of the earth."

The implications for Marxism are clear: in the beginning was the deed, the godless deed of cosmic evolution.

F. *Critique of above*

In the first place, the Marxist view of the eternal flux of the universe is, of course, based on the validity of their dialectical laws of matter and motion discussed and refuted above.³ However, it may now further be objected that even if nature or matter in motion is all that exists, it does not at all follow that it is eternal; and whether it is eternal or not, if matter is all that exists, it is difficult to see how it could keep "coming into being and passing away in ceaseless flux" without a deeper layer of existence behind this ceaseless flux to provide the continuity.¹⁹ For nature is not merely changing in form, according to Engels. Rather is the "*whole* of nature . . . coming into being and passing away."⁶ But in that case there is either no reality at all or a non-natural reality before those times when nature is coming into being or after those times when it is passing away, however brief in duration such times may be. The first alternative leads to nihilism, and also to the annihilation of the eternal matter of dialectical materialism. And the second alternative points to philosophical theism.

Here Engels would perhaps reply that *nature* is indeed eternal, and that only its *form* changes, is always changing, one of which such changing forms is our present universe. Even though this is not what he has written in the above quotation,⁶ the problem would nevertheless remain as to whether nature really does move in a "*cyclical* course,"⁶ a course of predictable and constantly repeated and rhythmical change.²⁰ The Christian philosopher with his view of

the once-and-for-all temporal unfolding of *our* universe as the *only* one, naturally rejects these cyclic “re-incarnations” of the universe(s) according to Marxism; yet even apart from this, the Marxists have nowhere explained why the law of unity of contradictory opposites, which embodies dialectical struggle, should cause the universe to move in *cycles* rather than in sudden *leaps*. Indeed, apart from the fact that cycles and leaps are hardly reconcilable with one another, leaps would seem to be more dialectical than are cycles. Yet even if leaps and cycles could be identified with one another, however, it is difficult to see how either of them are reconcilable with the concept of “ceaseless flux.”⁶ And here again, even if there were successive universes and even if they were in a state of “*ceaseless flux*,” it would be impossible for any sub-centenarian human observer (without a supra-natural point of reference [or without a revelation]) to determine such ceaselessness and to demonstrate that nature is eternally “coming into being and passing away,” so as to be able to claim that “the *whole* of nature was *shown* as moving in eternal flux and cyclical course.”⁶

To proceed. From the Christian point of view, it is certainly true of material beings that their basic form is “space and time,” but Engels has once again here assumed by faith alone that there can be no non-material beings capable of living outside of time and space.²¹ As a realistic epistemologist who professes that external reality exists outside of man irrespective of whether man observes this or not, Engels is here again inconsistent with his own views in that other field.²²

But not only are space and time absolutized as the dimensions of *all* being,²³ but they are also too closely identified with one another. Hegel is attacked for his view of “this absurdity of a development in space but outside of time, the fundamental condition of all development,”²⁴ and Engels’ confusion of space with time is nowhere more evident than in his attempt to relate both to eternity and infinity and his further confusion as to what constitutes infinity:

“Eternity in time, infinity in space,” wrote Engels,²⁵ “means . . . that there is no end in *any* direction, neither forwards nor backwards,

upwards or downwards, to the right or to the left. This infinity is something quite different from that of an infinite series, for the latter always starts out from one with one first term. The inapplicability of this idea of series to our object becomes clear directly we apply it to space. The infinite series, transferred to the sphere of space, is the line *drawn in a definite direction* to infinity. Is the infinity of space expressed in this even in the most remote way?"

From the Christian²⁶ (and almost from the Marxist) viewpoint, however, the whole point is surely that a line drawn through time is qualitatively different to a line drawn through space. A point or line in time is a *temporal* dimension, defines relationship to past, present and future and measures *duration*. A line in space is a *spatial* measurement, defines relationship to length, breadth and depth and measures *size*.

Engels has not realized that time necessarily elapses ontically in one direction only, forwards, and that even though one can epistemologically retrace that route of time in the reverse direction, it is the *same* route which is being retraced. Time may therefore extend "forwards" and even be retraced "backwards," but it does not, as does space, extend "upwards or downwards, to the right or to the left." And neither does space extend backwards and forwards in the sense that time does. To confuse time and space is to render all intelligent measurement in both fields vague.

The further and even more serious misrepresentation in Engels' statement is that he did not distinguish *qualitatively* between time and eternity or between space and infinity:

"... if we think of time as something counted from *one* forward, we imply in advance that time has a beginning. . . . We give the infinity of time a one-sided, halved character; but a one-sided, a halved infinity is also a contradiction in itself, the exact opposite of an infinity conceived without contradiction. . . ." ²⁵

From the Christian viewpoint, because Engels drew no qualitative distinction between immanent created time and transcendent and uncreated eternity, he would not concede that time had a beginning, arguing that to do so would give "the infinity of time a one-sided,

halved character.” But here he only confused time with infinity. For few really think of “the infinity of time” and few conceive of infinity “as something counted from *one* forward.” That which is infinite is uncountable. But time is indeed countable and measured as “from one forward” even by the most primitive of men who measure the time of the day from the sun and the time of the month from the phases of the moon and the time of the years in their series from the passage of the seasons. Time is necessarily something counted “from one forward” and is necessarily opposed to eternity or infinity.

Here Engels might object that “the subject at issue is not the *idea* of time, but real time”;²⁷ not solar or lunar time, but time per se. But this hardly solves his predicament. For if solar and lunar time as empirically understood are not accurate *reflections* of true and objective time, his whole theory of realistic epistemology falls. Lenin saw this and correctly argued that “space and time are not mere appearances, but objectively real forms of being. . . . Human conceptions of space and time are relative, but on the basis of these relative conceptions we arrive at absolute truth,” adding that the philosopher must “definitely and straightforwardly recognize that our conceptions of time and space as they develop reflect the objectively existing real time and space; that they approach, as our ideas do in general, objective truth.”²⁸

Eternity does, of course, comprehend time or temporal reality, but it also comprehends pre-temporal or a-temporal reality too. At least for the Christian, eternity is not, as Engels seemed to think, a series of moments in temporal succession extending infinitely backwards and forwards (or rather, in *all* directions, seeing Engels confuses time and space), but eternity is qualitatively different from time. This Engels should have realized even on the basis of his own law of transformation from quantity to quality, but instead he rather chose to subject eternity (impossible task!) to his law of unity of (contradictory) opposites:

“Infinity is a contradiction, and is full of contradictions. From the outset, it is a contradiction that an infinity is composed of noth-

ing but finites, and yet this is the case. . . . It is just *because* infinity is a contradiction that it is an infinite *process* unrolling endlessly in time and space.”²⁹

Certainly infinity contradicts Engels, who maintained it is “composed of nothing but finites.” For infinity is in-finity, has nothing to do with the finite, is not at all a sum total of finites, as Engels claimed. If it was, it would still be finite. But then infinity could not be “unrolling *endlessly* in space and time,” as Engels claims, and neither could it be a *process*, for if it was, it could not be infinite, as infinity is by definition incapable of further unrolling and of further process. Again, if it was a process, infinity would be measurable, to some degree understandable to man’s admittedly³⁰ finite mind. But if the finite can understand the infinite, the infinite is no longer infinite.

One can have great regard for the obvious truths of Lenin that “matter in motion cannot move otherwise than in space or time”³¹ and that “a philosophy which denies the objectivity of time and space is . . . absurd, . . . essentially foul and false,”³² but such statements neither establish the eternity of time³³ nor the infinity of space. And neither do they establish the eternity of matter.³⁴

Engels had insisted that the universe had no absolute beginning³⁵ but is in a state of eternal flux.⁶ But Clausius’ second law of thermodynamics has disproved such a state of affairs. Clausius’ law teaches that energy transformed into heat cannot be reconverted into higher forms of energy, but that heat tends to spread itself evenly throughout matter. Applied to the universe, the various parts of which are indisputably still at different temperatures to one another, this not only means that the universe is progressing towards a goal, but also that parts of it were originally at a much higher temperature than they are now. But if the universe was eternal, as the Marxists maintain, it must long ago have reached an even temperature everywhere. And the fact that this has not (yet) occurred, proves that the universe cannot be eternal, but must have been brought into existence by the release of an enormous quantity of energy in some or other act of creation in the remote past.³⁶

To this theory, first propounded in 1867, Engels replied in 1886: "The question as to what becomes lost has, so to say, first been clearly stated since 1867 (CLAUSIUS). Small wonder that it has not yet been solved; it may still be long before we with our small means come to do that. But solved it shall be, just as certainly as it is established that wonders do not occur in nature, and that the original heat of the nebula was not imparted to it by a wonder external to the world."³⁷

Here Engels admitted that he had no better or other explanation than that of Clausius, but of one thing he was convinced, namely that a miraculous origin of the universe is excluded. His conviction is anything but scientific, however, and is in fact an article of faith, or rather of (atheistic) religious bigotry. For even if wonders do not now occur in nature, it would not at all follow that wonders have never occurred in the remote past. And even Engels' denial that wonders are no longer occurring in nature only really amounts to the situation that Engels and those whose testimony *he* is prepared to accept have not witnessed such phenomena as *they* would choose to regard as wonders. Once again, Engels has ignored his own realistic epistemology, which insists on the ontical independence of external reality from man's empirical observation thereof.

One could, and probably should, here reply to the cosmogonical nebular theory of the utterly convinced Engels in the words of God in the book of Job: "Where wast thou when I laid the foundation of the earth? . . . Canst thou bind the sweet influences of Pleiades, or loose the bands of Orion? . . . Knowest thou the ordinances of heaven?"³⁸—for Engels' views are based neither on empirical observation nor on divine revelation. Germane though this procedure would be epistemologically, it is unnecessary for Christian apologetical purposes, as neither Copernicus nor Kant nor even Engels has shown "theology (by which Engels incorrectly means Christian philosophy,³⁹) the door."

This will be gone into presently, but for the moment it must be questioned whether the Kantian nebular hypothesis, quite reconcilable with the genesiology of Christian philosophy,⁴⁰ was in fact

the way in which the universe originated. Even today there are a number of other⁴¹ cosmogonical theories as deserving of serious examination as is the nebular theory.

It must also be objected that since, as Engels himself admits,⁴² "the Kantian theory is still, strictly speaking, only a hypothesis," Engels should have been rather more cautious in claiming that the "nebular theory had already indicated the origin of the solar system."⁴³ This is particularly so in view of the fact that even if our galaxy did originate by way of the nebular hypothesis, the solar system as a small particle thereof might in its turn have been formed in a different manner, e.g., by means of the "cigar hypothesis."⁴⁴

Be that as it may, is Engels' claim true that Copernicus' heliocentric theory of the solar system "shows theology³⁹ the door"? By no means. To the extent to which theology (the scientific study of God in His Self-revelation to man, according to the Bible), deals with the sun at all,⁴⁵ it is altogether reconcilable with Copernicanism. Like the nebular theory, Engels believed that even "the Copernican world system too is still no more than this,"⁴⁶ namely an hypothesis. And yet he had not hesitated to show the whole of "theology the door" with what he himself regarded as "only an hypothesis."⁴⁶

As regards the origin of the earth, Engels wrote of "the transition of the gaseous ball, from which the earth has developed, into liquid and subsequently into the largely solid state."¹⁴ Here again there can be no showing "theology the door," the Genesis account relating the same progressive terrestrial phenomena and in the same order: first gas, then liquid, and finally solid earth.⁴⁷

The next step in Engels' cosmogony is "when the planet acquires a firm shell and accumulations of water on its surface"; when "its atmosphere becomes the arena of meteorological phenomena . . . and its surface becomes the arena of geological changes in which the deposits resulting from atmospheric precipitation become of ever greater importance compared with the slowly decreasing external effects of the hot fluid interior."¹⁴ This too, with certain reservations, hardly "shows theology the door," for Christian theology too knows of the origin of the earth's atmosphere,⁴⁸ its accumula-

tions of water,⁴⁹ and the birth of its geological formations.⁵⁰

However, there are weaknesses in the Marxist geology. Firstly, there is the youth of that science. For even according to Engels, even after Kant, the propounder of the nebular thesis, "geology was totally unknown."⁵¹ And even in subsequent times, "geology had not yet gone beyond the embryonic stage of minerology; hence palaeontology could not yet exist at all."¹⁶

But surely the very fact that geology is admittedly such a young science should have made the Marxists a little more careful epistemologically in their claims on its behalf. To write off the age-old "appeal to creation" as "unnecessary" on the strength of a science only recently "totally unknown" is, to say the very least, a questionable procedure.

It was, as Engels suggested,¹⁶ the advent of palaeontology (the study of fossilized *organic* remains) which gave the anti-creationists their opportunity to reframe inorganic geology from their own radical viewpoint. This will be developed in the next chapter, but at this stage it will be as well to state that the attempt to date and interpret the lifeless rock strata in terms of their organic fossil content and to interpret the latter in its turn in terms of our changing knowledge of modern living organisms is to make geology depend on current palaeontology and the latter in its turn depend upon current and largely evolutionistic biology, and thus not only to interpret lifeless creatures in terms of living creatures, prior creations in terms of posterior creations, but also to help promote a biological monism by subsuming all the relatively sovereign non-biological natural sciences, such as geology, etc., under the control of the science of biology.

Whoever it was that denied that the world's "plants and animals living on it possessed a history of the time,"¹⁷ it was certainly not the Christian philosophers. And yet Engels seems to have held the astonishing view that the Christian world view of Western Europe in the first half of the eighteenth century, which in his opinion stood "far below Greek antiquity in the theoretical mastery of . . . the general outlook on nature,"⁵² actually was that "the earth had remained the same without alteration from all eternity or, alternatively,

from the first day of its creation.”⁵² Nothing could be further from the truth,⁵³ but it can clearly be seen why Engels, nevertheless believing this, greeted the new geological theories with such acclaim. In Engels’ view, it was simply on account of their “religious bigotry and stupidity” that the older Christian⁵⁴ “geologists like Buckland and Mantell should contort the facts of their science so as not to clash too much with the myths of the book of Genesis.”⁵⁵

It is quite clear that Engels welcomed the then new geology of Lyell as a powerful ally against “the moods of the creator” as expressed in the different days of creation according to the first chapter of the Biblical book of Genesis. Engels apparently did not realize that these “moods,” these “sudden revolutions,” were rather more in harmony with his own concept of the dialectical leap when applied to the geological sphere than were Lyell’s views of “a slow transformation of the earth” which he, Engels, was then welcoming. To this extent Engels was decidedly undialectical in preferring the uniformitarian evolutionism of Lyell to the sudden revolutions of Cuvier.⁵⁶

The real reason why Engels welcomed Lyell’s views was because the latter required a vast period of time⁵⁷ for geological stratification, a period in Engels’ view quite irreconcilable with the teachings of the Bible. Such a vast period of time is not in fact necessarily in conflict with the Bible, as pointed out above,⁵³ but Engels thought it was.⁵⁵

If Engels’ views on geology had been more stable, one might have been able to take him more seriously. But as things stand, his absolutization of the current dominant school of geology until replaced by the next school, and then his rejection of the first school in favor of the second, makes the depth of his views suspect.

In his *Anti-Dühring* in 1878, for example, Engels proclaimed that “the whole of geology is a series of negated negations, a series arising from the successive shattering of old and the depositing of new rock formations.”⁵⁸ If this view was a dangerous absolutization of Cuvier’s then still widely accepted geological catastrophism, it was at least in consonance with the Marxist dialectic.

However, in his *Dialectics of Nature*, Engels later wrote⁵⁹ that Cuvier's theory was "reactionary in substance," and that it was the uniformitarian "Lyell [who] first brought sense into geology" by stressing "the gradual effects of a slow transformation of the earth."⁵⁹ Perhaps still haunted by his previous identification of "the whole of geology" with Cuvier's revolutionism or "catastrophism," Engels still had the honesty to add—even though only by way of a footnote—that: "the defect of Lyell's view, at least in its first form, lay in conceiving the forces at work on the earth as constant, both in quality and quantity."⁵⁹

Yet by 1886, Engels had made a complete *volte face* or right-about turn and absolutized Lyell's theories in his *Ludwig Feuerbach*. "Geology," Engels then wrote,⁶⁰ "investigates the *gradual* formation of the earth's surface." From catastrophist, the dogmatic Engels had now travelled the full circle to uniformitarian.

Engels' ultimate geological uniformitarianism was faithfully taken over by the geologically uncritical Lenin as if it were the only view tenable. Rhetorically asking:⁶¹ "Was the earth evolved in the manner taught by the science of geology, or was the earth created in seven days?" Lenin, after no argumentation whatsoever, rather dogmatically answered his own question: ". . . the teachings of religion . . . concerning the past of our earth and the creation of the world do not correspond with the objective reality."⁶²

All this Marxist dogmatism is rather interesting not only in the light of modern non-Marxist geological repudiations of Lyell,⁶³ but also particularly in the light of Engels' own skepticism as to the value of geology as such. ". . . knowledge," he declared,⁶⁴ "must either . . . be completed only step by step, or, . . . *as in cosmogony, geology and the history of man, must always remain defective and incomplete because of the faultiness of the historical material.*" And after discussing the epistemological problems involved in "astronomy and mechanics, and in physics and chemistry," he truthfully added: "We are even worse off in geology, which by its nature is concerned chiefly with events which took place not only in our absence but *in the absence of any human being* whatever. This winning of final

and absolute truths in this field is *therefore* a very troublesome business, and the crop is extremely meagre.”⁶⁵

Comment is unnecessary. Engels himself has drastically reduced the weight of all his own cosmogonical arguments. The tragedy is that the “revisionist”⁶⁶ Lenin, for such he was, at least in respect of this one self-refutation of Engels, ignored Engels’ other and deeper epistemological insights.

G. Summary

Summarizing, it was seen that the Marxists’ denial of a cosmogonical beginning and their view that all nature is eternally coming into being and passing away raised the question of continuity in the reality of matter on the one hand, and that of a “cyclical course” instead of dialectical leaps on the other, whereas the concept of eternal change automatically raised the problem of time and space. It was next seen that the Marxists did not sufficiently distinguish between time and space on the one hand, and between time and eternity and space and infinity on the other. Space was wrongly absolutized as a necessary dimension of all being, and time was wrongly thought of as having had no beginning at all. Yet the Marxists still insisted that man’s concept of time was a true reflection of objective time as such, while nevertheless illogically insisting that true infinity is composed of nothing but finites.

Next it was seen that Clausius’ second law of thermodynamics demands an absolute beginning to the universe, but that Engels merely dodged the issue and replied by ridiculing that law and insisting that wonders do not occur in nature and that a satisfactory materialistic explanation would one day be given to refute that law’s application to the universe as a whole.

The Marxists were then seen to have conceded a relative origin of this present universe by virtue of the Kantian hypothesis, which they absolutized to the exclusion of all other cosmogonical hypotheses and which, coupled with the Copernican theory of the solar system, they quite wrongly regarded as having shown “theology the door.” For it was seen that neither the nebular nor any other

cosmogonical theory and neither the Copernican nor any other plausible natural scientific theory of the formation or continued operation of the solar system is irreconcilable with the teachings of Christianity.

Proceeding to the Marxists' view of the earth's formation, it was seen that their claim that our globe was first gaseous, then liquid, and finally solid is, contrary to their anticipations, quite reconcilable with the Genesis record, and that their claim that the idea of creation received a severe blow from the theory of geogony is just not true.

Scrutinizing the Marxists' view of inorganic geology, it was seen that they admitted the relative novelty of that science, but were persuaded as to its value particularly after the advent of (organic) palaeontology. Their accusations that the Christian Bible held that everything had remained the same since the first day of creation and that geology and palaeontology had now disproved this were seen to be false. Their rejection of catastrophist and their absolutization of uniformitarian geology was seen to be strangely undialectical, and largely motivated by a desire to eclipse the geological "moods of the creator."

Finally the Marxists' *volte face* in geology from their initial absolutization of catastrophism to their ultimate rejection thereof and their absolutization of uniformitarianism (contrary to many modern non-Marxist geologists) was seen to make their views on this subject rather suspect, particularly in the light of Engels' own admissions as to the "extremely meagre" value of geology as a whole on the basis of epistemological considerations.

The Marxist cosmogony, then, is vague, self-contradictory and unconvincing.

H. *Christian view of the universe*

Our Christian philosophical viewpoint rejects the Marxist concept of the eternal flux of successive universes, teaching creation from nothing and the once-and-for-all temporal unfolding of *our* universe as the *only* one, and asserting an essential continuity of cosmic being,

which it regards as vital to a true account of history, over against the Marxist dialectical discontinuity.

Neither can Christian philosophy approve the Marxist theory of the eternity of time. To the former, eternity precedes and comprehends time, is qualitatively different therefrom, is the dimension of God alone, all created beings (including men, angels and devils) being essentially and permanently time-bound. In one word, eternity is regarded as pre- and supra-creational; time is the essential dimension of all created existence.

Flowing herefrom, Christian philosophy distinguishes much more radically between time and space than does Marxism. Both time and space are created dimensions, but over against the Marxist theory of the essential spatiality of all phenomena, Christian philosophy asserts the unspatiality of the time-bound angels, devils, and disembodied human spirits between the individual's death and the later re-embodiment of his spirit on the new earth.

As regards the origin of the present universe and solar system, Christian philosophy would not object to the Kantian nebular hypothesis nor to that of the gradual solidification of the earth, provided both were not dogmatically asserted to the exclusion of all other cosmogonical theories, as the Marxists have unfortunately done. Christian philosophy would, however, reject the exclusively uniformitarian geology of the Marxists in their later years, while remaining open to any geological theory, such as neptunism or plutonism,⁶⁷ as long as it did not clash with the true exposition of the book of the Bible and the book of the rocks, both of which, properly interpreted, are regarded as cosmogonically authoritative for the reason that both are regarded as having come from the same Creative hand.

* * *

Communism versus creation. Avers the former: "In the beginning was the deed," the dialectical deed. Replies the latter: "In the beginning God created the heaven and earth."⁶⁸

V

COMMUNISM AND THE ORIGIN OF LIFE

“. . . the breath of the Almighty hath given me life,” declared Job of old,¹ but the Marxists insist that life came into being by spontaneous generation, even though, as Lenin declared,² “natural science positively asserts that the earth once existed in a state in which no man or any other living creature existed or could have existed.” Yet even if this latter unprovable³ and unbiblical⁴ declaration were true, it would of necessity still presuppose the question: What is life?

A. Definition of life

“All that exists,” “all that lives on earth and under water,” wrote Marx,⁵ “exists and lives only by some kind of movement.” To which Engels added: “*Life is the mode of existence of albuminous substances,*”⁶ going on to explain that albumen as a “mode of existence, essentially consists in the constant self-renewal of the chemical constituents of these substances. . . . And hence it follows, that if chemistry ever succeeds in producing albumen artificially, this albumen must show the phenomenon of life.”

Now “*organic exchange of matter (metabolism),*” continued Engels, “is the most characteristic phenomenon of life,”⁷ and this “exchange of matter which takes place through nutrition and excretion, is a *self-completing process,*” as opposed to inanimate dialectical movements and processes *outside* the organism.⁸ This exchange gives rise to all the other “simple characteristics of life,” maintained Engels,⁹ namely “response to stimuli . . . ; contractility . . . ; [and] the possibility of growth. . . .”

B. *Origin of life*

According to Engels,¹⁰ when the temperature of the cooling earth had become so far equalized that "it no longer exceeds the limits within which protein is capable of life, then, if other chemical pre-conditions are favourable, living protoplasm is formed." Here Engels obviously equated protein with albumen, because he went on to declare (as he had elsewhere similarly done of albumen⁹) that "protein exercises all the essential functions of life: digestion, excretion, movement, contraction, reaction to stimuli and reproduction."¹¹

Life thus originated when protoplasm was formed from chemicals, for "science," held Engels,¹² "is . . . able to say *with certainty* that it [life] *must have* arisen as a result of chemical action"; or, in the words of Marx,¹³ by "spontaneous generation."

C. *Development of genera*

From simple, living protoplasm, declared Engels,¹⁴ "thousands of years may have passed before the conditions arose in which the next advance could take place and this shapeless protein produce *the first cell* by formation of nucleus and cell membrane." Now "this first *cell* . . . provided the foundation for the morphological development of the whole organic world,"¹⁴ particularly in that basic protoplasm is the "essential component" of all genealogically related forms of life, from "the protamoeba, a simple protoplasmic particle without any differentiation whatever" through to "the higher organisms."¹⁵

Again, according to Engels,¹¹ of all living beings "of the whole organic world, the first to develop were innumerable species of non-cellular and cellular Protista, . . . of which some were gradually differentiated into the first plants and others into the first animals." "And from the first animals were developed, essentially by further differentiation, the numerous classes, orders, families, genera, and species of animals."¹⁴

D. *Critique of the above*

First of all, Marx's view that "all that lives on earth and under

water exists and lives only by some kind of movement”⁵ hardly distinguishes living matter from matter in general, as it has been seen above¹⁶ that the Marxists regard all things, thus even lifeless matter, as being in a state of movement. On this basis, there is no real distinction between the lifeless and the living.

Furthermore, Engels’ description of life as “the mode of existence of albuminous substances”⁶ only raises a number of other problems. To define life in terms of albumen and then albumen in terms of life is only a circumlocution and takes the matter no further. And to describe the “constant self-renewal of the *chemical* constituents of these substances” as the essential characteristic of living substances is surely inaccurate, in that this would require one to regard growing crystals, and possibly too the atomic disintegration and reintegration of the sun, as living phenomena (cf. n. 3).

If life is the mere self-renewal of the *chemical* constituents of a substance, one must next enquire of the Marxists what causes lifeless immediately pre-natal substances chemically congruent to albumen to become self-renewing, i.e., to become living albumen, what causes albumen to “die,” i.e., to become immediately post-mortal “albumen”; and what causes other chemically similar substances to remain lifeless or non-self-renewing.

To this enquiry the Marxists can give no satisfactory answer, and they can only point to the principle of dialectical movement which they regard as equally inherent in lifeless matter too:¹⁷ “Life, the mode of existence of albuminous substance,” declares Engels,¹⁸ “consists primarily in the fact that at each moment it is itself and at the same time something else.” And again: “Life is . . . also a contradiction which is present in things and processes themselves and which constantly asserts and solves itself.” But this hardly explains the essential difference between the living and the lifeless.

Attempting a further explanation of the qualitative difference between the kind of continuity in living things and that in lifeless matter, Engels hastened to add⁷ that “organic *exchange of matter* (metabolism) is the most general and most characteristic phenomenon of life.” But this is only another way of saying that individual

living matter (like individual lifeless matter) is in constant motion dialectically.

However, Engels added that the dialectical movement in living things "does not take place as the result of a process to which it is subjected from *without*, as is the way in which this can occur in the case of inanimate bodies. On the contrary, life, the exchange of matter which takes place through nutrition and excretion, is a self-completing process."⁸ But here again, it must be objected that living things *do* react to stimuli from *without* as well as move from within, and that as the Marxists have already held¹⁷ that "inanimate bodies" too are subjected to movement from both these two directions,⁹ this cannot be the essential characteristic of life either.

"From the exchange of matter . . . as the essential function of albumen, and from its peculiar plasticity," continued Engels,⁹ "proceed all the most simple characteristics of life: response to stimuli . . .; contractility . . .; the possibility of growth, which in the lowest forms includes propagation by fission, internal movement." These "characteristics of life" are well arranged, and do indeed proceed from the the principle of life in living objects. But the fact that they also proceed from lifeless objects too¹⁹ demonstrates that, however important they are, they do not constitute life as such. For they "proceed" from and do not constitute the basis of, living things. But if "the exchange of matter" is not the essence of life either, as shown above, the question: What is Life? has still remained unanswered by the Marxists.

This was frankly acknowledged by Engels where he wrote:²⁰ "Our definition of life is naturally inadequate, inasmuch as far from including all the phenomena of life it has to be limited to those which are most common and simplest." But this explanation is hardly satisfactory, inasmuch as Engels has elsewhere²¹ insisted that "*all* chemical investigations of the *organic* world lead . . . back in the final instance to a body which, as a result of chemical processes, distinguishes itself from all others in that it is a self-perfecting permanent chemical process, albumen."

Clearly, the Marxists have not told us what life is. Yet their

very mention of "inanimate bodies"⁸ as the opposite of living matter should have given them the clue. For if lifeless bodies are "inanimate," i.e., "spirit-less," living bodies must be animate or spirit-ed. And this is precisely the position of Christian philosophy, which regards the divine Spirit as the Principle of the breath of life in all living creatures without exception.²²

As regards the origin of life, if, as Engels has held,¹⁰ "protein [albumen] is capable of life" only beneath a maximum temperature, it cannot be capable of life above that temperature. Yet Engels still called that lifeless substance "protein," even though he has elsewhere written that "if chemistry ever succeeds in producing albumen artificially, the albumen *must* show the phenomenon of life." Clearly Engels, from his own point of view, should have written that "chemicals were capable of proteinization" at a certain temperature, in order to be consequential. But his view in one book¹⁰ that protein can be lifeless and in another book⁹ that it is *necessarily* alive shows the impasse into which he has been driven by his materialist monism.

Yet apart from the right temperature, life will only come about, declared Engels,¹⁰ "if other chemical preconditions are favourable." But even here he was rather reluctantly forced to add: "What these preconditions are, we do not yet know, which is not to be wondered at since so far not even the chemical formula of protein has been established."

However, today (1968) the chemical formula of protein *has* been established²³—deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA); yet science is hardly nearer to a solution as to what life is, still less as to how it came into being. And even if man, with all his knowledge and resources, may one day succeed in producing life artificially, it would not at all prove the materialistico-evolutionistic origin of the universe, but rather evidence that a supra-natural Being with knowledge and resources of Whom man is merely the image had done this in the past. For how could blind nature, without even man's knowledge and resources, have chanced to cause the first molecule of protein? The chances of amino-acids building up by chance in the way they always occur in normal proteins have been computed at 10^{1360} on the basis

of 1000 kg. of amino-acids getting this chance just once in a billion years.²⁴ And even if this ever occurred, why should that particle of albumen have continued to live, let alone constantly evolve further?

However, as Engels correctly remarked, science "has not yet succeeded in producing organic beings without descent from others; indeed, it has not yet succeeded even in producing simple protoplasm or other albuminous bodies out of their chemical elements."¹² But then Engels, in spite of this admission, made¹² the truly astounding remark that "with regard to the origin of life, . . . science is only able to say *with certainty* that it [life] *must have* arisen as a result of chemical action." Yet it must be insisted that the Marxist can hardly maintain "with certainty" that life "must have arisen as a result of *chemical* action," if it is equally conceded that science "has not yet succeeded even in producing simple protoplasm or other albuminous bodies out of their *chemical* elements." No, the basic error of Engels here is clear: He has vainly sought to explain the cosmologically-sovereign phenomenon of life in terms of an absolutized materio-chemical monism.

But even more fundamentally, if, as Engels conceded,¹⁰ "living protoplasm is formed" only if the temperature and "other chemical preconditions are favourable," how could admittedly lifeless material ever become living matter? For such involves not merely a *transfer* of one kind of motion (life) to an external particle of matter previously without that kind of motion—for such is the Christian view, *omnis vita ex vita* (all life is from life)—but rather involves the *creation* of a totally different kind of reality which had not previously existed in any part of the entire universe—for if it had (the universe being eternal on the Marxists' view), life would long previously have come into being, into *eternal* being by dialectical movement. Yet the Marxists admit it did not *then* do so. Hence their impasse is insuperable and complete.

This above¹² rather humbling admission of Engels in 1878, however, is in strange contrast with the uncritical assertions¹³ of Marx in 1844 that "the idea of the creation of the earth has received a severe blow . . . from the science which portrays the . . . develop-

ment of the earth as a process of spontaneous generation," adding that "*generatio aequivoca* (spontaneous generation) is the only practical refutation of the theory of creation."

This ancient theory of spontaneous generation, namely that life can and in fact did arise from lifeless matter, had already been refuted by Redi in the fifteenth and by Pasteur in the seventeenth century.²⁵ But one of the arch-evolutionists of the nineteenth century, the mechanical materialist Ernst Haeckel (who, because he was ignorant of the dialectic, was, according to Lenin,²⁶ compelled "to assume the existence of a property similar to sensation 'in the foundation-stones of the structure of matter itself' ") revived this idea of spontaneous generation when Huxley discovered what he thought was the primeval ooze of life in the deep sea in 1868. But once again, the theory was refuted when Möbius synthesized this "ooze" by mixing alcohol with sea-water.²⁵ Perhaps this is what frustrated Engels when he admitted²⁷ in 1878 that ". . . even the most presumptuous advocates of spontaneous generation have not claimed that this produced anything but bacteria, fungi or very primitive organisms"; but that if these organisms were not genealogically connected with "insects, fishes, fowls or mammals," the latter would have to "have been put into the world by a separate act of creation. So we arrive once again at a creator. . . ." ²⁷

Leaning heavily on Haeckel,²⁸ Engels argued¹⁵ that "among the lowest organisms there are many which are far below the cell—the Protamoeba, a simple protoplasmic particle without any differentiation whatever, and a whole series of other Monera and all bladder seaweeds (Siphonae). All of these are linked with the higher organism *only* by the fact that their essential component is protoplasm and that they consequently function as protoplasm, i.e., they live and die"; adding elsewhere²⁹ that "life is . . . a contradiction . . . ; and as soon as the contradiction ceases, life comes to an end, and death steps in."

Here it must be conceded that if lower and higher organisms are linked to one another "*only* by the fact that their essential component is protoplasm," and that no genealogical relationship is also implied,

Engels' view is quite acceptable, provided protoplasm as he understands it really is common to all living material beings.³⁰ But his view that protoplasm necessarily involves life *and death* and is a contradiction, cannot be accepted. From the Christian philosophical point of view there is no reason why living beings should *essentially* die at all,³¹ and modern biology tends to corroborate this view.³² And neither is life or living protoplasm a contradiction which ceases at death, for death is not the cessation of all continued existence.³³ Even from the Marxists' viewpoint, it is nonsensical to maintain that "death steps in" "as soon as the contradiction ceases,"²⁹ for they have already told us³⁴ that matter and motion are inseparable, and that motion is a contradiction, so that the contradiction inherent in living matter can never cease, and therefore not even in death.

From the simple, living protoplasm, "thousands of years may have passed," wrote Engels¹⁴ "before the conditions arose in which the next advance could take place and this shapeless protein produce *the first cell* by formation of nucleus and cell membrane." Previously Engels had insisted in a letter³⁵ to Marx in 1858 concerning the structure of plants and animals that "*everything* is a cell," but now in 1878³⁶ and 1886¹⁴ he was insisting that sub-cellular life was not only possible, but was the historical link between lifeless chemicals and "the first cell." Modern biologists, however, contradict Engels in declaring³⁷ that there is no life without the cell and that the cell is the basic unit of all living matter.

The suggestion that "thousands of years may have passed" before the living protoplasm became "the first cell" will be dealt with presently below when the palaeontological evidence is analyzed, but Engels' statement in his *Dialectics of Nature* that "this first cell also provided the foundation for the morphological development of the whole organic world"¹⁴ requires immediate scrutiny. Clearly Engels here means that all living beings are genealogically related to one another and in direct prehistorical descent from their common primordial ancestor, "the first cell." This he clearly taught in his *Ludwig Feuerbach*, where he wrote³⁸ that "the stock of organic products of nature environing us today, including man, is the result

of a long process of evolution from a few unicellular germs, and that these again have arisen from protoplasm or albumen, which came into existence by chemical means."

But now Engels has contradicted himself. Previously he had informed us that the lower organisms were "linked with the higher organisms *only* by the fact that their essential component is protoplasm,"¹⁵ but now³⁸ he illogically extends this organic link to that of genealogical descent too. For it is not at all clear why pan-biotic cellular or even sub-cellular protoplasmic life clearly structurally related, should necessarily be genealogically related too, rather than merely evidence a common Authorship.

Again, previously¹⁴ Engels had told us that "this first *cell* [singular] also provided the foundation for the morphological development of the *whole* organic world," but later³⁸ he proclaimed that "the stock of organic products of nature . . . is the result of a long process of evolution from a *few* unicellular germs" (plural). Clearly these two views, this of singular and that of plural origin, cannot both be sustained. If all nature evolved, it either evolved from one "*first cell*" or from "*a few unicellular germs*"; and if from the latter, nature is not a monistic unity unless those few cells themselves evolved from a primordial first cell.

The confusion on this point increases where Engels informs¹¹ us that "of the whole organic world; the first to develop [either from 'the first cell'¹⁴ or from 'a few unicellular germs'³⁸ as the case may be] were innumerable species of non-cellular and cellular Protista, of which *Eozoon canadense* alone has come down to us, and of which some were gradually differentiated into the first plants and others into the first animals."

But here there are a number of objections. Firstly, the number of Protista, however great, can hardly be "innumerable," particularly as regards the *non-cellular* Protista, seeing that "the *whole* organic world" has been held to have developed from the foundation of "the *first cell*," or even of "*a few unicellular germs*," whichever it may be. Secondly, if the cell, the principle of the whole organic world, also gave rise to innumerable non-cellular Protista, we have here a case

of devolution, quite acceptable to Christian philosophy,³⁹ but quite at variance with Engels' dialectical law of "upward" evolutionary development.⁴⁰ Thirdly, it is not clear why some Protista should have become non-cellular and others remained cellular, why some should have gradually differentiated into the first plants, and others into the first animals if the same eternal dialectical laws operate throughout. Neither, fourthly, is it clear why the Protista should only have been "*gradually* differentiated"; true dialectical movement should rather have required *sudden leaps*. And finally, apart from the fact that modern communists point out⁴¹ that Möbius disproved the organic origin of the fossil *Eozoon canadense* in 1878, it is not clear by what dialectical process, that of all the "innumerable . . . Protista," "*Eozoon canadense alone* has come down to us," and why it has come down to us dialectically unchanged.

From Protista, then, to the first plants and the first animals, "And from the first animals were developed, essentially by further differentiation," wrote Engels,¹⁴ "the numerous classes, orders, families, genera, and species of animals." But here again one must ask why some Protista developed into particular orders and families, and why other Protista developed into other orders and families, and why all these orders and families developed further into genera and species. Engels' explanation: "essentially by further differentiation," hardly answers the question, for not only does such differentiation clash with the Marxists' dialectical law of the unity (unification) of contradictory opposites, but it also raises the further questions as to why and also how these living beings ever became differentiated.

On the other hand one may doubt whether the differentiation is as great as it first appears to be. And this is also acknowledged by Engels where he elsewhere writes⁴² that ". . . closer investigation throws organisms out of one class into another, and distinguishing characteristics which had become almost articles of faith are losing their absolute validity." This is indeed true of many living organisms initially wrongly classified as genuses and later empirically (by cross-hybridization, etc.) found to be only specialized species, but this in no way detracts from the impossibility of the transmutation

of true genuses and *their* genealogical independence from one another. Successful hybridization between two living beings (e.g., between a Pekinese and a St. Bernard) only proves their genetic compatibility with one another and thus evidences a common ancestor and membership of the same genus. But unsuccessful attempts at hybridization between two living beings (e.g., between a lion and a bear) or hybridization between two relatively similar animals resulting in a sterile offspring (e.g., between a horse and a donkey, producing a sterile mule), conversely evidences *genetic* boundaries between organisms which cannot be transmuted, and also evidences the truth of Christian philosophy that God created "every living creature . . . after his kind."⁴³

Engels correctly noted that the realm of biology is extraordinarily complicated. "In this field," he wrote,⁴⁴ "there is such a multitude of reciprocal relations and causalities that not only does the solution of each question give rise to a host of other questions, but each separate problem can usually only be solved piecemeal through a series of investigations which often requires centuries to complete," sadly adding that "anyone who wants to establish really pure and immutable truths in this science, will therefore have to be content with such platitudes as: all men are mortal."

It is indeed unfortunate that Engels could not have left these very complex yet open biological issues yet a few more centuries for their thorough investigation to be completed, rather than seek their urgent unification on a materialistico-monistic basis, as he did.

E. *Darwinistic evolutionism*

The monistic fulcrum employed by Engels to attempt to bring about this forced materialistic unity of all living beings was the Darwinistic theory of transmutationism or evolutionism which soon gained dominance "since biology has been pursued in the light of the theory of evolution."⁴⁵

After discussing Darwin's theories of "the variability of species up to a certain point" and the "struggle for existence" of all living things,⁴⁶ both quite acceptable⁴⁷ to the Christian philosopher, Engels

discussed and approved the quite unscientific Darwinistic theory of the gradual alteration of species by transmission of acquired characteristics⁴⁸ which was later to result in the notorious Lysenko affair and even lead to the Haldanes' breach with the British Communist Party.⁴⁹ To give just one reason for rejecting the theory: the strong primordial lizards (dinosaurs) have disappeared whereas the even stronger and bigger whales, as well as the much tinier and weaker lizards and the (evolutionary speaking) ridiculous platypus, have survived. Were Darwin's third theory correct, the platypus, for example, would have had to cease laying eggs and become a completely viviparous mammal, in spite of its other peculiarities, in order to survive.⁵⁰

It is perhaps gratifying to the Christian philosopher to note that Darwin, and sometimes even Engels,⁵¹ regarded⁵² "all things . . . as the lineal descendants of some *few* beings," and that Haeckel⁵³ assumed "a quite independent stock for the vegetable kingdom, and a second for the animal kingdom," which comes some of the distance towards the Biblical idea that all the genuses of non-human earthly living creatures descend from several original ancestral pairs of each genus, each initially created "after his kind."⁴³ Perhaps this was what confused Engels as to whether "evolution" started from "the first cell"¹⁴ or from "a few unicellular germs,"³⁸ as seen above. And confusion there certainly was in Engels' mind, particularly as to the evolutionary family tree of man. For in one place⁵⁴ he referred to "the gill arches of our *fish* ancestors," whereas in another place⁵⁵ he referred to "the bodily evolution of our animal ancestors, starting from the *worm*." Of course, a fish by any other name may smell as sweet, or perhaps the worm turned. . . . On the other hand, perhaps Engels did not really know it all.

It may perhaps be wondered precisely why the revolutionistic Marxists ever bothered with the evolutionistic Darwin, the non-dialectician who naturalistically insisted that the brain of an ant was more wonderful than the brain of man⁵⁶ over against Marx's radical humanism.⁵⁷ Yet the answer is not far to seek. In a letter⁵⁸ to Engels in 1860, Marx conceded that even though Darwin's book on

Natural Selection was “developed in the crude English style, this is the book which contains the basis in natural history for our view,” and in his letter⁵⁹ to Lasalle in 1861 he specified that “Darwin’s book is very important and serves me as a *basis* in natural science for the class struggle in history. . . . Despite its deficiencies, not only is the death-blow dealt here for the first time to the teleological in the natural sciences, but their rational meaning is empirically explained.”

The Marxists’ view of science, culminating in man as humanized nature and in nature as naturalized humanism and in communist man as man par excellence, is, however, thoroughly teleological. But from the above quotations it can be seen that Darwinism was merely incorporated into Marxism to *serve* as a natural scientific basis for the Marxist historical materialism already worked out. Marx already had the sociological *Ueberbau* or superstructure. Now Darwin was clutched at to provide the natural scientific *Unterbau* or substructure.⁶⁰

Darwinist and Marxist biology depends for its validity on a peculiar construction of the relationship between geology, biology and palaeontology.⁶¹ In the pre-Darwinist era, “geology had not yet gone beyond the embryonic stage of minerology; hence palaeontology could not yet exist at all,” wrote Engels,⁶² and “in the field of biology the essential preoccupation was still the collecting and sifting of the immense material.”

But in the nineteenth century, the three disciplines were co-ordinated—or rather confused. For the palaeontological fossil remains, dated according to an evolutionistic biology, were used to establish the age of the rocks, and the order of the rock strata was used to date the genealogical “descent” of the fossil remains found therein. “Vast” biological periods required vast palaeontological periods, and these in their turn required vast geological periods. A vicious circle. But to Marx this was really quite straightforward. “Strata are our means of discovering about the epochs,” he wrote,⁶³ stressing the importance of “fossil bones . . . in the study of the organization of extinct species,” whereas “palaeontology” merely required the observers “to see the things which lie in front of their noses.”⁶⁴

To this combination of geology, palaeontology and biology, evolutionism also added the theory of embryological recapitulation, the theory that previous evolutionary stages of an organism are reflected in its embryonic development. Here Engels informs⁶⁵ us that “there is in fact a peculiar similarity between the gradual development of organic germs [embryos] into mature organisms, and the succession of plants and animals following each other in the history of the earth. And it is precisely this similarity which has given the theory of evolution its most secure basis.” But here it must be remarked that morphological similarity, e.g., of the *non-respirative* “gill-slits” in the neck of the human embryo, in no wise implies genealogical descent (from the fish⁵⁴—or from the worm⁵⁵—whichever absurdity Engels should choose to adopt).

The real trouble with this Marxist-Darwinist method is, of course—quite apart from the fact that even many modern evolutionists regard evolution as being based on a false philosophy⁶⁶—that the geological strata and their fossilized contents are often found *in reverse order* (to the evolutionary scheme) in certain parts of the world.⁶⁷ With this, the whole evolutionary scheme and the vast time-period it requires, falls to the ground in theory (for theory it is), but in practice it unfortunately just goes on evolving.

F. Summary

Summarizing, it was seen that the Marxists' views that life is movement or that life is the exchange of matter or that life involves response and growth, are inadequate because lifeless matter too exhibits these characteristics, whereas Engels' definition of life as the mode of existence of albuminous substances, as the constant *self-renewal* of their chemical constituents, equally fails for the reason that the lifeless sun and crystals also fall into this category, and also for the reason that the chemical constituents of living substances and similar non-self-renewing immediately pre-natal or post-mortal substances are chemically identical to living “albumen.” Again, Engels was seen to give a blanket definition of all living things in one place and to limit his definition only to the commonest living

phenomena in another place, and to speak of in-anima-te bodies while rejecting the Christian philosophical view of the divine Spirit or Anima Who in-anima-tes matter to make it live.

Attention was next drawn to the Marxists' views as to how life began and developed.

Firstly, it was seen that Engels was confused as to whether the relevant lifeless chemicals can be called protein before they become alive, or whether protein is necessarily and by definition alive. Then it was seen that the Marxists, by eternalizing the lifeless universe, made their own position of a non-eternal "creation" of life in time philosophically untenable and statistically so remote as to be utterly miraculous.

Next, the Marxists' doctrine of spontaneous generation as "the only practical refutation of the theory of creation" was analyzed. But it was seen that this ancient theory, previously refuted by Redi and Pasteur, was revived by Haeckel (and Huxley), who influenced the Marxists, only to be refuted yet again by Möbius.

Then it was seen how confused the Marxists were as to the existence of sub-cellular life and cellular descent therefrom, as to the "contradictory" and "life *and* death" nature of protoplasm, and as to the singular or plural cellular origin of life. It was shown that protoplasmic and cellular structural similarity in living beings in no wise establishes their genealogical relationship to one another, that the *gradual* descent of non-cellular Protista from "the first cell" is in conflict with the upward-bound leap of the Marxist dialectic, and that it is inexplicable how of all the "innumerable . . . Protista," *eoazon canadense* alone has survived, and survived dialectically unchanged at that.

Next, it was seen that the Marxist idea of "further differentiation" of these Protista into plants and animals, and then again into classes, orders, families, genera, and species, is untenable because it does not explain how and why such differentiation took place, which differentiation is, if anything, opposed to the Marxist dialectic. Then it was seen that although Engels correctly regarded the biological

field as extraordinarily complex, he nevertheless clutched at Darwinism to force a false monistic unity.

Looking at Darwinism, it was seen that particularly its doctrine of the gradual alteration of species by the transmission of acquired characteristics is scientifically untenable, and that its doctrines of gradual evolutionism and naturalism are not easily reconcilable with Marxist revolutionism and humanism. It was seen that the Marxists really only adopted Darwinism to supply the natural scientific basis for their already schematized sociological theory of historical materialism, and that both Darwinist and Marxist biology depend for their validity on a peculiar transformistic correlation (or confusion!) between geology, palaeontology and biology not sustainable against all the available facts.

The Marxists have not sufficiently explained the phenomenon of life. They have not accounted satisfactorily for its beginning or development. The true facts of life, taken scientifically in their entirety, bear evidence against the validity of their views on the subject.

C. *Christian view of life*

From the Christian philosophical viewpoint, life is not merely "the mode of existence of albuminous substances," as it is to the Marxists, but life is rather the result of that special indwelling of the divine Spirit known as animation. Each kind of life was created *sui generis*, after its own kind, and various measures and kinds of consciousness are invariably the dominant characteristic of each species and individual living creature. Metabolism and reproduction are not necessarily characteristics of living beings, for neither characterize angels at any time and at least the second will not characterize man in the state of glory.

The origin of life according to Christian philosophy was not the result of the earth's cooling down and chemical changes, as in Marxism, but the miraculous inworking of God's enlivening Spirit in specially selected lifeless matter and the latter's permanent endowment with the God-given and God-sustained power to continue in that enlivened condition.

Christian philosophy further rejects the Marxist account of the monophyletic⁶⁸ origin of all genera in favor of the Biblical data that God created *ex nihilo*, from nothing: plants, sea animals, winged animals, and land animals, and in that order, each basic genus “after his kind,” and each genealogically totally unrelated to the others. All of which necessarily implies a rejection of Marxist-Darwinistic evolutionism.

* * *

Communism versus creation. Did living things come from dead matter, or were they created by God, the God Who “is not the God of the dead, but of the living”?⁶⁹

VI

COMMUNISM AND THE ORIGIN OF MAN

“God created man in His Own image,” we are told on the first page of the Bible,¹ but Marxism teaches that man evolved from an ape.

In the last chapter it was seen how the Marxists held that life developed from protoplasm via innumerable non-cellular and cellular Protista, which were differentiated into plants and animals and which then further developed into “classes, orders, families, genera, and species of animals; and finally mammals . . . and among these again finally that mammal in which nature attains consciousness of itself—man.”²

A. *Origin of man*

Like his animal ancestors, “man, too,” declared Engels,² “arises by differentiation.” More particularly, man descended from the ape. For Marx wrote that man was a savage “after he had ceased to be an ape.”³ Engels wrote a pamphlet on “The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man,” on how “human society arose out of a troupe of tree-climbing monkeys”;⁴ and Lenin referred to the “herd of apes which grasp sticks” as the first stage in the primordial development of man.⁵

As to *when* man is alleged to have embarked upon his transition from the ape, Engels puts it “many hundreds of thousands of years ago” during what “geologists call the Tertiary period, most likely towards the end of it.”⁶ This could mean at any time since the Eocene start to the Pleistocene end of the Tertiary period, estimated

by evolutionistic geologists as having commenced at least⁷ some twenty-five and one million years ago respectively.⁸

B. *Locality and personality of primordial man*

As to *where* this transition from ape to man is supposed to have taken place, Engels informs us it was "somewhere in the tropical zone—probably on a great continent that has now sunk to the bottom of the Indian ocean."⁹ This idea is probably taken over from Haeckel, who proposed as the original home of man the land of Lemuria, named after the lemur, a small non-simian primate which evolutionists allege is distantly genealogically related to man, and which land he held had been situated between Africa and Australia before it accidentally disappeared into the depths of the sea at the end of the Tertiary period.¹⁰

It was certainly not only one being which became man at the time of man's first appearance on the earth. The idea of a primordial Robinson Crusoe all alone is purely legendary, held Marx,¹¹ and Engels was quick to point out that even Crusoe was a social rather than an individual person, in that "Crusoe enslaved Friday 'sword in hand'."¹² But then¹² Engels wisely asked: Where did he get the sword from? Even on the imaginary islands of Crusoe stories, swords have not, up to now, grown on trees." Yet Engels hastened to add: "We must apologize to the readers for returning with such insistence to the Crusoe and Friday story, which properly belongs to the nursery, and not to science. . . ." And similarly Engels elsewhere¹³ discussed with equal contempt the economist Carey's "own great Robinson Crusoeade about Adam and Eve." For "when Carey, who wants to develop his historical theory, proceeds to introduce Adam and Eve to us as Yankee backwoodsmen, he cannot expect us to believe him. . . . To the contrary, "this wretched ignorant stuff can only be compared with the shamelessness which allows him to unburden himself of such nonsense."

It may well be impossible to know today who were the first men, held the Marxists, but it is certain that they were not alone like

Crusoe. Moreover, an original pair such as the historical Adam and Eve is merely a myth, according to the Marxists.

C. *Physique and development of early man*

These primordial men just evolved from the ape, maintained Engels, "were completely covered with hair, they had beards and pointed ears, and they lived in bands in trees."⁶ However, "the decisive step in the transition from ape to man" was only taken when "these apes when *walking* on level ground began to disaccustom themselves to the aid of their hands and to adopt a more and more erect *gait*."⁶

Now that the *hands*, previously used by the apes to help them to move around, were freed for other uses when the apes began to walk erect on their hind feet, the next great step forward in man's evolution was the development of the hand to "perform hundreds of operations that no monkey's hand can imitate," according to Engels.¹⁴ According to Lenin, primeval man developed from "apes which grasped sticks,"⁵ while Marx gave his own meaning to Benjamin Franklin's definition of "man as a 'tool-making animal'."

Man's first estate, according to the Marxists, was that of a *savage*. For "man was a savage after he had ceased to be an ape," wrote Marx.³ "As men emerged from the animal world," wrote Engels,¹⁶ they were "still half-animal, brutal, still helpless in the face of the forces of Nature, still ignorant of their own."

As the apes were acquiring an upright gait and learning to manipulate their hands in labor in their transition to men, their communal tribal mode of living and laboring necessitated communication. And so it was, according to Engels, that the apes began to develop *speech* as a means of communicating with one another. This further distinguished man from the animals, because "the little that these, even the most highly-developed of them, have to communicate to one another can be communicated without the aid of articulate speech."¹⁷

When "man" still lived in trees, "fruits, nuts and roots served him as *food*," declared Engels.¹⁸ And "in a race of apes that far surpassed all others in intelligence and adaptability, this predatory

economy could not help leading to a continual increase in the number of plants used for food.”¹⁹ Yet “hunting and fishing implements,” continued Engels,¹⁹ referring to the discovered tools of prehistoric man, “presuppose the transition from an exclusively vegetable diet to the concomitant use of meat, and this is another important step in the process of transition from ape to man.” This, felt Engels, was because the large amounts of protein present in meat and fish developed the human *brain* more than had been the case with the vegetarian apes from which man descended.

Man’s meat diet, according to Engels,¹⁹ next “led to the harnessing of *fire* and the *domestication* of animals,” the first to make meat more digestible and the second to make it more plentiful. It was, wrote Engels,²⁰ “prehistoric man who discovered the making of fire by friction perhaps more than 100,000 years ago.” And “the generation of fire by friction gave man for the first time control over one of the forces of Nature, and thereby separated him for ever from the animal kingdom.”²¹

The above then, is the Marxist account of the transition from tree to ground, from “claws” to hands and feet, from ignorance to knowledge, from inarticulation to speech, from a vegetable to a meat diet, from hunting to farming, from ape to man. The question remains, however: Is “man” still regarded as an animal by the Marxists, or have these quantitative changes on his way from ape to man caused him to make a decisive dialectical leap to a qualitatively different being, man?

The whole question of man’s duties and relationships towards his fellow men and “fellow” apes is involved here. Certainly the Marxists hold that man is a historical descendant of the beast. Engels the naturalist wrote that “it is a fact that man sprang from the beasts,”²² that “primordial antiquity” represented “the emergence of man from the animal kingdom,”²³ that “comparative physiology gives one a withering contempt for the idealistic exaltation of men over the other animals,”²⁴ and that it is “inherent in the descent of man from the animal world that he can never entirely rid himself of animal characteristics.”²⁵ And even Marx, rather uncharacter-

istically and albeit only re-interpreting Franklin, described man as “a tool-making animal.”¹⁵

On the other hand, however, there is Marx the humanist, who insisted that the power to produce and consciousness thereof does indeed separate man from the rest of living nature.²⁶ Together with Engels, Marx maintained that “men may be distinguished from animals by consciousness, religion or anything else,” and that “they begin to differentiate themselves from animals as soon as they begin to *produce* their means of subsistence,” which “production first makes its appearance with the increase of population,” and which increase “presupposes intercourse of individuals amongst themselves.”²⁷

Then thirdly, there is Engels the dialectician, who concedes that men made a complete break with the apes, that fire “separated him *forever* from the animal world,”²¹ and that, even though “the Hegelian business of qualitative leap in the quantitative series is also very fine here,”²⁴ the “animal men had one quality which gave them an advantage over the other animals: perfectibility.”²⁸

However, from the Marxists’ viewpoint, the transition from ape to man is now complete. Man will change still further, dialectically, but henceforth he will change as man. For “the more human beings become removed from animals . . . , the more they make their history. . . .”²⁹ Man has finally and fully arrived on earth. “And with man we enter history.”²⁹

D. *Essence of man*

The question as to man’s origin leads almost imperceptibly to the related question as to his *essence*.

The essence of man according to Marxism is a many-sided reality, and it will be necessary to look briefly at a number of these sides.

Firstly, man is regarded as a “tool-making animal,”¹⁵ *homo laborans*, *homo faber*,³⁰ man the producer.²⁶ This has been touched on above, and will be developed still further on in ch. VII *infra*.

But secondly, man is also regarded, no less than a tool-making animal, as a *fire-making* animal as well.²¹ Even “in spite of the

gigantic and liberating revolution in the social world the steam engine is carrying through," wrote Engels of the industrial progress of nineteenth century,²¹ "it is beyond question that the generation of fire by friction was of even greater effectiveness for the liberation of mankind."

Next, man is a *social* being. "Co-operation, such as we find at the dawn of human development," declared Marx, is based on the fact that "each individual has no more torn himself off from the navel-string of his tribe or community, than each bee has freed itself from connexion with the hive"³¹ ". . . society produces man as man. . . . Activity and mind are social in their content as well as in their origin."³² And this social nature of man is held to imply of necessity "an original common ownership of land [even] among all civilized peoples."³³

Because he is a social being, man is also a being that *speaks*, and that speaks consciously. "Language is as old as consciousness," wrote Marx and Engels,³⁴ "language *is* practical consciousness, as it exists for other men, and thus it first really exists for myself as well. Language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men. . . . Consciousness is therefore from the very beginning a social product. . . ." Before men could speak, proclaimed Engels,³⁵ they were "equal animal men," "Alali: speechless."

But then, although speechless animal men were equal, one would perhaps expect the Marxists to hold that right at the beginning of humanity real men who can speak were also equal. Yet this is not the view of Engels,³⁵ who, with Rousseau, regards "the rise of *inequality* as progress, even though that progress is directed "apparently towards the perfection of the individual man, but in reality [only leads] towards the decay of the species." There may well be a certain "equality of intellectual endowment among men," declared Marx and Engels,³⁶ but men are sexually unequal,³⁷ unequal in will power,³⁸ and morally unequal.³⁹ And therefore "rights instead of being equal, must be unequal," declared Marx.⁴⁰ For equality demands the impossible, the existence of "two persons who are so

thoroughly detached from all reality, from all national, economic, political and religious relations which are found in the world, from all sex and personal differences, that nothing is left of either person. . . . ”⁴¹ Hence entire equality is in fact nothing but “a great exaggeration,”⁴² and “the proletarian demand for equality” is in fact admitted to be merely “an agitational means in order to rouse the workers against the capitalists.”⁴³

Yet further, according to Marx, man is essentially *good*. One of the “materialist theories” is that of “the original goodness of man,” wrote Marx,⁴⁴ and “there is no need for extraordinary penetration to discover what necessarily connects them [this and other theories] with communism and socialism.”

Both Marx and Engels held to the essential *mortality of man*. Marx condemned⁴⁵ Proudhon’s “dualism between life and ideas, soul and body,” and Engels regarded the statement that “all men are mortal” as so obvious as to be platitudinous.⁴⁶ Historically, maintained Engels,⁴⁷ it was the vulgar, non-dialectical, or “natural materialism” of “the philosophy of antiquity, incapable of clearing up the relation between thought and matter,” which “led to the doctrine of a soul separate from the body, then to the assertion of the immortality of the soul, and finally to monotheism.”

Lastly, Marx regarded the dominant mark of man’s essence as his oneness with yet *mastery over nature* and his self-creation. “Once the essence of man and of Nature, man as a natural being and Nature as human reality, has become evident . . . , the search for an alien being, a being outside man and Nature, a search which is an avowal of the unreality of man and Nature, becomes impossible. . . . ”⁴⁸ Hence since “what is called world history is nothing but the creation of man by human labour, and the emergence of Nature for man, he therefore has the evident and irrefutable proof of his self-creation, of his own origins.”⁴⁸ Man is, in fact, a being that “owes his existence to himself.”⁴⁹ For “man,” wrote Engels,⁵⁰ “makes nature serve his ends, masters it. This is the final, essential distinction between man and the other animals. . . . ”

E. *Critique of above*

Turning first to the *origin* of man, as regards the Marxists' claims that man descended from the ape, it must be pointed out that very few modern evolutionists would care to underwrite them. Divided though modern evolutionists are amongst themselves concerning what they regard as man's immediate ancestors,⁵¹ they are generally agreed amongst themselves that man did not descend from an ape at all, but claim that both man and ape descended from the same pre-simian or pre-monkey ancestor.⁵² On the other hand, Christian philosophy stoutly maintains that, in spite of some morphological resemblance, evidencing no more than a common Creator,⁵³ man alone is the image of God⁵⁴ and is genealogically totally unrelated to the ape or to any ancestor thereof.⁵⁵ So neither modern evolutionists nor Christian philosophers lend any support to the isolated Marxists' views concerning man's supposedly simian origin, even though both non-Marxist evolutionists and Christians would agree⁵⁶ with the Marxists⁵⁷ that man is nevertheless a part of nature. As even Engels in all honesty assured his readers elsewhere:¹⁸ "Although this period may have lasted for many thousands of years, *we have no direct evidence of its existence.*" This self-admission analyzes the true value of Engels' theory of descent more decisively than could any amount of adverse criticism.

One may now enquire why Engels ever held his anthropogenical theory as to the unestablished transition from ape to man if he himself admitted that the evidence for its veracity was so slender. The answer is that for him, "once we admit the descent of man from the animal kingdom, the acceptance of this transitional stage is inevitable."¹⁸

However, Christian philosophy does not so admit this descent. Quite apart from the Biblical objection that man is a materio-spiritual creature *sui generis* fashioned directly from the dust of the ground as the very image of God,⁵⁵ seeing that Engels' view of the origin and development of life in general has been found, in the previous chapter, to be philosophically meagre and unprovable, the burden is rather on

Engels to establish and not to assume man's simian ancestry for which he admits he has no direct evidence. And in the light of the extreme duplicity⁵⁸ surrounding the history of the discoveries of the so-called ape-men *Eoanthropus dawsoni* and *Pithecanthropus erectus*, the burden of proof must rest even more so on Engels and his fellow evolutionists rather than on the Christian creationists.

One should not attach too much importance to Engels' idea of the Indian Ocean as the cradle of humanity, for numerous other non-Christian anthropologists have variously suggested: America, Greenland, the North Pole, Germany, South Russia, and Africa⁵⁹—*quot homines, tot sententiae*,⁶⁰—all of which localities (save parts of Africa) further contradict Engels' theory by lying outside of the tropics, as too does Mesopotamia, which most Christian philosophers regard as the cradle of man,⁶¹ and which certainly seems more likely on ethnological, linguistical, historical, and archaeological grounds.¹⁰

As regards *who* or what first made this transition from ape to man, the Marxists are extremely vague. To the question: "who created the first man . . .?" Marx evasively replied,⁶² ". . . your question is itself a product of abstraction. . . . If you ask a question about the creation of nature and man you abstract nature from man." And then followed Marx's peculiar rationale for this statement: "You suppose them [nature and man] *non-existent* and you want me to demonstrate that they *exist*. I reply: give up your abstraction and at the same time you abandon your question. Or else, if you want to maintain your abstraction, be consistent, and if you think of man and nature as non-existent, think of yourself too as non-existent, for you are man and nature."

Although Marx was here primarily attacking idealism, the above statement nevertheless has anthropological implications. Hence this answer, if such it may be called, would be ludicrous if it were not so tragic. No one had ever assumed the *present non-existence* of man in asking Marx about the first man's origin. The question put to Marx was not whether man *now* exists, but whether he has *always* existed. And in the light of even Engels'⁶³ and Lenin's⁶⁴ admissions that there

was a time when man did not exist, Marx can only be regarded as trying to dodge the issue.

In a moment of weakness, however, "since Robinson Crusoe's experiences are a favourite theme with political economists," Marx condescended to "take a look at him on his island." After ridiculing the idea, Marx nevertheless admitted that "all the relations between Robinson and the objects of this wealth of his own creation . . . contain all that is essential to the determination of value."¹¹ But here Marx seemed to have forgotten that Crusoe's wealth was not entirely of his own human creation, for, as Marx himself admitted, Crusoe first "rescued a watch, ledger, and pen and ink from the wreck,"¹¹ unlike the first man could have done, and then proceeded to produce in solitude, economically unappreciated except by himself—a rather un-Marxist, subjectivistic theory of value.

With regard to Engels' statement that "Crusoe enslaved Friday 'sword in hand'," it is, of course, as Engels himself maintained, quite true that swords do not grow on the trees of the imaginary islands of Robinson Crusoe stories;¹² but it is equally true that swords do not grow on the imaginary subterranean continent of Lemuria of Friedrich Engels' stories either. As Engels himself pointed out: ". . . the hand of the lowest savage can perform hundreds of operations that no monkey's hand can imitate. No simian hand has ever fashioned even the crudest of stone knives."¹⁴ But this makes the very coming into existence of the human sword or knife more problematic than ever from the materialistic or evolutionistic points of view.

Engels' shift from Crusoe and Friday to Adam and Eve¹³ does, however, represent progress. At least human differentiation in the human population of Eden or Lemuria are now possible. This even Engels realized in his rebuttal of Dühring's equality between Crusoe and Friday prior to the latter's enslavement by the former. For "two people," rejoined Engels⁶⁵ in a brief insight into the truth, "may be unequal in sex, and this simple fact leads us at once to the fact that the simplest elements of society . . . are not two people, but a man

and a woman, who found a *family*, the simplest and first form of association for the purpose of production.”

Unfortunately this deep truth of the primordial monophylogensis⁶⁶ of the human race from one ancestral father and mother, the foundation of all Christian philosophical anthropology, morality, ethnology, soteriology and sociology, etc., and almost embraced by Marx himself,⁶⁷ was finally rejected by Engels in his statement that man descended from “a specially highly-developed *race* of anthropoid apes” which “lived in bands in trees,⁶ and Lenin’s belief that man descended from a “*herd* of apes.”⁵

As regards the *appearance* of these so-called transitional forms, Engels (who ontically did not as then exist and who, from his own realistic basis epistemologically⁶⁸ cannot therefore really know) assures us (apparently once more by faith alone) that “Darwin has given us an approximate description of these ancestors of ours. They were completely covered with hair, they had beards and pointed ears, and they lived in bands in trees.”⁶ But here it must be pointed out that even if the unearthed skulls and skeletons claimed by evolutionists to be those of transitional forms rather than of pure apes or pure men, as the case may be, really were such, one could hardly deduce therefrom that they were “completely covered with hair.” This would, in fact, also be rather unnecessary if they lived “in the tropical zone,” as Engels maintained that they did;⁶ and that they had beards and pointed ears is equally unestablishable.

These “ancestors of ours”⁶ may, “at least partially,” as Engels elsewhere¹⁸ corrected himself, have dwelt in *trees*. But then so do some quite definitely human tribes in the Congo and elsewhere even to this day, alongside tree-living apes. However, if this were a case of the survival of the fittest and of species alteration through transmitted characteristics, which the Marxists have informed us permeates the whole realm of living things, it is not clear how that part of the apes which remained in the trees managed to survive if the rest of their number left the trees and became men precisely in order to survive; and how some of the apes, while continuing to dwell in their trees, became tree-dwelling men if, as Engels main-

tained,⁶ “the decisive step in the transition from ape to man” was taken precisely as “these apes when *walking* on level ground began to . . . adopt a more and more erect gait.” If the Marxists were to reply that tree-living men are degenerate men⁶⁹ who once lived on the ground, with which Christian philosophy would agree, it must be pointed out that such a view conflicts with the Marxist view of the upward-bound dialectic,⁷⁰ unless of course by the “upward-bound” is meant rising from the ground up into the trees!

Certainly the Christian philosopher would agree⁷¹ that the use of the hand and of the *tool* is one of the conspicuous consequences of the difference between man and animals. But this is a consequence, not the essence of the difference.⁷² Again, one must remember that some animals also use tools. The short-beaked insectivorous tool-using finch of the Galapagos, for example, clutches a cactus-spine in its beak to drill for tree-infesting insects.⁷³ So Engels’ statement⁷⁴ that “animals . . . have tools . . . only as limbs of their bodies” is hardly accurate.

The portrayal of primordial man as a *savage*¹⁶ is, of course, a true reflection of the evolutionistic theory of man’s origin, but it must be stated that this picture is quite without historical foundation. The very fact that such savage peoples still exist today alongside of highly refined and civilized peoples, and that savage individuals, e.g., Hitler, are still found amongst highly civilized nations, shows how misleading it is to pinpoint savagery to a certain period in the development of man, or indeed even in the development of a particular people. The British barbarians of many centuries ago had their noble Caradocs, and the modern Britain has her savage and criminal sadists. Modern Greece and Mesopotamia are, if anything, probably inferior in refinement to their ancient counterparts. True civilization is not demonstrably improving in its total qualities,⁷⁵ and there is no valid reason at all for preferring the Marxist picture of primordial man as a brutal savage to that of Christian philosophy which represents man’s first⁷⁶ estate as one of knowledge, holiness and righteousness, as the very image of God.⁷⁷

Certainly *speech* is a great consequence of man's essential difference from the animals, but it is not the essential difference itself.⁷⁸ Again, it is unwise to assert that animals have little to communicate with one another, and even that they can communicate with one another without the aid of articulate speech. Just because man has not been able to study animal communication as thoroughly as should be the case, does not give the Marxists the authority to preclude all articulate speech in animals. This is becoming more apparent nowadays from experiments with dolphins. But in any case, such preclusion cancels the validity of Marxist realism irrespective of man's present epistemological prowess.

Less acceptable from the Christian philosophical point of view is the Marxists' view as to the role of *diet* in the averred transition from ape to man. For irrespective of the brain's nutriment through increased use of meat and fish protein, it must be admitted that there is no noticeable difference between the intelligence of carnivorous or omnivorous men on the one hand and of vegetarian men on the other. In fact, many vegetarians are highly educated people, and many carnivores and omnivores are still savages. Again, if a fish and flesh diet were such an important factor in the development of the brain, one would expect the vegetarian whale and elephant to be less intelligent than the carnivorous shark and python, whereas in fact the reverse is rather the case and the former animals' massive brains dwarf those of the latter. Or, restricting the comparison to apes, if the flesh-eating thesis were correct, it is inexplicable why the omnivorous gibbon should only have a cranial capacity of approximately one-fifth the size of the exclusively vegetarian gorilla.⁷⁹

To Christian philosophy the question of diet is relatively unimportant today,⁸⁰ although in point of historical fact man was perhaps⁸¹ exclusively vegetarian⁸² before his fall from grace, after which he became omnivorous.⁸³ From this viewpoint, his intellectual prowess was greater⁷⁷ primordially when still a vegetarian, which is the very opposite of what Engels taught.

Certainly man's use of *fire* is very ancient, from the Christian philosophical viewpoint⁸⁴ nearly as ancient as the origin of man

himself; yet the figure of 100,000 years is just guesswork. So too, the domestication of animals is very long established. Perhaps even longer than the Marxists think, in that man probably domesticated animals right from his very origin.⁸⁵

As regards whether man is still an animal or not, it may be doubted whether any true synthesis can emerge from the three Marxist motifs of naturalism,²² humanism,²⁶ and dialectics²¹ For one thing, it may be enquired why the so-called eternal dialectical law of the “qualitative leap in the quantitative series” should be “very fine” in the case of the so-called transition from ape to man, and not so very fine in other cases. Again, if fire has separated man “for ever” from the animal world, it is not clear how it can still be true that man “can never entirely rid himself of animal characteristics”; and even if man is a tool-maker, how he can still be a “tool-making *animal*.”

The Christian philosophers have little quarrel with the Marxists as to the *historical* nature of man. Both parties believe that the earth’s “history” before man’s advent really took place in a chronological succession of moments in time, and both believe that history proper requires the presence of man as the pinnacle of nature. But they differ when attention is drawn to the *content* of this history—to the Marxists: the dialectical movement of matter in motion through man as its highest form; and to the Christian philosophers: the objectified unfolding of God’s actual counsel for man through creation, redemption and consummation.

So much for the *origin* of man. But to proceed: however much truth there is in the Marxists’ attempts to define man’s *essence*, these attempts are not without inherent defects.

Whereas it is true that man is a tool-maker and a fire-maker, the Marxist description of man as a social being is not altogether true. Even on the Marxist hypothesis, man was a family being before he was a social being.⁸⁶ But the question is: what was man before he was a family being? Before this man was an individual being, and even though the Marxists may correctly argue that individual man is in his turn a product of society, it is clear that the *first* man was an individual; even if he had dialectically “leapt” from the tree-

dwelling apes, the others would have been left behind him, at least temporarily, whilst he stood alone as an individual *man*. Even the possible Marxist thesis that all the men-bound apes made the leap simultaneously solves nothing, for it presupposes their alienation as an *individual* group of ex-simian men over against the other individual group of apes that remained apes and which the “apes” that became man rather anti-socially left behind them. To Christian philosophy, there is no problem. Man was first an individual,⁸⁷ then a family⁸⁸ and finally a society,⁸⁹ and is now all three simultaneously⁹⁰ as is the Triune God⁹¹ Whose image he is;⁹² whereas anti-socialness is the result of sin.⁹³

It is true that speech is a dominant characteristic of man, but it is not true that “language, like consciousness, only arises from the necessity of intercourse with other men. . . .”³⁴ The first man to have made the leap from apehood, from the Marxist viewpoint, became conscious of his erstwhile fellows still in transition when they were not yet men, for if the first man did not as then speak, he was, on the Marxist hypothesis, not yet truly man. From the Christian philosophical viewpoint, however, God first spoke to man,⁹⁴ then man spoke to or about the animals,⁹⁵ then he surveyed his fellow (wo)man and spoke to himself,⁹⁶ and finally he spoke to her.⁹⁷

It is not too easy to evaluate the Marxists’ view of man’s inequality. Even from the Christian philosophical view, there is much truth in the Marxists’ standpoint, e.g., as to sexual inequality.⁹⁸ Yet it must be pointed out that when the Marxists speak of inequality they really mean moral, voluntary, etc., inferiority, whereas when the Christian speaks of inequality he generally means pluriformity, at least as regards man’s first and sinless estate,⁹⁹ although inferiority did become a later non-essential factor as a result of sin, in which latter all men are, however, indeed equal before God.¹⁰⁰

As to whether man was originally good (thus Marx) or brutal (thus Engels), it is clear that all depends upon one’s standard of right and wrong. However, it is clear that the Marxists’ contradictory

use of the words "good" and "brutal" only shows how devoid of meaning their use of both words are, when used by them almost interchangeably; but even if ape-men were brutal and men not, how could men, the descendants of the ape-men, equally matter in motion, have become otherwise, unless matter too be moral, or alternatively unless matter be conjoined to moral spirit? The Christian philosopher with his rigid standard of God's revelation, however, would "agree" with Marx (against Engels) that man was originally good,¹⁰¹ but insist (with Engels) that he is now no longer truly good,¹⁰² i.e., good in the sight of the holy and perfect God.

As to man's mortality, affirmed by Engels as a "platitude," it is very strange that he could find his way open to immortalize the dead Marx by claiming at his funeral that "his name shall live forth through the centuries"¹⁰³ and that his death was "an immeasurable loss."¹⁰⁴ Certainly man is mortal¹⁰⁵ *now*, but that he has always *been*¹⁰⁶ or always *will be* mortal¹⁰⁷ does not necessarily follow in logic and must in fact be denied apriorically in terms of Christian philosophy.

Lastly, it must be conceded to the Marxists that man is one with¹⁰⁸ yet master over nature.¹⁰⁹ But it does not at all follow from this that man created himself. This would only follow if nature created itself; but it has been shown above¹¹⁰ that this has not been demonstrated at all, and that the contrary is rather evident.

Just as the Marxists sought the *origin* of man in his gait, hand, speech and diet respectively, so too have they variously sought the *essence* of man in his manufacture of tools and of fire, in his social being, his speech, his goodness, his naturalism, and his dominion. But it is impossible for each of these different facets to be congruent to man's whole essence. Rather are they the *consequences* of a deeper essence at the root of them all. This Marxism cannot fathom, but when it is perceived that all the above facets imply a supra-natural, supra-material quality, the logic of Christian philosophy is seen in its claim that the essence of man is the image of God.¹¹¹

F. Summary

Summarizing, as regards man's *origin*, it was seen that the Marxists, contrary to nearly all other evolutionists, believe men to have been descended not from ape-men, but from a herd of tree-dwelling apes. They then conceded of this development, alleged to have occurred "many hundreds of thousands of years ago," that they had "no direct evidence of its existence," but that it necessarily followed "once we admit the descent of man from the animal kingdom."

Then the Marxists claimed, as did Haeckel, that this transition occurred "somewhere in the tropical zone" on what is now a great subterranean continent, whereas other evolutionists have variously suggested nearly all the other extant continents and places and even the very place claimed by the Bible, Mesopotamia in Asia.

There is much uncertainty as to who or which beings are alleged to have made this transition. Adam and Eve and even Robinson Crusoe were not tolerated, except in jest, although Engels did seem to appreciate that if two people were the first men, they would have to be a man and a woman and they would have to construct a family. The Marxist view, however, vague as it is, appears to be that a whole *race* of apes simultaneously became man.

Then it was seen that the Marxist claims as to the hairy and ape-like appearance of these first men are really based neither on accurate anatomical identification and analysis of fossil remains nor on logical processes, whereas their adduction of walking on the ground as the decisive step "in the transition from ape to man" on the one hand and the specialized development of the hand and the manufacture of tools on the other, leaves unexplained why some men still live in trees and some animals employ tools.

The Marxist view of savagery as the primordial condition of men was not adequately established, and their view as to the part played by speech, though containing much truth, was overstated in denying the possibility of articulate communication between animals. Similarly, their views on the role of diet, while stressing

the known truth that meat and fish are rich in proteins needed by the brain, hardly explains a dialectical leap from ape to man, particularly seeing that many vegetarians, both human and animal, have as much brain power as have carnivores, if not more. Finally, the claim that fire irrevocably severed man from the animal kingdom forever was found to be vague and unconvincing.

It was next seen that the Marxists were not clear as to whether or not man is still an animal, the naturalism of Engels tending to uphold this, the humanism of Marx to deny it, and the dialectical leap to confuse the picture further by being "very fine here." Nevertheless, it was seen that the Marxists correctly stressed history as having been entered with the advent of man.

As regards the *essence* of man, it was seen that the Marxists accentuated many valuable facets of man, even though man's essence is not adequately explained by any one of them. Such facets were man's capacity to make tools and fire, his social nature, his speech, his (in)equality, his goodness (Engels: his brutality), his part in and mastery over nature, and his self-creation. All these facets were analyzed, and, where necessary, the fallacies in the Marxist position were pointed out. Finally, it was seen that the true essence of man must lie deeper than all these facets, which were only some of the more obvious consequences thereof, and that the Marxists could therefore not be deemed to have clarified the problems connected with the origin and essence of man.

G. *Christian view of man*

Our Christian philosophical viewpoint apriorically rejects the Marxist and Darwinist account of man's origin. We affirm that the entire human race descended from one original pair, the historical persons Adam and Eve, rather than from a band of tree-dwelling apes. As such we assert that man is essentially different from and genealogically totally unrelated to the animals, that he was originally immediately created from lifeless dust and enlivened by the Spirit of God without any gradual evolution at all from any pre-human ancestors whatsoever, and that his original habitat was in the east,

in a garden in Eden, and not on some legendary and sub-terranean land of Lemuria now in the middle of the Indian Ocean.

Christian philosophy further insists that the essence of man is his creation as the image of God in perfect knowledge, righteousness and holiness,¹¹² and that he was destined to dominate the earth, the sea and the sky.¹¹¹ As such Engels' views as to man's primordial animality and savagery must be discounted, and the human characteristics he mentions such as speech, brain, dominion, etc., must be seen not as causes but as results of man's creation in the divine image.

* * *

Communism versus creation. Did man evolve from the slime or was he created sublime? Is he a graduate animal or is he the image of God?¹¹¹ "For thou hast made him a little lower than the angels, and has crowned him with glory and honour. Thou madest him to have dominion over the works of thy hands; thou hast put all things under his feet."¹⁰⁹

VII

COMMUNISM AND THE ORIGIN OF LABOR

“What profit hath a man of all his labour . . . ?” asks the Preacher;¹ and the Marxists would assure us that all the profits of labor should be shared communally.

In chapter six, reference was made to Engels’ pamphlet: “The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man.” There Engels maintained that labor and speech were the two most essential stimuli under the influence of which the brain of the ape gradually changed into that of man,² and that labor is “the characteristic difference between the troupes of monkeys and human society.”³

A. Determinative role of labor

According to Engels, it was labor that “created man himself,”⁴ even though primordial man was “as poor as the animals, and hardly more productive than these.”⁵ And not only Engels, but Marx too accentuated the vital role of labor regarding man’s origin. To him “the outstanding thing in Hegel’s *Phänomenologie [des Geistes—N.L.]* is that Hegel grasps the self-creation of man as a process . . . ; and that he therefore grasps the nature of labour and conceives the object man . . . as a result of his own labour.”⁶ Labor it is that radically separates man from the animals, that causes him to rise above the animals, that exalts him above nature.

Thus the Marxists regard labor as the basis of all other human relationships. This is taught by their doctrine of historical material-

ism, namely "that view of the course of history," wrote Engels,⁷ "which seeks the ultimate cause and the great moving power of all important historic events in the economic development of society, in the changes in the modes of production and exchange, in the consequent division of society into distinct classes, and in the struggles of these classes against one another." This simply means that the mode of production in material life determines the social, political, and intellectual life processes in general, as Marx put it.⁸

Engels gave Marx all the credit for this discovery of the law of evolution in human history, the law that "mankind must first of all eat and drink, have shelter and clothing before it can pursue politics, religion, science, art, etc."⁹ All these truths and indeed all social factors whatsoever were "to be sought not in the *philosophy* but in the *economics* of the epoch concerned."¹⁰ It is "the economic structure of society" which is "the real basis on which a juridical and political superstructure arises," wrote Marx,¹¹ for "the mode of production of the material means of existence conditions the whole process of social, political and intellectual life." "*Industry* is the real historical relation of Nature . . . to man,"¹² and "religion, the family, the State, law, morality, science, art, etc., are only *particular* forms of production and come under its general law."¹³

Labor thus dominates and predetermines all human existence. Yet because labor is "a process in which both man and Nature participate,"¹⁴ it is "not the sole source of all wealth," for "*nature* is just as much the source of use values . . . as labour."¹⁵ However, in labor nature is acted upon by *man*. For "human labour has the power of detaining solar energy on the earth's surface,"¹⁶ and labor is "only the manifestation of human power,"¹⁵ a process in which "man of his own accord starts, regulates and controls the material reactions between himself and Nature."¹⁴

B. *Premeditated nature of labor*

Unlike many other living beings, man labors only after *pre-meditation*. What a plant, for example, does unconsciously, man does deliberately by work.¹⁶ Man "opposes himself to Nature as

one of her forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate Nature's production in the form of his own words. . . . We presuppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human," argued Marx.¹⁴ "A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells, but what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in his imagination before he erects it in reality."¹⁴ Whereas an animal does not distinguish activity from itself, man makes his life activity itself an *object* of his will and consciousness, not identifying himself completely therewith.¹⁷ "The use and fabrication of instruments of labour," wrote Marx,¹⁸ "although existing in the germ among certain species of animals, is specifically characteristic of the human labour-process, and Franklin therefore defines man as a tool-making animal."

C. *Teleological orientation of labor*

Furthermore, man's labor process is *teleologically* orientated. Man not only effects a change of form in the material but," declared Marx,¹⁴ "he also realizes a *purpose* of his own that gives the law to his *modus operandi*, and to which he must subordinate his will," for it is absolutely vital that "during the whole operation, the workman's will be steadily in consonance with his purpose."

D. *Concrete and technological nature of labor*

The nature of labor is also *concrete and material*. Fitted into the Robinson Crusoe framework, such labor would include "making tools and furniture, taming goats, fishing and hunting."¹⁹ But relaxation, recreation and religious exercises cannot be regarded as labor—"of his prayers and the like we take no account, since they are a source of pleasure to him, and he looks upon them as so much recreation."¹⁹

The Marxist doctrine of the development of labor is essentially *technological*, for man is *homo faber*, *homo laborans*, a tool-making animal.²⁰ Indeed, "technology discloses man's mode of dealing with

Nature, the process of production whereby he sustains his life, and by which also his social relations and the mental conceptions that flow from them, are formed," declared Marx,²¹ so that any history of religion even that fails to take account of this material basis, is uncritical.

Of course, the concepts "technology" and "tools" are taken in a very wide sense. As the laborer works, even "*Nature* becomes one of the organs of his activity, one that he annexes to himself in spite of the Bible. As the earth is his original larder, so too it is his original tool house."²² Nature itself, of course, "constructs no machines, no locomotives, railways, electric telegraphs, self-acting mules, etc.," for they are all products of human industry, natural materials transformed into instruments of the human domination of nature.²³

Tools too are "instruments of the *human* brain created by the human hand; . . . the materialized power of [human] knowledge."²³ Animals may indeed produce nests and dens and hives, but they produce involuntarily and they only produce themselves. Man, on the other hand, produces the whole of nature, produces voluntarily and aesthetically.²⁴ Hence, as Engels remarks,²⁵ "the hand of the lowest savage can perform hundreds of operations that no monkey's hand can imitate," for "no simian hand ever fashioned even the crudest of stone knives."

The use of tools, however, is never an individual affair, but is always exercised for the benefit of the *community* and future generations, improving on inventions inherited from previous generations. "The individual and isolated hunter or fisher who forms the starting-point with Smith and Ricardo belongs to the insipid illusions of the eighteenth century," wrote Marx.²⁶ Adam and/or Robinson Crusoe are illusions.²⁷

Hence, even, or rather particularly, in his technology, man is a social animal, dependent on society for the tools he will improve, but also changing society in the process. Changes in tools were the factors which led to the changes from one great historical era to another, "in broad outline, the Asiatic, the ancient, the feudal and

the modern bourgeois modes of production,” according to Marx,²⁸ as “the progressive epochs in the economic system of society.” Fire was the “tool” which separated man from the beasts, and was more important than any other subsequent tool.²⁹ Gold and silver, iron and corn ruined the human race.³⁰ The discovery of iron and other developments led to slavery;³¹ “the hand-mill gives you society with the feudal land; [and] the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist,” wrote Marx.³²

E. *Division of labor*

Such development of technology, however, implies a progressive *division of labor*. Originally, such labor divisions were quite involuntary, and all labor relations of men were independent of their will.³³ In acquiring new productive forces men changed their mode of production; and in changing their mode of production they changed their way of earning their living and thus changed all their social relations, so that “social relations are just as much produced by men as linen, flax, etc.,” so that “these categories . . . are *historical and transitory products*” and “are as little eternal as the relations they express.”³²

In their early period, Marx and Engels regarded³⁴ the division of labor as “being originally nothing else than the division of labour in the sexual act,”³⁴ an idea which Engels reaffirmed in 1884 in his *Origin of the Family*,³⁵ where he also argued that in later barbarism “division of labour was a pure and simple outgrowth of nature; it existed only between the two sexes.”³⁶ This *sexual* division led to a “natural division of labour within the *family* cultivating the soil,”³⁷ and this in turn led to a further “division of labour which took place of itself or ‘naturally’ as a result of natural aptitudes, e.g., bodily strength, needs, coincidence, etc., etc.”³⁴

Hence, it was not long before the natural division of labor within the family cultivating the soil made possible, at a certain level of well-being, “the introduction of one or more strangers, as additional forces,”³⁷ so that, in addition to the *natural* division of labor (between men and women, young and old, strong and feeble), there

now took place a further *professional* division of labor (between the various crafts and professions).³⁸ It is true that even this division of labor entailed "some crippling both of mind and body,"³⁹ but on the other hand "this division of labour is a necessary condition for the production of commodities," even though it sometimes occurs without such commodity production, e.g., in primitive Indian communities.⁴⁰

However, "the division of labour becomes real division only from the instant when the *division of material and spiritual labour* takes place,"³⁴ with which "coincides the first form of ideologists (priests)."⁴¹ This could only take place after the first considerable *surplus* in production, for a surplus of the product of labor over and above the cost of maintenance of labor was and is the basis of all social, political and intellectual progress;⁴² for without such surplus "any increase of the productive forces, extension of trade, development of the state and of law, or beginning of art and science, was only possible by means of a greater division of labour."⁴³ At first surpluses were few and insignificant, however, and so, "in the division of labour, man is also divided," and "all other physical and mental faculties are sacrificed to the development of one single activity."⁴⁴ This is unavoidably so, "because the *division of labour* implies the possibility, indeed the fact, that intellectual and material activity—enjoyment and labour, production and consumption—devolve on different individuals."⁴⁵

F. *Labor and human alienation*

This division of labor went hand in hand with the alienation of man from nature, from his fellow man and from himself; the alienation between man's hand and his head, between producer and product, between labor-value and market-value. This alienation accompanied and resulted from man's transition from manual work to mental, from bare necessities to money, from common ownership to private property, from freedom to slavery, and from country to town life. It is to an examination of each of these that we must now turn.

G. *Manual and mental labor*

To some extent, the technological development of the tool, coupled with the increasing division of labor, automatically led to the distinction between hand and head, *between manual and mental labor*. All labor, according to the Marxists, was originally and is fundamentally manual.⁴⁶ "Originally," wrote Marx,⁴⁷ "there was less distinction between a burden-bearer and a philosopher than between a sleigh-dog and a greyhound." It is only from the moment that the distinction between material and mental labor appears, that the division of labor becomes real.⁴⁸ This division then leads to the creation of "active, conceptive ideologists, who make the perfecting of the illusion of the class about itself their chief source of livelihood."⁴⁹ Again, just as mental labor is derived from prior manual labor, so too is skilled labor derived from prior unskilled labor. "Skilled labour counts only as simple labour intensified, or rather, multiplied simple labour . . .," maintained both Marx and Engels.⁵⁰

H. *Labor and production*

All labor, however simple, involved *production*, from the ancient production of fire⁵¹ onwards. From the very beginning, however, production was always a social affair, as even "my *own* existence is a social activity," and therefore, wrote Marx,⁵² "for this reason, what I myself produce, I produce for society and with the consciousness of acting as a social being." Yet notwithstanding this, there was little productiveness under primordial primitive communism, paradoxically, when surplus production was still pitifully small. It was only when man made "his first economic advance," an advance that "consisted in the increase and development of production by means of slave labour," that "the peoples made progress of themselves."⁵³ This was indeed not without advantage to society as a whole, as it unleashed an "immense increase of productive forces" which made it possible to distribute labor among all members of society without exception, and thereby to limit the labor time of each individual member to such an extent that all have enough free

time left to take part in the general, both theoretical and practical, affairs of society.⁵⁴

I. *Labor and commodities*

Increased production soon led to the production of *commodities*. "A commodity," wrote Marx,⁵⁵ is "an object outside us, a thing that by its properties satisfies human wants of some sort or another," which presents itself "as a complex of two things—use-value and exchange-value."⁵⁶

J. *Labor and value*

Commodities draw attention to the concept of *value*, and represent an alienating transition from the primitive concept of labor-value to that of market-value, i.e., use-value and exchange-value. For "labour is the measure of all value, but labour itself has no value."⁵⁷ Each person, of course, "must always maintain himself in the sense that he *himself* consumes the means of subsistence,"⁵⁷ but from the Marxist viewpoint, "the value of commodities is determined by the socially necessary general human labour embodied in them, and this in turn is measured by its duration,"⁵⁷ for if wages determined value no exploitation of labor by the capitalists would be possible.⁵⁸ And so the value of any article is the amount of labor socially necessary, or the labor-time socially necessary for its production, with the result that the value of a commodity would therefore remain constant, if the time required for its production also remained constant.⁵⁹ The Platonic standpoint of use-value alone rather than labor-value is to be rejected, for "Plato's treatment of the division of labour as the foundation on which the division of society into classes is based . . . is merely the Athenian idealization of the caste system."⁶⁰

K. *Labor and money*

Also important is the transition from an economy of bare necessities to a *monetary system*. Regarding the origin of money, Marx insisted⁶¹ that "nomad races are the first to develop the money-form,

because all their worldly goods consist of movable objects and are therefore directly alienable; and because their mode of life, by continually bringing them into contact with foreign communities, solicits the exchange of products." Yet in itself, however, the money-form is only the reflection, in a single commodity, of the value relations between all commodities.⁶² Hence, it is not that money renders commodities commensurable. "Just the contrary," wrote Marx,⁶³ "money as a measure of value, is the phenomenal form that must of necessity be assumed by that measure of value which is immanent in commodities, labour-time."

As value is based on labor-time rather than market-price, as soon as the product of man's hand is alienated from his physical possession and becomes an article of trade, money itself both results and corrupts. "For the poets it is gold and silver, for the philosopher iron and corn, which have civilized *men* and ruined the human *race*," wrote Engels,⁶⁴ whereas Marx observed⁶⁵ that "the power to confuse and invert all human and natural qualities, . . . the divine power of money, resides in its *essence* as the alienated and exteriorized social life of men. It is the alienated *power of humanity*."

This is particularly apparent when one considers the phenomenon of *capital*. For capital, as opposed to landed property, invariably takes the form at first as money.⁶⁶ This monetary capital, as opposed to labor-value, becomes divine to alienated man,⁶⁵ and the zenith of alienation is reached in the antisocial Jew, whose jealous god is huckstering and money.⁶⁷ Indeed, there is in fact a "real connexion" between the "whole system of alienation—private property, acquisitiveness, the separation of labour, capital and land, exchange and competition, valuation and devaluation of man, monopoly and competition—and the system of *money*."⁶⁸

L. *Labor and private property*

A parallel transition from labor-value to money is that from common ownership to *private property*.

Originally men held land in common on a tribal basis, just as they hunted and fished on a communal tribal basis.⁶⁹ Such coopera-

tion was found at the dawn of history,⁷⁰ was everywhere in evidence from India to Ireland,⁷¹ in which latter country common land ownership continued until as late as A.D. 1600.⁷² The ubiquity⁷³ of this communal system is evident in that that of the primitive Russians “down to the smallest detail, is absolutely identical with the *primitive German* communal system.”⁷⁴ Whether it obtained amongst the Slavonians, Romans, Teutons, Celts, or Indians,⁷⁵ not everywhere were products transformed into commodities, but the work was always distributed on the basis of tradition and requirements,⁷⁶ even though land in detached parcels was sometimes temporarily allocated to families by the community, while woodland and pastureland continued to be used in common,⁷⁷ all of which corresponded to the socialist tendency.⁷⁸

Whereas this original common ownership of land corresponded to a level of human development restricted to what lay immediately at hand, and presupposed a superfluity of land allowing for the correction of any bad effects of this primordial economy, “when this surplus land was exhausted, common ownership declined,” leading to the creation of ruling and oppressed classes,⁷⁹ as well as to that greatest of all evils, private property.

Originally property and labor were identical, but with their separation from one another, “property turns out to be the right, on the part of the capitalist, to appropriate the unpaid labour of others or its product, and, on the part of the labourer, the impossibility of appropriating his own product,” so that “the separation of property from labour has become the necessary consequence of a law that apparently originated in their identity.”⁸⁰

This separation apparently began when the commune itself started *trading* with other communes. “The exchange of commodities,” wrote Marx,⁸¹ “first begins on the boundaries of such communities, at their points of contact with similar communities, or with members of the latter. So soon, however, as products once become commodities in the external relations of a community, they also, by reaction, become so in its internal intercourse.” Engels too has affirmed⁸² that private property “developed even within these

communes, at first through barter with strangers, till it reached the form of commodities.”

With the transition from primary needs to commodities and from manual to mental labor, “the more the products of the commune assumed the commodity form, that is, the less they were produced for their producers’ own use and the more for the purpose of exchange, the more the original primitive division of labour was replaced by exchange also within the commune, the more did inequality develop in the property of the individual members of the commune, the more deeply was the ancient common ownership of the land undermined, and the more rapidly did the commune move towards its dissolution and transformation into a village of small peasants.”⁸² Yet this took a long time. For “the genesis of the farmer,” wrote Marx,⁸³ “is a slow process evolving through many centuries.”

M. *Labor and surplus*

Private property was, however, given its greatest boost by the *surplus* mechanism and the institution of slavery. Increased productivity and “exploitation of labour by the capitalists” resulted in “the formation of a surplus of products.” Indeed, the whole development of human society beyond the stage of brute savagery begins from the day when the labor of the family created more products than were necessary for its maintenance, from the day when one portion of labor could be devoted to the production no longer of the mere means of subsistence, but of means of production. A surplus of the products of labor over and above the cost of the maintenance of labor was and is the basis of all social, political, and intellectual progress.⁸⁴

N. *Labor and slavery*

Slavery, however, is just as important a factor in the development of labor. Indeed, “without the slavery of antiquity, no modern socialism,” wrote Engels.⁸⁵ The “introduction of slavery . . . was a great step forward,”⁸⁵ for whereas prisoners of war had formerly

been put to death, with the invention of slavery there was made possible "the division of labour between agriculture and industry on a considerable scale."⁸⁵

A good example is the U.S.A. "It is slavery that has given the colonies their value," wrote Marx,⁸⁶ "for slavery is an economic category of the greatest importance. Without slavery, North America, the most progressive of countries, would be transformed into a patriarchal country. . . . Abolish slavery and you have wiped America off the map of nations."

Slavery is not, however, a primordial institution, as it presupposes the means of subjugating and employing the slave and the provision of enough basic needs to keep him alive. "Therefore, before slavery becomes possible, a certain level of production must already have been reached and a certain inequality of distribution must already have appeared."⁸⁷

Yet miserable as was his role, unlike the proletarian, the slave "has his existence assured, be that existence never so wretched," for "it is entirely to the interest of the slave owner that this security should be assured." The labor of the proletarian, however, "is sold only when it is needed by the owning class," he "has no security for life,"⁸⁸ and he has nothing to lose but his chains.⁸⁹

O. *Labor and urbanization*

The last great factor in the development of labor is the *estrangement of the town from the country*. "The division of labour within a nation brings about, in the first place," wrote Marx and Engels,⁹⁰ "the separation of industrial and commercial from agricultural labour, and hence the separation of *town* and *country* and the opposition of their interests." This in turn leads to the alienation of the urbanite from the rustic, the one becoming "a narrow-minded city animal" and the other "a narrow-minded rural animal."⁹¹ Especially in the city does this estrangement develop. "Plato's presentation . . . for his time," considered Marx and Engels,⁹² "was full of genius—of the division of labour as the national basis of the city," but in the modern city we now have "Machinofacturing"—

the “technical subordination of the worker to the uniform working of the instrument of labour,” the “worker who carries out one and the same simple operation for a lifetime, [who] converts his whole body into the automatic specialized instrument of that operation.”⁹³ The primordial *homo faber* has become the alienated *homo machina*.

P. *Critique of above*

Certainly there are moments of truth in this Marxist theory of labor, particularly in respect of the great role of economic factors in influencing human behavior, the misuse of money, the dignity of labor, the subjugation of nature, the economic value of surpluses and slavery and the increasing division of labor. Yet a radical critique discovers the weaknesses of the theory at nearly every point.

Firstly, for example, it is quite untrue that labor is *the* distinguishing characteristic between man and the apes. This has already been dealt with previously,⁹⁴ so here we would only add that if, as the Marxists claim, labor *created* men from man-bound apes while they were yet sub-human, it is difficult to see how an external *cause* of man can be equated with the dominant characteristic of man which *now* distinguishes him from the apes. In fact, the definition only raises the problem as to why labor operated amongst the men-bound apes differently than it did amongst the non-men-bound apes, which Marxists conceded could also “labour” up to a point.

Secondly, it is quite untrue that labor, vitally important as it unquestionably is, is the *basis* of all other relationships. The Marxists had forgotten that all sorts of *different* sociological and legal relationships have existed together with the same technological stage of development, e.g., in respect of ancient Greece it has been held that there appears to be no correlation between the practically unchanged age-old modes of production and the vastly different successive and/or contemporaneous systems of religion and systems of democracy, oligarchy, slavery, colonialism, etc. But even apart from this, it is an open question whether the life and actions of such a complicated phenomenon as man can be reduced to only one basic denominator such as the economic.

This was in fact realized by Marx and Engels in their riper years. The Ukrainian Socialist Podolinsky was castigated by Engels in 1882 because he had “confused physics and economics,”⁹⁵ and in 1894 Engels declared⁹⁶ that “under economic conditions are further included the *geographical* basis on which they operate and those *remnants of earlier stages* of economic development which have actually been transmitted and have survived, often through *tradition* or the force of *inertia*; also of course the *external* milieu which surrounds this form of society . . . [whereas] *race* is itself an economic factor,” and concluded that “it is not that the economic position is the *cause and alone active*, while everything else only has a passive effect.” Thus was Engels’ “economics” meaninglessly extended to cover just about every aspect of life—geography, tradition, inertia, milieu, race—a sad comment on his own condemnation of Podolinsky’s confusion of physics and economics and a very far cry from Marx’s radical historical materialism, or rather historical economism, as propounded in the Preface to his *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*. But then, as Engels himself conceded:⁹⁷ “Marx and I are ourselves partly to blame for the fact that younger writers sometimes lay more stress on the economic side than is due to it,” sadly admitting of “the more recent ‘Marxists’ ” that “the most wonderful rubbish has been produced from this quarter too.” Yet while condemning⁹⁸ the various economic schools of fatalism, Romanticism, humanitarianism, and philanthropism, it is amazing that Marx did not realize that his own early hypothesis of economico-historical materialism was just one more absolutistic “-ism” too, and equally worthy of condemnation for its extreme monism.

Thirdly, it is certainly untrue that labor is always concrete and material. On this supposition, performance arts such as acting and musical recitals could hardly be regarded as true labor, unless one rather superficially evaluated them as “matter in motion.” But even then, one would also have to include prayer, especially public prayer, as a form of labor. On no account can true prayer, perhaps the most exacting and exhausting of all labors, be characterized “as

so much recreation," simply because Marx rather inaccurately described it as "a source of pleasure" to the supplicant. For this would equally apply to the painter, musician, actor, etc., too.

Next, Marx is correct in describing the earth as man's larder and tool house²² wherewith he is to exercise his dominion over nature.²³ But he is utterly incorrect that this is so "in spite of the Bible." Had Marx taken the trouble to have read even the first leaf of God's Word, he would have encountered the Lord's great cultural mandate to man: "Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the *earth*, and *subdue* it: and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth."⁹⁹

As regards the great role of tools in labor, Marx must be credited with having realized this rather obvious truth. But his attempt to attribute each age to the invention of a specific tool, e.g., the feudal age to the hand-mill, is, to say the least, an over-simplification. Who can establish that medieval poetry, for example, is ultimately the product of the invention of the hand-mill?!¹⁰⁰ And what tool in use in Palestine and not elsewhere two thousand years ago produced Christianity?¹⁰¹

Certainly it is true that both ancient and modern man, at least technologically, depended and depends upon tools he inherited and inherits from his society, but the point is: who fashioned the *first* tool? Clearly the first man could not have copied the "tools" of pre-human ape society, for as Engels so correctly remarked, "no simian hand has ever fashioned even the crudest of stone knives."¹⁰² If the Biblical account of the cultural mandate⁹⁹ is rejected, the socialist is confronted with the problem of the non-social origin of the very first tool.

As regards the various successive social orders—"the Asiatic, the ancient, the feudal and the modern bourgeois modes of production,"²⁸ it is clear that the whole Marxian scheme is much too simplistic—for where do the highly literate Icelandic peasants and the highly civilized Aztecs and Incas, for example, fit into the picture? Lenin's scheme ranging from slavery through serfdom and finally

to capitalism¹⁰³ differed from that of Marx,²⁸ and even Marx elsewhere acknowledged¹⁰⁴ that “in the earlier epochs of history, we find almost everywhere a complicated arrangement of society into various orders. . . . In ancient Rome we have patricians, knights, plebeians, slaves; in the Middle Ages, feudal lords, vassals, guild-masters, journeymen, apprentices, serfs; in almost all of these classes, again, subordinate gradations.”

The Marxist doctrine of the division of labor is wrong from the start. Marx and Engels maintained that the division of labor was “originally nothing else than the division of labour in the sexual act,”³⁴ but that all labor division categories are “*historical and transitory and products*” and “are as little eternal as the relations they express.”³² The sex relation is, of course, equally *historical and transitory and non-eternal* from the Christian viewpoint,¹⁰⁵ but from the Marxists’ viewpoint in the sense that they understand these three words, Marx’s statement is patently false. For if the division of labor, rather than the Christian concept of sin, is indeed the cause of human alienation, as the Marxists believe, it necessarily follows that *nature* is evil, is an alienating force, as sex pervades the whole of animate material nature, and that the sexes of pre-human apes must already have been alienated from one another by virtue of their sexual division of labor even before the advent of man; which is quite preposterous. Moreover, from the Biblical point of view, the division of labor between man and woman certainly preceded the sexual act.¹⁰⁶

Marx and Engels also claimed that “the division of labour becomes real division only from the instant when the *division of material and spiritual labour* takes place.”³⁴ Apart from the fact that, from the Christian viewpoint, the first man did, broadly speaking, labor materially for six days and rest spiritually in worship on the sabbath,¹⁰⁷ it may also be questioned whether any chiefly material type of labor can be exclusively so, without any spiritual elements and vice-versa. “Spiritual work” involves material exertion, and “material work” is surely conducted towards some non-material end, e.g., the creation of comfort or happiness, etc. But even more fundamentally, seeing Marxism presupposes a stage

prior to alienation when material and spiritual labor were still undivided, it presupposes their thorough compatibility and thus undermines its own materialistic monism. Again, how this "division of material and spiritual labour" as *the* factor whereby "the division of labour becomes real division" can be reconciled with the Marxists' statement in the previous paragraph that the division of labor was "originally nothing else than the division of labour in the sexual act," remains a mystery.

As regards the Marxists' concept of alienation between manual and mental labor, they seem to have forgotten that both are truly labor, and, in spite of interdependence, are both distinct functions. All manual labor presupposes mental exertion, however little, and all mental exertion involves the material mind, however little. Again, the Marxist view of "skilled labour" as "multiplied simple labour" is too simplistic to be true or useful. Infinite multiplication of unskilled labor, e.g., street-sweeping, will never amount to skilled labor, e.g., city administration. Both are labor, but each is a labor *sui generis*, and Marxist reduction of both to a monistic denominator does justice neither to street-sweeping nor to city administration.

Again, the Marxists are most confused as to what constituted the first division of labor. In the *German Ideology* it is variously claimed to be the sexual act,³⁴ the resulting increase in the density of population,¹⁰⁸ "the natural division of labour occurring within the family,"¹⁰⁹ and the division between material and spiritual labor;³⁴ but in *Anti-Dühring* it is claimed that "the first great division of labour in society is the separation between town and country."¹¹⁰ Clearly, not all these aspects can be the *first* division of labor, so that the Marxist problem results in an impasse.

Coming to the question of value and money, it must be remarked that only a state-enforced policy—something which is proto-genesiologically and ultra-eschatologically anathema to the Marxists—can regulate the circulation of commodities at labor-value. The Capitalist free-trade theory which the Marxists attacked is based on the theory of supply and demand, the theory that, left to themselves, commodities will always sell at market-value, or, in special

circumstances, at use-value. A machine-gun, for instance, is obviously worth more to its possessor when attacked by hordes of savages than it is as an exhibit in the museum of a gun-collector, yet to fix its value according to the amount of "socially necessary labour" involved in its manufacture is quite inaccurate. Gold is not valuable because men risk their lives mining it, but they risk their lives mining it because it is valuable, i.e., because its market-value is high and because it is in high demand. Again, there can hardly be any such thing as the "socially necessary labour" involved in the production of a particular commodity, as labor output varies considerably from one individual producer to another.

Neither is it true that the *essence* of money is "the alienated and exteriorized social life of men." Money can be, and often is, misused to alienate man from his fellow man (like the money advanced by communist lands to promote violent revolutions elsewhere), but this misuse is hardly the *essence* of money. Not money itself, but "the *love* of money is the root of all evil."¹¹¹ Money in the form of capital and investments is essential to the entrepreneur whose undertakings always have the conscious or unconscious effect or side-effect of raising the overall standard of living of human beings. Those who condemn capitalism for the poverty accompanying its early rise in Europe have neither proved the causative bond between capitalism and such poverty nor remembered the perhaps even greater poverty *before* the rise of capitalism in Europe and the even greater poverty throughout pre-capitalistic Asia and non-Southern Africa. Engels' admission that the first men amongst whom "a kind of equality of social position" prevailed, "a certain equality in the conditions of existence," were "as poor as the animals and hardly more productive than these,"¹¹² should never be forgotten, for this was primitive *communism*. "The ancient communes, where they continue to exist, have for thousands of years formed the basis of the most barbarous form of *state*, oriental despotism, from India to Russia. It was *only when the communes dissolved* that the peoples made progress in themselves, and their first economic advance consisted in the increase and development of production. . . . Only

the immense increase of the productive forces attained through large-scale industry made it possible to distribute labour among all members of society without exception, and thereby to limit the labour time of each individual member to such an extent that all have enough free time left to take part in the general—both theoretical and practical—affairs of society.”¹¹³

It must also be disputed that originally men held land in common on a tribal basis.⁶⁹ Apart from the Biblical account, which rather suggests the contrary,¹¹⁴ Engels himself admitted that land was often held by families,⁷⁷ and Marx conceded that property rights were originally based on man's *own* labor.¹¹⁵ But if, as Engels suggested,⁸⁰ property and labor were originally identical, it is difficult to see what else the Marxists' labor-theory of value is but a defense of the right to own private property, and what else their crusade against the exploiting capitalist is but an outburst of righteous indignation, a just demand that the exploited laborer be paid what *he* (personally and privately) is entitled to *possess* by virtue of his labors, and what else the expropriated proletarian is other than a bourgeois property-owner unrighteously deprived of his property. But this was not seen by the superficial Marxists. Small wonder that Engels confusedly and unencouragingly wrote to Marx¹¹⁶ of his investigation of the German primitive commune called the *Mark*, “with which [investigation] I am still dissatisfied. . . . I myself would like to be quit of the stuff and get back to the natural sciences.” Small wonder then that on the one hand Engels described “Plato's presentation . . . of the division of labour as the natural basis of the city” as “full of *genius*,”¹¹⁷ whereas on the other hand Marx could insist that “Plato's *Republic*, in so far as the division of labour is treated in it as the formative principle of the State, is merely the Athenian idealization of the Egyptian cast system.”¹¹⁸ Their confusion in this matter only endorses the superficiality of their analysis.

As regards the origin of private property, the Marxist argument is again unconvincing. In one breath both Marx⁸¹ and Engels⁸² have declared that private property originated in inter-communal

trade, in barter with strangers; but elsewhere Engels attributed it to a shaking off of the communal fetters on production.¹¹⁹ However, if it originated by barter *between* tribes on an *inter-tribal* basis, it is difficult to see how this could lead to individual barter *within* each tribe on an *intra-tribal* basis. Again, in one place private property is said to have been promoted by the surplus mechanism,⁸⁴ and in another by the rise of slavery.^{85f} However, if man's socio-economic behavior is determined by his environment, it is not clear what inducement there could ever have been to produce the first surplus, and, once produced, how it could ever lead to the exploitation of others by certain members of the commune. Again, if food, etc., had always been distributed equally in the past, it is obscure why a surplus should lead to certain individuals hoarding it for themselves.

Again, if slavery indeed represented "a great step forward in production,"⁸⁵ it is not clear how the slave-owner can be held responsible for his then obviously *progressive* behavior, especially as his behavior is regarded as socio-economically unavoidable. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how can one reconcile Engels' account of war as the origin of slavery⁸⁵ with Marx's view that slavery is inherent in the family,¹²⁰ even apart from the Biblical account that even the division of labor between agriculture and industry took place without slavery.¹²¹ Again, Marx's overgeneralizations that "without slavery, North America, the most progressive of countries, would be transformed into a patriarchal country," and "abolish slavery, and you have wiped America off the map of nations,"⁸⁶ are certainly highly disputable statements, and have been proved utterly false by the history of the last hundred years.

Q. Summary

Summarizing, it was seen that Marxism incorrectly characterizes man as a tool-making animal, himself created by labor and thereby distinguished from the animals, and thereby predetermined in his total socio-political, religious, legal, etc., behavior.

It was correctly seen that man's labor is teleologically orientated,

and that tools play an important part therein, although the idea that a specific tool ultimately determines the whole course of the same specific age was seen to be grossly exaggerated.

As regards the division of labor, it was seen that confusion reigns amongst the Marxists as to its cause, as well as regards the relative precedence and value of mental and manual labor, and as to the number and order of development of the socio-economic eras too. Then their labor theory of value and doctrine of the evil essence of money were considered and found to be untenable, as too are their views as to the primordially of common land ownership and the later origin of private property as a result of surpluses and slavery.

R. *Christian view of labor*

The Christian philosophical viewpoint emphasizes the importance of labor to man, as does Marxism; but as regards the nature, division, and goal of labor, Christianity is in absolute contrast to Marxism.

The *nature* of labor is man's execution of the "cultural mandate" by consciously subduing the earth, the sea, and the sky to the glory of God alone,¹²² even though man is indirectly benefitted thereby;¹²³ and Christianity, unlike Marxism, also requires resting from labor on every sabbath day.¹²⁴

The *division* of labor is, to Christianity, natural and God-ordained, and not alien and abhorrent as in Marxism. For whereas Adam was ordained by God to develop the arts and sciences, Eve was ordained by God to help Adam and to bear children who would also help him further.¹²⁵ Sin is not the cause of the division of labor as such, although it is quite true that it had a very detrimental effect thereon.¹²⁶ Rather than be abolished—which is impossible in any case—the division of labor should be sanctified, as Jesus Christ the Second Adam did in respect to carpentry and as "the beloved physician" Luke did in respect to medicine.¹²⁷ Yet a slave should take his freedom when offered it,¹²⁸ and Paul the missionary sometimes turned to tent-making,¹²⁹ thereby showing that the division of labor is not inflexible.

The *goal* of labor according to Christian philosophy is the enjoyment and true synthesis of the fruits thereof here and now, but particularly in the next life too. "Blessed are the dead which die in the Lord . . . that they may rest from their labors; and their works do *follow* them."¹³⁰ "Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the *earth*."¹³¹

* * *

Communism versus creation. Miraculous creationism or materialistic communism. Which is the origin of labor? Engels' true dictum: ". . . so long as the world has existed and so long as it continues to exist, every individual must maintain himself,"¹³² led to the Soviet Constitution's adoption of the brilliant slogan, "He who does not work, shall not eat."¹³³ The slogan was brilliant, but hardly original, for it was taken almost word for word from the social doctrine of the Christian Bible.¹³⁴

VIII

COMMUNISM AND THE ORIGIN OF SOCIETY

“Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it,” God instructed the first parents of all mankind in the world’s first human society.¹ But according to the Marxists, it was the labor of a band of sub-human apes that created all other human relationships, that created human society,² whereas man, according to Marx,³ “is in the most literal sense a political animal (zoon politikon), not only a sociable animal, but an animal which can only individualize itself in society.”

The meaning of the word “society” is indeed rather vague, but in this chapter we will use it as an omnibus term to comprehend every social category.

A. *Origin and nature of the family*

“Until the beginning of the [eighteen] sixties there was no such thing as a history of the family,” wrote Engels in 1891,⁴ as “in this sphere historical science was still completely under the influence of the Five Books of Moses,” and regrettably, “the patriarchal form of the family, described there in greater detail than anywhere else, was implicitly accepted as the oldest form of the family.”

Before this time even Marx argued⁵—in full agreement with “the Five Books of Moses”—that “the deeper we go back into history, the more the individual and hence also the producing individual appears to depend on and belong to a larger totality: firstly still in a wholly natural manner in the family and the family as enlarged to the tribe, and later in the community in its various forms,

resulting from the contrast and fusion of the tribes." Hence tribe preceded community, and family preceded tribe.

In their early years, round about 1845, both Marx and Engels had regarded "the relation between man and wife, parents and children, *the family*" as "at first the *only* social relationship,"⁶ so that the division of labor was originally "nothing else than the division of labour in the sexual act."⁷ Even in 1876, Engels was still prepared to consider "the childishness for a moment" that "two people, . . . a man and a woman, who found a *family*, [constituted] the simplest and first form of association for the purpose of production,"⁸ even though the very thought of an historical "Adam and Eve" could only be described as "wretched ignorant stuff,"⁹ and even though Marx too insisted¹⁰ that it was "just as absurd to regard the Teutonic-Christian form of the family as absolute and final as it would be to apply that character to the ancient Roman, the ancient Greek, or the Eastern forms."

It would seem that the change from the Marxists' affirmation of the primordially of the family to their denial thereof occurred chiefly as a result of the publications of two sociologists—Bachofen's "Mother Right" in 1861 and Morgan's "Ancient Society" in 1877.¹¹ Bachofen had maintained that men originally lived in a state of sexual promiscuity and that such promiscuity excludes all certainty as regards paternity, whereas the transition to monogamy, where the woman belongs exclusively to one man, implied the violation of a primeval injunction;¹¹ and Morgan in addition posited a primitive stage at which promiscuous intercourse prevailed within a tribe, so that every woman belonged equally to every man and similarly, every man to every woman.¹² This, coupled with Engels' pseudo-Darwinian conviction that "human society arose out of a troupe of tree-climbing monkeys,"¹³ led the Marxists from the late eighteen-eighties onwards to reject the family and proto-monogamy in favor of the community and proto-promiscuity.

As far as Engels was thenceforth concerned, "the study of the history of primitive society . . . reveals to us the conditions in which

men live in polygamy and their wives simultaneously in polyandry, and the common children are, therefore, regarded as being common to them all.”¹⁴ This is what is known as “*group marriage*, the form in which whole groups of men and whole groups of women belong to one another, and which leaves but little scope for jealousy.”¹⁵ Yet even group marriage was not the earliest practice. No, even the forms of group marriage only “point to earlier, simpler forms of sexual relations and thus, in the last analysis, to a period of *promiscuous intercourse* corresponding to the period of transition from animality to humanity.”¹⁵ During this stage, “not only did brother and sister live as man and wife originally,” but “prior to the invention of *incest* . . . , sexual intercourse between parents and children could be no more disgusting than between other persons belonging to different generations.”¹⁶ Hence, even as Marx remarked:¹⁷ “In primeval times the sister *was* the wife.”

It must be admitted that, although he admitted community of wives as the primordial state of affairs during primitive communism, Marx did not *necessarily* identify it with true communism as such,¹⁸ and Lenin positively disapproved thereof.¹⁹ On the other hand, however, there is no doubt that Marx (who was as loyal to his wife as was Lenin to Nadezhda Krupskaya²⁰) did not condemn such community of wives, and he certainly traced its origin to the time of the primitive commune,²¹ while it was especially the “sexual Bohemian”²² Engels who dwelt on such matters.²³ Traces of such pre-monogamous communal intercourse can still be seen in the *Jus Primae Noctis* (right to the first night) originally found in Europe among the Celts and the Slavs, which right, according to Engels,²⁴ is also found amongst the American Redskins for the medicine man as the representative of the tribe.

Monogamy gradually developed from group marriage as a result of economic causes. “Monogamy arose out of the concentration of considerable wealth in the hands of one person, and that a man, and out of the desire to bequeath this wealth to this man’s children and to no one else’s.”²⁵ As such, monogamy is fraught with unfortunate characteristics: “It is based on the supremacy of the

man”; there is now “far greater rigidity of the marriage tie than previously”; and now “women are degraded owing to the predominance of the man and the competition of female slaves.” Hence, because it was “monogamy *only for the woman*, but not for the man,” the institution “was not in any way the fruit of individual sex love, with which it had absolutely nothing in common,” being instead merely “the first form of the family based not on natural but on economic conditions, namely, on the victory of private property over original, naturally developed, common ownership.”²⁶ In the *Origin of the Family* of 1884, Engels could still re-affirm his conviction previously expressed in *The German Ideology* of 1846 that “the first division of labour is that between man and woman for child breeding,”²⁷ and even in his *Ludwig Feuerbach* of 1886 he insisted that relations between human beings, based on affection, and especially between the two sexes, have existed as long as mankind has;²⁸ yet he also insisted: “And today I can add: The first class antagonism which appears in history coincides with the antagonism between man and woman in monogamous marriage, and the first class oppression with that of the female sex by the male.”²⁷

Even the monogamous family, however, is not a static institution. Although Engels certainly accepted sexual inequality between man and woman,²⁸ that did not prevent him and other socialists such as August Bebel²⁹ from incessantly agitating³⁰ for equalization of woman’s position in society. This was Marx’s endeavor too, who held³¹ that “the relation of man to woman . . . indicates . . . how far man’s *natural* behaviour has become *human*,” that “great social changes are impossible without the feminine ferment,” and that “social progress can be measured exactly by the social position of the fair sex [the ugly ones included].”³²

It is important to remember, however, that the family is never alone. No two persons or no family can ever be so thoroughly detached from all reality, “from all national, economic, political and religious relations which are found in the world, from all sex or personal differences, that nothing is left of either person beyond the mere idea: person.”³³ For even “as men emerged from the animal

world," there nevertheless "prevailed a certain equality in the conditions of existence, and for the heads of families a kind of equality of social production—at least an absence of social classes."³⁴ Hence the individual family's necessity of having to come to terms with other families, originally on an equal basis, presupposes the necessity of a social relationship between men larger than the family, on the basis of which relationship families could co-exist in peace—the community relationship.

Family life not only implies community life, but also led to economic *production*. Intercourse led to an increase in population, and and that in its turn to an increase in production, which again affected the life of the individual.³⁵ Then, "the natural division of labour within the family cultivating the soil made possible, at a certain level of well-being, the introduction of one or more *strangers* as additional forces."³⁶ Even at this relatively early stage, "the social structure . . . is no more than an extension of the family, with patriarchal family chiefs, below them the members of the tribe, and finally slaves."³⁷

According to Engels, then, incest and promiscuity led to group marriage, and group marriage to the *consanguine family*. In the latter men and women of each generation were allowed to cohabit with one another, but not with members of older or younger generations.³⁸ Ultimately the consanguine family in its turn led to the *punaluan family*, where brothers and sisters were also prevented from cohabiting,³⁹ and this again ultimately to the *gens*,⁴⁰ that is, a unit embracing all "the recognized descendants of a definite individual ancestress, the founder of the gens."⁴¹ Intra-gentile marriages were forbidden,⁴² but as men increased in number, gentes would subdivide into new gentes, and the original gens would become a *phratry*, several of which constitute the *tribe*.⁴³ And so, as society expanded and became more complicated in its organization, the aboriginal group family faded away into monogamy on the one hand and the ever-expanding community on the other. In this way "the family which is at first the only social relationship, becomes later, when increased needs create new social relations and the in-

creased population new needs, a subordinate one.”⁴⁴

If two or more phratries constitute the tribe or embryonic national unit, what then is the tribe or nation?

B. *Origin and nature of the nations*

It has been seen above⁴⁵ that Marx and Engels initially regarded the tribe as having developed from the family, but that they later regarded the family in its various forms from group marriage to monogamy as having developed from the tribe.

Originally Marx used the phrase “nation” synonymously with “state,” but even by 1848-1849 he was using the phrase differently in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*,⁴⁶ regarding the “nation” as a human mass with similar historical traditions, language, and general characteristics which had grown out of the socio-historical process of development on a specified “Natural Basis” (embracing terrain, climate, racial affinity). Engels too seems to have made this distinction between “nation” and “state” when he acknowledged in 1866 that “no state boundaries agree with the natural boundaries of nationality, the language boundaries,”⁴⁷ although Marx himself never equated nationality and language.⁴⁸ In the *German Ideology*, however, Marx and Engels both stressed “the real basis of the bonds existing in every family and tribal aggregate, such as consanguinity, language, division of labour on a larger scale, and other interests,”⁴⁹ whereas to Engels “race is itself an economic factor.”⁵⁰

The *origin* of the various tribes and nations is shrouded in mystery, but certainly man did not descend from only a single⁹ pair of ancestors.¹³ Rather did many men evolve simultaneously, for “as *men* emerged from the animal world . . . so *they* made *their* entry into history . . . still ignorant of *their* own.”⁵¹ Yet the burning question as regards nationality and race is whether all tribes were originally one or whether each evolved separately from the apes, thus accounting for racial differences, etc.

To this question the Marxists’ answers are not altogether clear, but the main thrust of their views seems to indicate that there was only *one* primordial tribe, the “*herd* of apes which grasped sticks”

which preceded the “primordial men” (thus Lenin⁵²); the “specially highly-developed *race* of anthropoid apes [which] lived somewhere in the tropical zone,” the “*troupe* of tree-climbing monkeys,” the “ape *band*” out of which “human society arose”⁵³ (thus Engels). Marx too seemed to agree that distinctions between nations and races should be attributed to environment rather than to differences in the bloodstream, and even that mankind was biologically singular rather than plural,⁵⁴ for “even the natural differences *within the species*, like *racial* differences . . . can and must be done away with historically.”⁵⁵ Engels too seems to have thought that national and racial differences were not original but only arose later.⁵⁰

On the other hand, other statements do seem to point to separate *further* evolution of the various tribes *after* their joint and related descent from the same sub-human ancestors. “Man,” wrote Engels, “learned to live in any climate. He spread over the whole of the habitable world, . . . the transition from the uniformly hot climate of the original home of man to colder regions, where the year was divided into summer and winter, created new requirements: shelter and clothing as protection against cold and damp, new spheres of labour and hence new activities which further and further separated man from the animal.”⁵⁶ Engels believed that as the productive forces of primitive men gradually increased, “the increasing density of population creates at one point a community of interests, at another, conflicting interests, between the *separate* communities, whose groupings into larger units brings about in turn a new division of labour, the setting up of organs to safeguard common interests . . . owing to the increasing number of conflicts with *other* groups,”⁵⁷ and that “race itself is an economic factor.”⁵⁰

However, “where nature is too lavish,” wrote Marx of primitive man, “she does not impose upon him any necessity of developing himself. It is not the tropics with their luxuriant vegetation, but the temperate zone, that is the mother country of capital.”⁵⁸ And so it is, wrote Engels, that “the [aboriginee] Australians and many Polynesians are to this day in the middle stage of savagery.”⁵⁹

Yet comparative study of the various nations is very important,

for "to look . . . into the primitive age of *each* nation . . . corresponds to the socialist tendency";⁶⁰ and it is necessary to examine the "division of labour" within the tribe as enlarged "by the increase of population, and more especially, by the conflicts between different tribes, and the subjugation of one tribe by another."⁶¹

Again, whether a society takes the form of "a patriarchal family, an ancient Indian community, or a Peruvian Inca state," "the exchange of commodities . . . first begins on the boundaries of such communities, at their points of contact with similar communities."⁶² Here "nomad races are the first to develop the money-form, . . . because their mode of life, by continually bringing them into contact with foreign communities, solicits the exchange of products."⁶³

"From tribes," wrote Engels,⁶⁴ "there developed nations and states," and these *nations also developed certain distinguishing characteristics*. Marx, for example, made remarks about "the solid but slow nature of the Anglo-Saxon worker,"⁶⁵ and "the revolutionary ardour of the Celtic worker,"⁶⁶ whereas "certain primitive peoples" rather appeared to possess "neither the temperament nor the disposition" for capitalism.⁶⁷ The French had performed the useful service of endowing "English materialism with *esprit*" and civilizing it,⁶⁸ and unlike the Germans, the English lacked "the spirit of generalization."⁶⁹

National and international consciousness developed hand in hand under mutual influence. It is only when the division of labor between material and mental labor appears, that consciousness can really imagine that it is something other than consciousness of existing practice, that is, *really* conceiving something without conceiving something *real*; but "this can also occur in a particular national sphere of relations, through the appearance of the contradiction, not within the national sphere, but between this national consciousness and the practice of other nations, i.e., between the national and the general consciousness of a nation."⁷⁰ Hence, "the relations between different nations depend upon the extent to which each has developed its productive forces, the division of labour, and internal intercourse."⁷¹

However, not only nations developed from tribes, but states did too.⁶⁴ And hence it is to a consideration of the state and *government* in general that attention must now be drawn.

C. *Origin and nature of government*

According to Engels,⁷² the state “has not existed from all eternity. There have been societies that did without it, that had no conception of the state and state power.” And according to Marx too,⁷³ “the family and civil society are preconditions of the state; . . . the family and civil society form themselves into the state . . . [which] emerges from the masses as they exist as members of the family and of civil society”; for “the social structure and the State always arise from the life-process of individuals.”⁷⁴

What then is the *reason* for the existence of government in general and the state in particular, if it is not a primordial institution? Here Engels remarked⁷⁵ that “at a certain stage of economic development, which was necessarily bound up with the cleavage of society into classes, the state became a necessity owing to this cleavage.” The state is by no means a power forced on society “from *without*.” Rather is the state “a *product* of society at a certain stage of development,” the “admission that this society . . . is cleft into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel.” But in order that these antagonisms, *classes* with conflicting economic interests, might not consume themselves and society in sterile struggle, a power seemingly standing above society became necessary for the purpose of moderating the conflict, of keeping it within the bounds of order; and this power is the state.⁷⁶ And this opinion was equally emphatically endorsed by Lenin, who regarded the state as “a machine for the oppression of one class by another” which only appears “when the division into classes—when the exploiters and exploited—appears,” so that “there was no state when there were no classes—no exploiters, no exploited.”⁷⁷

As regards the *development* of the state from its earliest beginnings, the fullest account is perhaps that given by Engels in his *Anti-Dühring*:⁷⁸ “After men had emerged from the animal world,

they were all desperately poor and equal in such poverty, there being a total absence of social class," which continued among the natural agricultural communities of the civilized peoples of a later period. Yet "in each such community, there were from the beginning certain common interests the safeguarding of which had to be handed over to individuals, even though under the control of the community as a whole. Such were the adjudication of disputes; repression of encroachments by individuals on the rights of others; control of water supplies, especially in hot countries; and finally, when conditions were still absolutely primitive, religious functions. Such offences are still to be found in primitive communities of every period—in the oldest German Mark communities and even today in India. They are naturally endowed with a certain measure of authority and the beginnings of state power. The productive forces gradually increase; the increasing density of population creates at one point a community of interests, at another, conflicting interests, between the separate communities, whose grouping into larger units brings about in turn a new division of labour, the setting up of organs to safeguard common interests and to guard against conflicting interests. These organs which, for the reason that they represent the common interests of the whole group, have a special position in relation to each individual community—in certain circumstances even one of opposition—soon make themselves even more independent, partly through heredity of functions, which comes about almost as a matter of course in a world where everything happens in a natural way, and partly because they become more and more indispensable owing to the increasing number of conflicts with the other groups."

The first principles of government apart from those in the communal family are found in the *gens*, which amongst the Iroquois "has a council, the democratic assembly of all adult male and female members of the gens, all with equal voice,"⁷⁹ whereas Greeks as well as Pelasgians and other peoples of the same tribal origin were constituted since prehistoric times in the same organic series as the American Indians: "gens, phratry, tribe, confederacy of tribes."⁸⁰

However, as “the gentile constitution had grown out of a society that knew no internal antagonisms” and which “had no coercive power except public opinion,” when slavery and class struggle and economic competition arose, “the gentile constitution had outlived its usefulness,” and “its place was taken by the *state*.”⁸¹

Inevitably, however, the governmental function, originally performed by all equally,⁷⁸ became concentrated first in the hands of democratically chosen gentile delegates,⁷⁹ and then finally in the hands of a few hereditarily determined leaders.⁷⁸ While productivity was still low, “any increase of the productive forces, extension of trade, development of the state and of law, or the beginning of art and science, was only possible by means of a greater division of labour,” wrote Engels.⁸² And the necessary basis for this was the great division of labor between the masses discharging simple manual labor and “the few privileged persons directing labour, conducting trade and public affairs.”⁸² This was in at least one respect regrettable, because it alienated man from his fellow man, yet it was also historically quite unavoidable. For “society gives rise to certain common functions which it cannot dispense with,” and “the persons selected for these functions form a new branch of the division of labour within society,” which “gives them particular interests, distinct too from the interests of those who gave them their office.” Unfortunately, the office-bearers, presumably even those of the communist party, then “make themselves independent of the latter, and—the state is in being.”⁸³

In contrast to the old gens, the state divided its subjects “*according to territory*,” established “a *public power* which no longer directly coincided with the population” and, “in order to maintain this public power, contributions from the citizens become necessary—*taxes*.”⁸⁴ Politicians, lawyers, philosophers, and religionists now arose⁸⁵ to assist the state of antiquity to hold down the slaves, the feudal state to hold down the serfs, and the modern state to hold down the proletariat⁸⁶—and the post-revolutionary socialist state to hold down the anti-communists!

For this is the typical role of the state—*class oppression*. Ac-

ording to Engels the state is nothing more than a machine for the oppression of one class by another,⁸⁷ is nothing but the organized collective power of the possessing classes, the landowners and the capitalists, as against the exploited classes, the peasants and the workers,⁸⁸ “a machine for controlling the oppressed and exploited class,”⁸⁹ an organization existing “for the purpose of forcibly keeping the exploited classes in the condition of oppression corresponding with the given mode of production,”⁹⁰ an institution “organized for the protection of the possessing against the non-possessing classes.”⁹¹ “The State is a special organization of force; it is the organization of violence for the suppression of some class,” held Lenin.⁹² It “has as its highest purpose the protection of private property,” remarked Engels,⁹³ for it is an institution which perpetuates class divisions in society and forcibly maintains the right of the possessing classes to exploit and rule the non-possessing classes. In one word, as Lenin put it,⁹⁴ “the state is a machine for the oppression of one class by another—for holding the other subordinated classes obedient to one class.”

Although the state became “the first ideological power over man,” created by society for itself as an organ for the safeguarding of its common interests against internal and external attacks,⁹⁵ this organ nevertheless always exhibits a *dependent* character, for “the state is not an independent domain with an independent development,”⁹⁶ but “the state is the *arrangement* of society.”⁹⁷ Indeed, the Social Democratic Gotha Program which “treated the state as an independent being” was utterly rejected by Marx, *inter alia* for this very reason.⁹⁸ And this dependence of the state on socio-economic factors is also evident in Engels’ characterization of the form of the state as “only a reflexion . . . of the economic needs of the class controlling production,” and especially in earlier times when the production of the material life of man was not yet carried on with abundant means.⁹⁹

Be that as it may, ultimately the state becomes seemingly independent of the community. It rises up out of society, places itself above it, and increasingly alienates itself from it,⁹⁹ so that finally

a stage is reached when “the political force has made itself independent in relation to society, and has transformed itself from society’s servant into its master.”¹⁰⁰

D. *Origin and nature of law*

The state in its turn also gives rise to *law*. From tribes there developed nations and states, “and then law and politics arose,” wrote Engels.¹⁰¹ For once the state has become an independent power vis-a-vis society, “it produces forthwith a further ideology. It is indeed among professional politicians, theorists of public law and jurists of private law that the connection with economic facts gets lost for fair. Since in each particular case the economic facts must assume the form of juristic motives in order to receive legal sanction; and since, in so doing, consideration, of course, has to be given to the whole legal system already in operation, the juristic form is, in consequence, made everything and the economic nothing.”¹⁰²

In primitive times, juridical organs were set up “to safeguard common interests and to guard against conflicting interests.”¹⁰³ At that stage all law was still public law, as there was not yet any private property; but when divisions of labor occurred faster than surpluses could be produced, “any increase of the productive forces, extension of trade, development of the state and of law . . . was only possible by means of a greater division of labour.”¹⁰⁴ This in its turn ultimately resulted in the development of “civil law . . . concurrently with private property out of the disintegration of the natural community.”¹⁰⁵ Thenceforth, rather artificially, “public law and private law are treated as independent spheres, each having its own independent historical development, each being capable of and needing a systematic presentation by the consistent elimination of all inner contradictions.”¹⁰²

The great claim made by Marx at his Cologne trial was his assertion that “society does not rest upon the law,” for that is only a “legalist illusion.” To the contrary, “law must rest upon society.”¹⁰⁶ It is incorrect and bourgeois to uphold “fossilized legal concep-

tions,"¹⁰⁷ to insist on "the maintenance of laws which belong to a past epoch of society, which were made by the representations of vanished or vanishing social interests";¹⁰⁶ laws such as capital punishment, for example, for "since Cain the world has neither been intimidated nor ameliorated by punishment. Quite the contrary,"¹⁰⁸ for "law, morality, religion, are . . . so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as many bourgeois interests"; for the bourgeoisie "has converted the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science into its paid wage-labourers."¹⁰⁹

E. *Critique of above*

It stands to the credit of Marx and Engels in their early period that they regarded the *family* as the root of the community rather than *vice-versa*, although it is regrettable that even then they confused the primordial marital relationship with the family relationship as its immediate product. It is not altogether true that "the relation between man and wife, parents and children, the *family*" is "at first the *only* social relationship,"⁶ for the relationship between wife and husband, pre-eminently governed by the seventh commandment, historically precedes the different relationship between parents and children, pre-eminently governed by the fifth commandment and relatively sovereign in its own sphere over against the former.¹¹⁰ To reduce both the marital and the parental relationship to the "family" as their "lowest common denominator," as it were, not only tends toward sociological monism, but is also philosophically untenable in that a childless married couple can hardly be regarded as expressing the same relationship phenomenologically as that which prevails amongst a man and his wife and their several children.

Darwinian evolution in natural science and especially the concomitant or resultant theories of Bachofen and Morgan in sociology brought about the "Copernican revolution" in the thinking of Marx and Engels as regards their previous assumptions about the priority of the family before the community. Apart from the fact that the whole radical nature of their *volte-face* exposes the thus self-admitted superficiality and even falsity of either their previous or alternatively

of their later views, the fact that Bachofen and Morgan were later combatted by certain anthropologists also casts grave doubts on the tenability of the later views of Marx and Engels too. Bachofen's views as to the primordality of matriarchy were almost without exception based on passages from primitive German and Roman writers who regularly resorted to hearsay and whose reports are unverifiable.¹¹¹

As regards Morgan, apart from the fact that he restricted his surveys to only some of the primitive North American Indian societies, his views were summarily applied by Engels to interpret the much older Greek and Roman societies.¹¹² Yet hardly a single sociologist or anthropologist accepted Morgan's views fifty years later¹¹³ and even the Marxist Cunow considered Engels' Morganic views of the forms of the family and the community as "belonging to the weakest parts of the Marxist doctrine of the community"¹¹⁴ (in radical conflict with those of authorities such as Durkheim, Dargun, Grosse, Mucke, Starke, and Westermarck¹¹³), and frankly as "artificial."¹¹⁴

That group marriage (and even incest) has characterized certain primitive societies is indisputable, but that either is a primordial institution¹¹⁵ is quite unprovable. That monogamy arose under conditions of "considerable wealth" and thus as a result of economic causes²⁵ is hardly likely, as in any primitive society only the rich minority has even been able to afford more than one wife. Monogamy is, if anything, less economical in undeveloped communities, as the greater number of children of the polygamist have greater earning power for their father than have the lesser number of children of the monogamist. Again, the view that monogamy is "not based on *natural* conditions,"²⁴ is totally untrue. For apart from the Biblical teaching as to the proto-monogamy of man¹¹⁶ and conceivably of the animals too,¹¹⁷ monogamy seems far more natural than does polygamy in that only one pair of partners, a male and a female, are capable of performing sexual intercourse simultaneously; in that all offspring are the result of but one pair of parents; and in

that there have always been approximately equal numbers of males and females in the world.

Engels' view as to the absolute proto-equality between men and women is at strange variance with his views of the original barbarity of man on the one hand,¹¹⁷ and of his assumed proto-matriarchy on the other, which views are utterly without foundation. Apart from their conflict with the teachings of the Bible,¹¹⁸ whether primordial man and especially the male had been warlike or not, the fact that he nearly always exceeded and still exceeds the female in physical power as well as the fact that the female would have to retire from public life from time to time during menstruation and pregnancy and child-nursing, clearly establishes the truth of proto-patriarchy.¹¹⁹

Turning to the origin of *nationality*, it is to be appreciated that Marx and Engels apparently taught the genealogical descent of all the extant human races from one original race, but the rejection of the monophylogeneticism of the members of that original race is not only contrary to the Bible,¹²⁰ but also raises the ethical problem as to *why* each human being should then be his "brother's" keeper. Again, that race is an economic rather than a genetic factor,⁵⁰ while correctly assuming the primordial existence of only one human race, is not only contrary to the Bible¹²¹ but is also biologically absurd. Racial features such as skin pigmentation and hair quality are always genetically constant and have nothing whatsoever to do with varying economic factors.

Moreover, the views of Engels that the first men lived in a hot tropical zone but that colder climate "further and further separated men from the animals," certainly seems to suggest that men still living in the tropics are more animal-like than their relatives dwelling in the temperate zones. This theory is fraught with the dangers of racialism. For not race or climate, but regeneration or sin determine the improvement or degeneration of the human species.

While on this point of racialism, it is instructive to note how racially prejudiced Engels and particularly Marx really were. It is true that Engels was sometimes opposed to anti-Semitism,¹²² yet even he did not fail to condemn "Jewish swindlers like Disraeli,"¹²³

whereas Marx's vitriolic anti-Semitism is well known.¹²⁴ Both Marx and Engels were violently anti-Prussian¹²⁵ and anti-Slavic,¹²⁶ and Lenin was anti-American, anti-British, and anti-European.¹²⁷ Marx claimed to be an *internationalist*,¹²⁸ but in actual fact he was the very opposite, an *antinationalist*, as evidenced by his violent denunciation¹²⁹ of Scandinavianism: "Scandinavianism consists in enthusiasm for a brutal, dirty, piratical, old-Nordic nationality, . . . in brutality towards women, chronic drunkenness, and teary sentimentality alternating with Berserk fury."

In the political field, it is to be appreciated that the Marxists appear to distinguish between authority and government on the one hand and the state as a later institution on the other. This would seem to be in broad agreement too with the Biblical teaching of authority as such as a creation ordinance,¹³⁰ and of a compulsory and punitive governmental institution as an infralapsarian and post-diluvian category.¹³¹ Yet the Christian philosopher cannot accept with Engels⁷⁷ that in the community "there were from the *beginning* common interests the *safeguarding* of which *had* to be handed over to individuals," such as "the adjudication of disputes," etc., for there were *no* human disputes in the very *beginning* of the human race,¹³² that is, before the fall of man; and the state, although a divine institution, was only ordained later.

Again, authority is not the same as oppression. Authority has always existed and alway will. It is, however, utterly untrue that "the state is nothing more than a machine for the oppression of one class by another."⁸⁷ Certainly it may, under exceptional circumstances, become this, as under the dictatorship of the proletariat and under the barbarity of primitive communism, for, as even Engels admitted, "the ancient communes . . . formed the basis of the most barbarous form of the state."¹³³ But the true function of the state is precisely to maintain law and order and *prevent* the oppression of one class by another.

It cannot therefore be conceded to the Marxists that the state is in any way *dependent* upon societal or economic factors. Without denying the *interdependence* of all the factors, it must be insisted that

the juridical, political and/or administrative tasks of the state are unique and derive their authority from no other source than directly from God.¹³⁴ At one stage, even Marx and Engels both saw that, "as a result of this contradiction between the interest of the individual and that of the community, [that] the latter takes an *independent* form as the state."¹³⁵

The idea that *law* only arose after the institution of the state is also quite incorrect. From the Christian viewpoint, the first man was essentially righteous, essentially *law-abiding*,¹³² even though political *law-enforcement* only followed later.¹³¹ Law is not a bourgeois prejudice, but bourgeois and proletarian prejudice is the result of the *transgression* of the law,¹³⁶ a transgression with serious consequences especially when not *punished* on account of a perverted relaxation of the law.¹³⁷ This punitive aspect is vital.¹³¹ Marx's statement is utterly untrue that "since Cain the world has neither been intimidated nor ameliorated by punishment. Quite the contrary."¹⁰⁸ Punishment will not eliminate future legal transgressions, but it will and does check their unbridled multiplication. The bourgeoisie or the proletariat may indeed unfortunately succeed in corrupting the lawyer, the priest, the poet, etc.,¹⁰⁹ but even the bourgeoisie cannot dispense with their services, rather does it presuppose them. It is a great pity that Marx only saw bourgeois failures to apply the laws, and that he made no attempt to analyze the structures of the legal norms themselves. This was perhaps inevitable from his viewpoint, as the class-struggle, and more particularly the class struggle during this present Capitalistic era, dominated his thought, whereas from the Christian viewpoint the struggle between not only classes but also individuals, families, nations, religions, etc., has been waged ever since the fall as the radical result of all-pervading sin.

F. Summary

Summarizing, it was seen that the Marxists made a right-about-turn in their views as to the order of historical priority between the family and the community, and never really succeeded in giving a

satisfactory account of their relationship. Their beliefs in the primordiality of promiscuity and group marriage before monogamy, and the latter's unnaturalness and economic cause, were found to be untenable; and their admission of woman's inequality yet their crusade for her equalization and insistence on primordial matriarchy revealed an area of strange inconsistency.

The various nations were correctly seen to have arisen from the same group of primordial ancestors, even though the Marxist denial of a primordial ancestral pair at the root of that group was seen to be false. Engels' view of race as an economic factor, his implication of the greater animality of dwellers in warm climates and particularly Marx's violent racialism, however, were all seen to be inaccurate aspects of the Marxist theory.

Authority, government, and state were correctly distinguished from one another, but the denial of the state's relative independence of the community and economics, and the denial of its function in *preventing* oppression, were not at all convincing.

Finally, the primordiality, nature, and indispensability of law were misconstrued. Law as such was not distinguished from its human enforcement, and the necessity of punishment on transgression was wrongly regarded as but an archaic survival.

Once again, the Marxists' denial of the pluriformity of institutions within society and their determination to subsume family, community, nation, government, law, etc., under one monistical societal denominator, historical materialism, has not proved very helpful to a satisfactory understanding of all these institutions, and therefore of society in its totality.

G. *Christian view of society*

From the Christian philosophical viewpoint, man functioned and functions individually, maritally, in his family circle, and nationally, in that order.

Contrary to Marxism, Christian philosophy both distinguishes between the marital and the *family* functions and insists upon the primordiality of marriage before the family and again of the family

before the community.¹³⁸ As such, the family—father, mother, and child—are together the image of and reflect something of the glory of the Holy Family—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Hence Christian philosophy must reject the family-destroying communistic-anthropological monism of Marxism. Again, the indestructibility of the earthly marriage bond implicit in the command to cleave to one's wife,¹³⁹ is as permanent as, and is illustrative of, the Bridegroom-bride relationship between Christ and His church and is therefore implacably opposed to the dissoluble marital and even promiscuous communal sexual unions of Marxism. However, the equally valid command to married man to leave his parents,¹³⁹ stresses the relative autonomy of the one family over against other families in particular and over against society in general.

Christian philosophy views the *nation* as a God-ordained dynamic category which necessarily would have originated even if sin had never occurred, by men leaving their parents and multiplying and replenishing and ultimately subjugating the entire earth¹⁴⁰ outside of Eden, whence they would thus have emigrated. And even before the destruction of the tower of Babel,¹⁴¹ Semitic, Hamitic, and Japhethitic or Indo-Germanic clans and embryonic nations were already distinguishable.¹⁴² Sin did, of course, have a very detrimental effect on developing nationality, yet the dynamic confounding of tongues into the various languages at Babel (Gen. 11) was sanctified by the just as dynamic speaking in tongues on the day of Pentecost;¹⁴³ yet Pentecost did not annul nationality as such. Hence Paul, even after his conversion to Christianity, remained a Jew of the Jews;¹⁴⁴ even though, for evangelizational reasons, he was always ready to become a gentile for the gentiles.¹⁴⁵ So nations are ordained, created, preserved, and sanctified by the Lord,¹⁴⁶ and will probably still be identifiable as nations on the new earth.¹⁴⁷

The principle of *political authority* antedated the fall,¹⁴⁸ but it was only after the fall that the *zoon politikon* or body politic was ordained by God as a law-enforcing institution to check the spread of crime.¹⁴⁹ The peace officer or political magistrate does not bear his sword in vain as an unused ornament, for he is an active servant

of God.¹⁵⁰ Hence Christian philosophy acknowledges both the rights of the state (to uphold law and order, to conscript soldiers, and to impose taxes for this purpose),¹⁵¹ as well as the duties of the state (to maintain civic righteousness and protect the needy).¹⁵²

Law, of course, existed from the very beginning, not only in the human realm of man's true righteousness,¹⁵³ but also in the realm of nature,¹⁵⁴ although in the human realm it only became humanly enforceable after the fall and the flood,¹⁵⁵ and remains a valid category and profession even for the New Testament Christian.¹⁵⁶

* * *

Communism versus creation. Did society arise from a herd of apes, or did the Triune Society of God create human society and all of its facets? Miraculous creation or materialistic communism?

IX

COMMUNISM AND THE ORIGIN OF RELIGION

Man, according to the Bible, is essentially religious, and was "created in righteousness and true holiness."¹ But according to the Marxists, man is essentially an irreligious animal.

A. Definition of religion

As good a definition of religion as the Marxists give anywhere is found in Engels' *Anti Dühring*: "All religion, however, is nothing but the phantastic reflection in men's minds of those eternal forces which control their daily life, a reflection in which the terrestrial forces assume the form of supernatural forces."² Religion to the Marxist is not the global experience it is to Christian and non-Christian religionist alike, but rather an inessential addendum to man and his activities which only evidences man's immaturity and/or enslavement and which must therefore be opposed and ultimately eliminated by the assertion of man's essential "divinity."

B. Origin of religion

As to the *origin* of religion, the first point must be that it is not revealed by God, but invented by man. "*Man makes religion, religion does not make man.*"³ Religion to the Marxist is utterly immanentistic in its origin, and revelation is absolutely discounted.

Marx roundly condemned the Christian theologians who claim that "every religion which is not theirs is an invention of men, while their own religion is an emanation from God,"⁴ and what Marx and Engels said about the origin of historical materialism in

contrast to the post-Hegelian German Ideology could equally well be applied to their account of the origin of religion: "In direct contrast to the German Ideology, which descends from heaven to earth, here ascent is made from earth to heaven."⁵

Secondly, this non-revealed and humanly invented religion was originally both the product of man's thought and of extra-human matter. According to Engels,⁶ "religion arose in very primitive times from erroneous, primitive conceptions of men about their *own* nature and external nature surrounding them." "In religion man is governed by the products of his own brain,"⁷ but the religious ideology of men is indeed also "the direct efflux of their material relations."⁸

If man himself is the internal origin of religion, its external origin must thus be attributed to his environment—to nature and man's fear thereof, to economic causes such as the division of labor, and to society and the state.

As regards nature, Engels considered the "conception of holiness" of primitive peoples to "have been taken over from the animal kingdom—the *bestial*,"⁹ whereas Marx described the "natural religion" as a "purely animal consciousness of nature," "which first appears to men as a completely alien, all powerful and unassailable force, with which men's relations are purely animal and by which they are overawed like beasts."¹⁰

C. *Development of religion*

Man's initial "religious" fear of nature, however, was soon transferred to his fear of *man*. This became most marked under the conditions of economic tension resulting from the primordial division of labor. According to *The German Ideology*, "the division of material and spiritual labour," with which coincided "the first form of ideologists" (priests),¹¹ ultimately led "to the forming of 'pure' theory, theology, philosophy, morals, etc";¹² and according to Marx's *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, the economic structure of society is the real basis on which the superstructure arises, the resultant superstructure consisting, *inter alia*, of "religious,

aesthetic or philosophic—in a word, ideological forms.”¹³ As Lenin remarked: “The roots of modern religion are deeply embedded in the social oppression of the working masses, and in their complete helplessness before the blind forces of capitalism, which every day and every hour cause a thousand times more horrible suffering and torture for ordinary working folk than are caused by exceptional events such as war, earthquakes, etc. ‘Fear created the gods.’”¹⁴

Religion first really took root as an established institution, however, after the rise of the *state*. In the primitive community, certain individuals acting on behalf of the community saw to the adjudication of disputes; repression of encroachments by individuals on the right of others; control of water supplies, especially in hot countries; “and finally, when conditions were still absolutely primitive, religious functions.”¹⁵ “Law and politics arose,” wrote Engels,¹⁶ “and with them the fantastic mirror image of human things in the human mind: religion.” Once an independent power, the state produced the ideology of law, and later that of philosophy and that of religion.¹⁷ As Marx observed: “This state, this society, produces religion, a perverted consciousness of the world, because this world itself is perverted.”¹⁸

D. *Religion as alienation*

The fact that religion only arises “because this world itself is perverted,”¹⁸ however, presupposes a perversion, an *alienation*, between man and world or between man and man. This estrangement or alienation was progressive, starting between man and his instruments, and then leading to further estrangement between man and value, man and society, and man and religion. The Christian account of this critical alienation, man’s primordial fall into sin,¹⁹ is summarily rejected by the Marxists. As far as Marx was concerned, “theology explains the origin of evil by the fall of man, that is, it asserts as a historical fact what it should explain,”²⁰ which allegedly historical fact is nothing less than a “legend” and “insipid childishness”;²¹ and as far as the sarcastic Engels was concerned, being “equally born in original sin” was the “only *one* point” of

which "Christianity knew . . . in which all men were equal."²² The normal individual "has also the need for a normal portion of *work*, for an *end* of rest," so labor in the sweat of the brow, "Jehova[h]'s curse,"²³ is in fact quite normal and natural.

Yet Marxists readily admit that there are *defects* both in human and extra-human nature. Engels referred to "the degree of bestiality" in mankind,²⁴ and Marx referred to "the defects of human existence."²⁵ However, Marx equally insisted that these human defects have their origin "not in the nature of man (*im Wesen des Menschen*)," but "in the circumstances of life."²⁵ ". . . religion, a perverted consciousness of the world," is produced precisely "because this world *is* perverted (*verkehrt*)." ²⁶ Actually, the fact that the worldly basis stands out against itself and "an independent realm establishes itself in the skies," can be explained only by the fact that "the worldly basis itself is split and contradictory in itself."²⁷

As to the *cause* of the alienation or "fall of men (*Entäusserung, Entfremdung*²⁸)," it is clear to Marx and Engels that property must first have been gained by production,²⁹ surpluses, and the division of labor, before it can be alienated or robbed,³⁰ and that "the working of metals and agriculture were the two arts the discovery of which produced this great revolution."³¹ Once this had happened, however, "*greed and the lust for power* are the levers of historical development."³² Declared Engels: ". . . *gold and silver, . . . iron and corn . . . ruined the human race*,"³¹ and Marx observed that *money* exhibits "its essence as the alienated and exteriorized social life of man" in its "power to confuse and invert all human and natural qualities, to bring about the fraternization of incompatibles," and may hence be characterized as "the alienated power of humanity."³³ As such, money can turn idea into reality or make reality remain a mere idea.³⁴ "Gold! Yellow, glittering, precious gold," wrote Marx, citing Shakespeare with approval, will "make black, white; foul, fair; wrong, right; base, noble; old, young; coward, valiant," will enable the unlovable to buy love and the coward to buy influence,³⁵ so that, as Lenin remarked,³⁶ the solution

can only be found in "the elimination of economic slavery, the true source of the religious humbugging of mankind."

The alienation is not static, however, but goes through a process of *development*. Originally, "in the stage of nature and savagery, men were equal; . . . but these equal animal-men had one quality which gave them an advantage over the other animals: perfectibility . . . and this was the cause of inequality. . . ." All further progress beyond the original state consisted likewise as steps forward, apparently towards the *perfection of the individual man*, but in reality towards the decay of the species.³⁷ This inequality resulting from apparently inherent perfectibility in its turn led to the employment of strangers inside the family circle, and ultimately the "*slavery* which first made possible the division of labour between agriculture and industry."³⁸ "This crystallization of social activity," wrote Marx and Engels,³⁹ "this consolidation of what we ourselves produce into an objective power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to nought our calculations, is one of the chief factors in historical development up to now."

The *result* of this alienation is that man hereby not only produces his relation to the process of production as alien and hostile man; but he also produces the relationship between himself and other men.⁴⁰ Hence small property in land "creates a class of barbarians standing halfway outside of society,"⁴¹ with the result that "the worker feels himself only when he is not working, and when he is at work he feels outside himself."⁴² This in its turn produces and is further aggravated by the production of the whole system of alienation—"private property, acquisitiveness, the separation of labour, capital and land, exchange and competition, valuation and devaluation of man, monopoly and competition,"⁴³ so that this alienation "produces as its counterpart a bestial savagery," a complete, primitive and abstract simplicity of needs, whereby "man returns to the cave dwelling again," but which is now, however, "poisoned by the pestilential breath of civilization."⁴⁴

Religion, as an attempt to explain and overcome this alienation, has its own history. All religion has "its roots in the narrow-

minded and ignorant notions of savagery.”⁴⁵ In very early times ignorant men under the stimulus of “dream apparitions” came to believe that their thinking and sensation were not activities of their bodies, “but of a distinct soul which inhabits the body and leaves it at death, whence arose the idea of its immortality. In an exactly similar manner, “the first gods arose through the personification of natural forces.” And these gods in the further development of religions assumed more and more extramundane form, until finally by a process of abstraction occurring naturally in the course of man’s intellectual development, out of the many more or less limited and mutually limiting gods, “there arose in the minds of men the idea of the one exclusive God of the monotheistic religions.”⁴⁶

In his *Anti-Dühring*, Engels gives us extra particulars of this process: “In the beginnings of history it was the forces of *nature* which were first so reflected and which in the course of evolution underwent the most manifold and varied personifications among the various peoples. This early process has been traced back by comparative mythology, at least in the case of the Indo-European peoples, to its origin in the Indian Vedas. . . . But it is not long before, side by side, with the forces of nature, social forces begin to be active. . . . The fantastic figures . . . at this point acquire *social* attributes, become representatives of the forces of history. (This twofold character assumed later on by the divinities was one of the causes of the subsequently widespread *confusion* of mythologies.⁴⁷) At a still further stage of evolution, all the natural and social attributes of the numerous gods are transferred to *one* almighty god, who is but a reflection of the abstract man.”⁴⁸

“Such was the origin of monotheism which was historically the last product of the vulgarized philosophy of the later Greeks and found its incarnation in the exclusively national god of the Jews, Jehovah.”⁴⁸ “Likewise rationally vulgarized Judaism in mixture and intercourse with aliens and half-Jews ended by neglecting the ritual and transforming the former exclusively Jewish national god, Jahveh, into the one true God, the creator of heaven and earth, and by adopting the idea of the immortality of the soul which was alien to early

Judaism. Thus monotheistic vulgar philosophy came into contact with vulgar religion, which presented it with the ready-made one and only God. Thus the ground was prepared on which the elaboration among the Jews of the likewise vulgarized philonic notions could produce Christianity, which once produced would be acceptable to both Greeks and Romans.”⁴⁹

E. *Nature of religion*

The above account of the Marxists of the development of religion almost imperceptibly leads to their analysis of the *nature* of religion, of which they enumerate many facets.

Pre-eminently, all religion is nothing but “the phantastic *reflection* in men’s minds of those external forces which control their daily life, a reflection in which the terrestrial force assumes the form of supernatural forces,” so that religion will only continue to exist as the sentimental form of men’s relation to the extraneous natural and social forces which dominate them, so long as men remain under the control of these forces.⁵⁰ Hence, as Karl Marx stated,⁵¹ “the religious world is but the reflex of the real world.”

However, not only is religion a reflection, it is also an *abstraction*. It is to Christianity’s credit that it, unlike philosophy, “has only one incarnation of the *Logos*,” but this nevertheless implies that “all that exists, all that lives on land and under water can be reduced by abstraction to a logical category,” thus falsely implying that “the whole world can be drowned in a world of abstractions, in the world of logical categories.”⁵² Together with morality and metaphysics, religion is merely an abstract ideology,⁵³ a matter of no vital importance, in fact, just a form of recreation.⁵⁴

Yet in spite of its unimportant beginning, religion becomes highly important as an *instrument of class oppression*. A good example of this, felt Marx,⁵⁵ is found in “the social principles of Christianity,” which “justified the slavery of Antiquity, glorified the serfdom of the Middle Ages and equally knew, when necessary, how to defend the oppression of the proletariat,” how to “preach the necessity of a ruling and an oppressed class.” And according to Engels,⁵⁶ the

slogan "religion must be kept alive for the people" is motivated solely by the desire to oppress and in the knowledge that "the first and foremost of all moral means of action upon the masses is and remains—religion."

The oppressed yet still religious classes have unfortunately not realized that in reality every class, even "every profession has its own morality," and even this it violates whenever it can do so with impunity;⁵⁷ that "religion is the self-consciousness and self-feeling of man who has either not yet found himself or has already lost himself again";⁵⁸ that "religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, . . . the spirit of a spiritless situation," "the *opium* of the people."⁵⁹ Or as Lenin remarked:⁶⁰ "Religion is a sort of spiritual booze, in which the slaves of capital drown their human image, their demand for a life more or less worthy of man."

It may perhaps be enquired whether dialectical materialism, the proletarian instrument for the oppression of the bourgeois class, is not itself a religion. But here the Marxists are adamant that their philosophy is not. Engels had already condemned Feuerbach, in whose philosophy "sex love and the intercourse between the sexes is apotheosized to a *religion*," concluding that "if Feuerbach wishes to establish a *true* religion upon the basis of an essentially materialist conception of nature, that is the same as regarding modern chemistry as true alchemy."⁶¹ And later, when Lunacharsky and the "god-builders" sought to elevate man to the title of God,⁶² Lenin sharply condemned them,⁶³ and demanded that "everyone must be absolutely free to profess . . . no religion whatever, i.e., to be an atheist, which every socialist is, as a rule."⁶⁴

F. *Morality and religion*

It should not be thought, however, that Marxism is consequently opposed to all *morality*. Certainly man was originally cruel and barbarous during primitive communism;⁶⁵ certainly Christian morality must be repudiated, in terms of which Christian morality "it is necessary to kill human nature to cure it of its diseases."⁶⁶ All class

morality is rejected, such as that “preached by the bourgeoisie who derived ethics from God’s Commandments”—rejected as “a deception, a fraud, a befogging of the mind of the workers and the peasants by the landlords and capitalists”⁶⁷—yet morality as such is not repudiated.

As Marx and Engels remarked, one must not forget “the original goodness of man”; and “if enlightened self-interest is the principle of all morality, it is necessary for the private interest of each man to coincide with the general interest of humanity.”⁶⁸ Humanity may have derived from a primordial bestiality, yet, felt Engels, “there has on the whole been progress in morality as in all other branches of human knowledge”;⁶⁹ and even Lenin believed that “morality serves the purpose of helping human society to rise to a higher level, and to get rid of the exploitation of labour.”⁷⁰ There certainly is such a thing as communist morality, but it “is entirely subordinated to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat,” and is derived from the interests thereof, lying entirely in the “conscious mass struggle against the exploiters.”⁶⁷

G. *Evaluation of religion*

Finally, it must be investigated how the Marxists *evaluate* religion.

Although religion as such is regarded as a relative matter,⁷¹ and although some believers demonstrate their “religious integrity” in that they “do not separate theory from practice,”⁷² Marxism is nevertheless *hostile* to religion in general and Christianity in particular.

As regards religion in general, its “charges against communism . . . are not deserving of serious examination,”⁷³ and without further ado, “communism abolishes eternal truths, it abolishes all religion.”⁷⁴ Because the root of the matter is man himself, “the criticism of religion ends with the doctrine that *man is the highest being for man*,” and that “atheism is humanism mediated through the abolition of religion, just as communism mediated through the abolition

of private property is.”⁷⁵ Hence “the abolition of religion as the *illusory* happiness of the people is required for their *real* happiness.”⁷⁶

It is especially Lenin, however, who refuses to conceal his intractable hostility to religion. It is “a mark of servility to fideism,” to religious faith, to take the view that “religious opinion is a private affair,”⁷⁷ and dialectical materialism is “unqualifiedly atheistic and decidedly hostile to every religion,”⁷⁸ for “Marxism is Materialism. As such it stands just as unsparingly and hostilely opposed to religion as that of the materialism of the encyclopedists of the 18th century or the materialism of Feuerbach. That is beyond doubt. . . . We must fight religion. That is the *Abc of the whole of materialism* and consequently also of Marxism.”⁷⁹ This applies to every kind of religion, for “every religious idea, every idea of every god, even every flirtation with a god, is an unspeakable abomination, . . . is the most dangerous abomination, the most repulsive ‘infection.’ ”⁸⁰ The blasphemy of the Marxists is hardly restrained.⁸¹

As regards the Christian religion in particular, however, although for a society based upon the production of commodities, Christianity is the most fitting development,⁸² although supernatural revelation may suffice to prop up a tottering society,⁸³ and although “nothing is easier than to give Christian asceticism a Socialist tinge” insofar as “Christianity [has] declaimed against private property, against marriage, and against the State,”⁸⁴ Christianity must nevertheless be ruthlessly opposed.

For even the very *historical* basis of the Christian religion is false. It was perfectly clear to Engels that “the so-called sacred writing of the Jews are nothing more than the record of the old Arabian religious and tribal tradition,” modified by the early separation of the Jews from their tribally related nomadic neighbors;⁸⁵ and it was also clear that the stupid Duhring, who, “by drawing a parallel with the original Jew Adam . . . suffers from the misfortune of not having the faintest idea that this original Jew had been shown by Smith’s Assyrian discoveries to have been an original Semite,” and that “the whole history of creation and the flood turns out to be a part of the old heathen religious myths

which the Jews have in common with the Babylonians, Chaldeans and Assyrians.”⁸⁶

The *social* teaching of Christianity is equally objectionable. “The social principles of Christianity,” which “have now had eighteen hundred years to develop and need no further development,” wrote Marx,⁸⁷ “preach cowardice, self-contempt, abasement, submission, dejection” and are “sneakish.” They “transfer . . . all infamies to heaven and thus justify the further existence of those infamies on earth,” they “declare all vile acts of the oppressors against the oppressed to be either the just punishment of original sins and others sins or trials that the Lord in his infinite wisdom imposes on those redeemed.”⁸⁷

H. *Critique of above*

As regards the *origin* of religion, Engels can hardly be correct in describing it as having been taken over from the animal kingdom⁹ and Marx in having described it as “purely animal consciousness”;¹⁰ for sacrifice and ritual are the very essence of religion, and neither have ever been observed amongst the animals. And even Marx and Engels both insisted that “men may be distinguished from animals by . . . religion.”⁸⁸

That the *state* produced religion^{17f} is also patently untrue, in that many stateless primitive communities (e.g., the pseudo-monotheistic Bushmen) have some sort of religion, whereas some states (e.g., that under the French Revolution) are highly “anti-religious” and even “unreligious,” in the Marxist sense of these words.

It is to be appreciated that Marxism has a radical doctrine of human estrangement or *alienation*, and that it correctly views unredeemed humanity as twisted and warped. But it is not clear how Engels’ view of man’s primordial brutality⁸⁹ can be reconciled with Marx’s view that these “defects of human existence” have their origin “not in the nature of man.”⁹⁰ Again, it is gratifying to note Engels’ emphasis on the part played in man’s alienation by “*greed and lust for power*,”³² but the further emphases on “gold and silver”³² and “the working of metals and agriculture” as causes can

hardly be taken seriously, for all have achieved much benefit for man and, correctly employed, often checked his alienation from nature and from his fellow man, e.g., the promotion of trade and prosperity has resulted in spare time usable for social intercourse. Certainly the Marxists are right that man's attitude to work has suffered as a result of this alienation,⁴² yet Marx's view that "this alienation . . . produces as its counterpoint a bestial savagery"⁴⁴ is only reconcilable with Engels' view that "each step forward in civilization was a step towards freedom"⁹¹ if man was either eternally alienated or a savage prior to the commencement of his temporal alienation as well as thereafter, in which case his alienation becomes meaningless.

It is also quite true that religion has a history, as the Marxists suggest, but there is no substance in their insistence that such history developed from animism towards monotheism. This theory was disproved by the anthropologists Ehrenreich, Dixon, and Kroecker and the ethnologists and religious historians Preuss, Swanton, Radin, Lowie, Heiler, and Nieuwenhuis, whereas most modern anthropological evidence tends to show that animism, polytheism, etc., are all corruptions of one true primordial religion.⁹²

That dreams and nationalization of the deity, etc.,⁴⁶ played a part in the *devolution* of religion is very likely, but Engels is quite wrong that the Indian Vedas give the clue to the origin of the worship of natural forces. If anything, the Vedas rather bear evidence of the decay of monotheism (Dyauspitar, cf. Deus-pater and Jupiter) than of the rise of mythology, and still less of pantheism.⁹³ Again, the mono-pantheism of Brahmanism preceded the polytheistic tendency of later Hinduism, whereas on Engels' hypothesis this should have been the other way round.

The Marxists' representation of Jehovah or Jahveh as a distillation of earlier natural forces, etc., is not only quite unbiblical, but it is also hardly seriously considered even in the more learned of today's liberal theological circles; whereas their theory about the transformation of "the former exclusively Jewish national god, Jahveh, into the one true God, the creator of heaven and earth,"

reminds one of the antiscriptural and often refuted nineteenth-century J-E-P-D Graf-Wellhausen-Kuenen, hypothesis. If, however, as Engels suggests, this monotheistic Jewish God was somehow transformed into the different Christian God of " $3 \times 1 = 1$," as Marx suggests,⁹⁴ it would merely disprove Engels' theory as to the lateness of monotheism in that tritheism, a form of polytheism, would here be later still. Of course, no Christian has ever taught that $3 \times 1 = 1$, which formula deliberately confuses the well-known Christian distinction drawn between God's unique essence and his threefold personality. If numerics must be resorted to, the approximate Christian formulae would be $1 = 1$, $3 = 3$, $1 + 1 + 1 = 3$, and $3:1 = 3:1$, for: "I am that I am."⁹⁵

Again, it is quite untrue that "the idea of the immortality of the soul . . . was alien to early Judaism,"⁹⁶ and that Christianity was so formed to "be acceptable to both Greeks and Romans."⁹⁷

The Marxist theory of religion as a *reflection* of the real world is immediately suspect as Engels insists in one place that the "forces of *Nature* . . . were at first so reflected,"⁹⁸ whereas Marx insists that the reflection is *economic*.⁹⁹ The view that Christianity is the product of *class oppression* seems strange in that it started chiefly amongst the poor proletariat and the *very* "petty bourgeoisie" (fishermen, housewives, etc.) in the towns rather than amongst the exploiters of the rich landowners,⁹⁸ and also overlooks the fact that the apostles demanded that widows and orphans be supported by the richer Christians;¹⁰⁰ whereas the theory that every class has its own morality is surely opposed by the Christian Biblical injunctions to all classes alike to serve one another.¹⁰¹

The Marxists' view that Marxism is not a religion seems extremely strange in the light of Marx's exaltation of the "great saint, of saintly man,"¹⁰² of "the consciousness of man as the supreme divinity"¹⁰³ and of his description of man's task as that of "to *change* . . . the very stuff of *human nature*; to *transform* each individual . . . into a *part* of something greater than himself," towards the "*restoration* of the human world and of human relationships to *man him-*

self."¹⁰⁴ If this does not embody elements of religion, however perverted, it is difficult to see what else could.

Regarding morality, it is difficult to see how the above desire to "*transform* each individual . . . into a *part* of something greater than himself"¹⁰⁴ can be reconciled with Marx's other view that "enlightened self-interest is the principle of all morality," particularly seeing morality is never unchangeable to the communist. Again, if all morality is class morality, proletarian morality must be class morality too and therefore relative and is accordingly to be rejected, in the words of Lenin, as "a deception and a fraud."¹⁰⁵ Clearly, if morality is not universal in its scope, it can have no really compelling power even to one particular class. Moreover, that either morality or religion is regarded as a relative matter misses the whole point that both are never relative matters to their sincere adherents—least of all to the Marxist moralists and religionists.

The Marxist view that religion's "charges against communism . . . are not deserving of serious examination"⁷³ evidences a rather closed if not unscientific frame of mind, and Marxism's intractable hostility towards a mere "sigh of an oppressed creature" such as religion is felt to be,⁵⁰ does seem to be making a mountain out of a molehill, unless, of course, Marxism is itself a religion competing against all others!

In the face of Marx's mention of Christian Socialism which has "declaimed against private property,"⁸⁴ it is interesting to heed Engels' opinion that "the traces of common ownership which are also found in the early stages of the new religion [of Christianity] can be ascribed to solidarity among the proscribed rather than to real equalitarian ideas."¹⁰⁵ This admission is particularly valuable in the light of stupid¹⁰⁶ claims regarding the so-called "early Christian communism" mentioned in chapter two of the book of Acts.

The fact that some Arabian traditions somewhat correspond to the story of Adam and some Assyrian discoveries to those of the flood, etc., in no wise proves the Bible's inaccuracy. To the contrary, rather does it suggest trustworthy common primordial tradi-

tions from which both the completely trustworthy Biblical traditions and the less trustworthy non-Biblical traditions developed in different ways to the extent of their dissimilarity.

Finally, it is highly unfair to describe the social principles of Christianity as “sneakish”⁸⁷ and ineffectual, for their widespread application has led to humaneness, education, hospitalization, missions, the elevation of women, etc. To say that “the principles of Christianity” have “now had eighteen hundred years to develop and need no further development”⁸⁷ is grossly unfair in that the tiny minority which constituted true Christians in each of those eighteen centuries has wielded an influence for good altogether in excess of its size. Its principles will continue to experience “further development,” in spite of all temporary setbacks, until “the earth shall be filled with the knowledge of the glory of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea.”¹⁰⁷

I. Summary

Summarizing, it was seen that the Marxist account of the *origin* of religion was contradictory, sometimes attributing it to residue animality, and at other times to the rise of the state. Its account of *alienation* is equally vague and ambiguous, ranging from the division of labor to gold and silver, and its account of the *development* of religion from proto-animism to later monotheism was found to be untenable.

As regards the *nature* of religion, because they deny its supernatural essence, the Marxists were not able to give an account in depth, variously typifying it as a reflection, an abstraction, and an instrument of class oppression, while not realizing that Marxism is itself a supernatural, devil-inspired religion. *Morality* too was misunderstood, respectively characterized as self-interest and class interest.

Evaluating religion, Marxism finds it illusory yet dangerous, and confronts it with a hostile refusal to conduct an impartial examination, yet with a readiness to use incorrectly any extra-Biblical evidence of the historicity of the Biblical events as a lever

to try to mythologize the latter's records. The positive gains of eighteen centuries of Christianity are discounted, whereas nothing nearly as positive is offered in its place.

J. *Christian view of religion*

The Christian philosophical viewpoint on religion is in radical contradistinction to that of Marxism. Religion is not a fantastic reflection, but a living bond between man and the true or false object of his veneration. Its *origin* inheres not in any human relic of animality but in the essence of man himself as the very image of God, so that man is inescapably religious, and will of necessity either worship the true God Whose image he is or else some or other idol.

The *development* of religion is such that the fall into sin, man's alienation from God and from his fellow man, breaks the religious bond between man and the true "object" of his worship (God), and fixes it on some aspect of the non-transcendent. In this way men "changed the truth of God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator."¹⁰⁸ In this way man's religion degenerated from pure and primordial monotheism to polytheism and animism, to pantheism, agnosticism, and atheism, except where God checked such degeneration in the hearts of those it pleased Him so to do through His common and/or particular grace.

The *nature* of religion, as already stated, is that of a bond between man and the "object" of his worship. As such it is neither a reflection nor an abstraction, but quite the most real experience possible. But if the "object" of man's worship is not the true God and Him alone, class oppression may indeed result, and once started, can only be broken by a thorough conversion to the true God.

To the Christian philosopher, true *morality* is inseparable from true religion. Although they are distinguishable, the former governs man's relationship to his fellow man, and therein indirectly to his God, and the latter his direct relationship to his God. Because true

morality is anchored in religion, in one's relationship to the true God, it can have neither self-interest nor class-interest as its principle, but unreservedly acknowledges the second table of the Ten Commandments of God as its basis, which immediately puts an end to all relativity in morality.

The Christian religion, while radically opposed to Marxism, is not afraid or averse to studying it, as is Marxism to studying Christianity. Christian philosophy is confident it can meet the philosophy of Marxism on its own ground and offer a much more satisfying account of reality than can the atheistic religionists.

* * *

Communism versus creation. Christianity offers and experiences eternal life not at the grave but here and now,¹⁰⁹ whereas Communism vaguely promises the suffering proletariat relief only after the distant revolution and the dissolution of the succeeding dictatorship of the proletariat and the "proletarian" Party, thus, "a pie in the sky bye-and-bye." What shall one say of the unlikely fulfillment of the still-so-remote Communist religious promise of the speedy advent of the eschatological workers' paradise? This promise "is the *opium* of the people."¹¹⁰

COMMUNISM AND THE ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE

If early men distinguished themselves from all previously created earthly beings by their ability to think and to know that they know, then there is some truth in the well-known dictum of Engels that "the great basic question of all philosophy is that concerning thinking and being,"¹ even though we are further informed by the Bible that it is the Spirit or "inspiration of the Almighty [that] giveth them understanding."² This brings us to the field of epistemology, a field in which Lenin³ was active. "Knowledge" was defined by Lenin⁴ as "the reflection of Nature on the part of man," and it is proposed to deal with the subject under the consecutive aspects of its origin, its nature, and its value.

A. *Origin of knowledge*

Turning first to the origin of knowledge, it may be best to deal immediately with the phenomenon of *mind*. The Marxists, while distinguishing between the two, regard mind as essentially the same as matter, for they regard mind as merely matter in a slightly different form. Lenin insisted⁵ that "the contradistinction between matter and mind has an absolute significance only between the boundaries of a very limited region—in this case exclusively within the limits of the fundamental epistemological problem of what was to be considered primary and what secondary," and that "beyond these bounds the relativity of the contradistinction is unquestionable."

Quoting Engels with approval, Lenin informs us further⁶ that “matter is not a product of mind, but mind itself is only the highest product of matter,” adding that “consciousness and thought . . . are only evidences of a *material* bodily organ, the brain.”

It is not to be thought, however, that this material mind is limited to human beings. Animals too have minds. For example, there is Engels’ dog Dido, which Engels maintained⁷ was able to distinguish men from animals (and hence possessed generic concepts), to crack nuts (and hence to analyze unknown objects), and to perform “artful tricks” (and hence to synthesize). But there the matter ends. Presumably even in respect of Dido, Engels pronounced⁸ that “to a dog his master is divine, although this master may be the biggest scoundrel on earth.” This is because, in contradistinction to human knowledge, that of an animal “is in no way sovereign.”⁸ For the capacity to reason dialectically, which presupposes “investigation of the nature of concepts themselves,” is, according to Engels,⁷ confined to man alone.

B. *Sensation and thought*

If mind is merely a higher form of matter, what then is a *sensation*? According to Lenin,⁹ “sensation is nothing but a direct connection of the mind with the external world,” the “transformation of energy of external excitation into a mental state,” whereas “the sophistry of idealist philosophy” consists in taking the sensation “not as an image corresponding to the perception of the external phenomenon but as the ‘only entity,’” for “idealist philosophy . . . is afraid to recognize that the cognitive capacity of man can reflect the uniformity of nature.”¹⁰

Sensation thus presupposes a material outer world and a material inner brain which it connects with one another. Indeed, Lenin felt¹¹ that “sensation without matter” was an “absurdity.” Moreover, this outer world is held to be not without order and schematism. Engels believed¹² it was a matter of actual “perception that all the phenomena of Nature are systematically interconnected.”

Like raw sensation, even processed sensation or *thought* too

would be impossible without the brain.¹¹ The empirio-criticism or phenomenalism of Richard Avenarius which denied this was, according to Lenin,¹³ a “brainless philosophy.” Engels too had previously pointed out that “consciousness and thought are products of the brain of man,”¹⁴ and that as “man himself is a product of Nature,” the products of the human brain too must “in the last analysis also [be] products of Nature, [and] do not contradict the rest of Nature but are in correspondence with it.”¹⁵

For Marx,¹⁶ thought was “nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought,” whereas “the ideal is nothing more than the material when it has been transposed and translated inside the human head.”¹⁷ But this means that thought, though material, was nevertheless transposed and translated material. Transposed by a dialectical process. Only the non-dialectical vulgar materialists “assumed that thought is secreted by the brain as bile is secreted by the liver,” wrote Lenin, and this was something Engels had opposed.¹⁸ “One day we shall certainly ‘reduce’ thought experimentally to molecular and chemical motions in the brain,” claimed Engels,¹⁹ “but does that exhaust the essence of thought?”

C. *Mind and matter*

Although the mind is only a species of *matter*, according to the Marxists, it is nevertheless a separate *species* of matter and differs from non-mental matter in being dependent thereon and secondary thereto, even in spite of being the highest form thereof. “Matter is not a product of mind,” wrote Engels,²⁰ “but mind itself is merely the highest product thereof.” Lenin²¹ put the case even more clearly: “Nature is here taken as primary, sensation and experience as derivative,” adding elsewhere²² that “materialism, in full agreement with natural science, takes matter as the *prius* (i.e., the prime element—N.L.), regarding consciousness, reason and sensation as derivative, because in a well expressed form it is connected only with the higher forms of matter [organic matter].”

According to Marx and Engels,²³ the priority of matter before

mind is not only provable, but also obvious, for “the individual finds himself forced by every one of his senses to believe in the existence of the world and of other individuals; and everything, down to his *profane* stomach, reminds him daily that the external world is not a void, [but] that it is, on the contrary, that which *fills* [his stomach].” And according to Lenin,²⁴ things exist independently of our consciousness, independently of our perceptions, outside of us, for the existence of the earth prior to the emergence of man is real, so real that “no man who has the least education, and is healthy, could doubt that the earth existed when there could be no life, no sensation.”²⁵ Hence it is that “materialism generally recognizes the objectively real being [matter] as existing independent of mind, sensation, experience, etc.”²⁶

Having stated the Marxists' views of the origin of knowledge, we next state their empirio-photographic and dialectical views as to the nature of knowledge.

D. *Nature of knowledge*

Marxism unashamedly finds its epistemology on common sense or naive realism.⁹⁹ According to Lenin,²⁶ “truths represent approximate *reflections* of an object which exists independently of humanity.” These “objects (things-in-themselves) are truly reflected in the mind” as “‘phenomena,’” “‘things-for-us’” or “*copies* of the ‘objects-in-themselves,’”²⁷ which latter are “*copied, photographed, and reflected* by our sensations.”²⁸ According to Engels, “the dialectics of the brain is only a reflection of the forms of motion of the real world, both of nature and history.”²⁹ These reflections are “images [*Abbilder*] of *real* things”³⁰ and undoubtedly “produce a *correct* reflection of reality.”³¹ So much so, that “sense experience should be the basis of all science,” according to Marx,³² and “science is not real science unless it sets out from sense experience in its double form, sense awareness and sensed need—unless therefore it sets out from nature.”

This naive realism with its distinct empirical implications necessarily implies a rejection of rationalism and indeed of anything

resembling an *a priori* method.³³ From the Marxist point of view, this *a priori* faulty method consists of arriving at the properties of an object deductively, from the concept of the object, instead of learning them from the object itself. "First the concept of the object is formed from the object; then the spit is turned round, and the object is measured by its image, the concept of it. The object is then made to conform to the concept, not the concept to the object." There is, of course, a gradual approximation of our reason towards the knowledge of matter. "But this does not at all prove that nature, matter itself, is a symbol—a product of our reason," wrote Lenin,³⁴ or that "nature is the creation of our reason or abstract reason."

The Marxists concede that this gradual approximation of our reason towards the knowledge of matter implies that man's knowledge, though real and true, is only approximate. Even though Lenin really believed that "social consciousness *reflects* social being," even though "the reflection may be a true though approximate copy of the [thing] reflected," yet he admitted that "to speak of their identity is absurd." For "consciousness . . . is only an image of being, at best an approximately true (adequate, ideally exact) image of it."³⁵

A good example of such an "approximate" reflection is Lenin's account³⁶ of color: The sensation of red reflects ether vibrations of a frequency of approximately 504 trillions per second. The sensation of blue reflects ether vibrations of a frequency of approximately 620 trillions per second. The vibrations of ether exist independently of our sensations of light. Our sensations of light depend on the action of the vibrations of the ether on the human organ of vision. Our sensations reflect objective reality, i.e., something that exists independently of humanity and of human sensations. That is how science views it.

Here Lenin meant that the human sensations of redness or blueness are approximate reflections of the external ether vibrations. Yet though approximate, these reflections are nevertheless regarded as trustworthy sensations of the objective world of material reality. And even if the agnostic should admit the empirical source of

knowledge, yet skeptically doubt its accuracy and argue as to the difficulty of establishing how far the experienced sensation approximately corresponds to the thing-in-itself, he should remember, wrote Engels,³⁷ that “before there was argumentation there was *action*. . . . And human action had solved the difficulty long before human ingenuity invented it. . . . From the moment we turn to our own use these objects, according to the qualities we perceive in them, we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense-perceptions . . . [and] . . . if we succeed in accomplishing our aim, . . . that is positive proof that our perception of it and of its qualities, *so far*, agree with reality outside ourselves. And whenever we find ourselves face to face with a failure, then we generally are not long in making out the cause that made us fail. . . . So long as we take care to train and to use our senses properly, . . . we shall find that the result of our action proves the conformity of our perceptions with the objective nature of the things perceived,” for there is no inherent incompatibility between the other world and our sense-perceptions of it.

“In short,” remarked Lenin³⁸ on the above passage from Engels, “this means that the materialist affirms both the existence and knowledge of things-in-themselves while the agnostic admits neither the thought concerning the existence of things-in-themselves, nor the possibility of knowing about them. . . .” The materialistic theory, then, the theory of reflection of objects by the mind, is here presented with perfect clearness: things exist outside of us. Our perceptions and representations are their images. “To regard our sensations as images of the external world, to recognize objective truth, to hold the materialist theory of knowledge—these are all one and the same thing.”³⁹ To the Marxist, empiricism, realism, and materialism are all identical.

Yet particularly in his *later* writings, Lenin became aware that “this reflection, however, is by no means a simple, immediate, total affair, but rather a process involving a series of *abstractions, formulations*, the framing of *concepts, laws*, etc.”⁴⁰ His previous realization that reflections were approximate had paved the way for

his progress from naive realism to critical realism. And now his further realization that the reflections were also subjected by the mind to abstractions, formulations, and concepts was preparing the way for rationalism, and even idealism. For "representation cannot grasp motion *in its entirety*, thus it cannot grasp motion at a speed of 186,000 miles per second, but *thought* can grasp it, and is obliged to do so,"⁴¹ for "thought derived from representation likewise reflects reality."⁴²

Hence the ascent made from the concrete to the abstract, provided it is *correct*—does not get farther away from the truth, but comes closer to it, for "all scientific . . . abstractions present a deeper, more faithful, *more complete* reflection of Nature."⁴³ Indeed, reason's manufacture of an image or concept of the phenomenon "is *no* simple, immediate, mirror-like and dead, but rather a complicated, disagreeing, zigzag-like deed which *includes* the possibility of the phantasy floating away from life."⁴⁴

Moreover, even in the simplest generalization, in the most elementary general idea, "there *resides* a definite little piece of phantasy"; in fact, "it is nonsensical to deny the role of phantasy even in the strictest science," as evidenced by Pissarew's appraisal of "the useful dream as an instigation to work and of empty dreams."⁴⁴ Actually, the disagreement between dream and reality is not injurious, if only the dreamer seriously believes in his dream, and "dreams of this kind are unfortunately all too rare in our movement," admitted Lenin.⁴⁵

Although the Marxists have now moved full circle from realism and empiricism through rationalism and almost to idealism, or at least to a kind of existentialistic pragmatism, they would attempt to account for all these various emphases as products of the ever-present and infinitely elastic *dialectic*. For "the movement of knowledge towards its object must always take place in dialectical fashion," maintained Lenin,⁴⁶ "withdrawing in order to grasp it more securely," grasping its object in a "complicated, disagreeing, zigzag-like deed";⁴⁴ "dividing and uniting elements by analysis and synthesis and even by blunders, for such is the essence of thought," remarked Engels.⁴⁷

In one word, "dialectics is the theory of knowledge of [Hegel and] Marxism," and the "logic, dialectics and theory of knowledge of materialism, . . . are all one and the same" and all three are destined to be "converted into a single discipline."⁴⁸

The dialectic in knowledge is of great importance as the underlying principle in the Marxist view of *logic*.

This is because "in the theory of knowledge, as in other branches of science," wrote Lenin,⁴⁹ "we must think dialectically, that is, we must not regard our knowledge as ready-made and unchangeable, but must determine how from ignorance knowledge is gradually built up, and how incomplete, inexact knowledge becomes more complete and exact." For knowledge is the eternal, unending approach of reason to the object. The reflection of nature in human thought is "not to be regarded as 'dead,' 'abstract,' *without motion*, or without contradictions, but as in eternal process of movement and of the coming into existence and abolition of contradictions."⁵⁰

This means that the objective laws of objective dialectical movement (dealt with in ch. III) necessarily assert themselves in thought movement too,⁵¹ for thought moves just as dialectically as does all nature of which it is but a part. Consequently Aristotle's laws of logical thought are of very limited application, for they are static, and thought is really dynamic. Trotsky believed that "Aristotle lived in a period when the idea of evolution did not exist," and that the movie of dialectical logic has now replaced the static photograph of formal logic;⁵² and Engels remarked⁵³ that the theory of the laws of thought is by no means an "eternal truth" established once and for all, but that "it is precisely dialectics that . . . alone offers . . . the method of explaining the evolutionary processes occurring in Nature, inter-connections in general and transitions."

Formal logic is therefore regarded as the "lower mathematics of logic,"⁵⁴ i.e., of dialectical logic which rises above the former's "narrow horizon" and "contains the germ of a more comprehensive view of the world" than does the former,⁵⁵ which former retains its validity only for "everyday use"⁵⁴ where "small dimensions or brief periods of time are in question."⁵⁶

E. *Value of knowledge*

Having described the Marxist views as to the origin of knowledge and the nature of knowledge, there follows a final description of the value of knowledge. Here an analysis must be given of the relation between relative knowledge and absolute truth.

As regards the (dialectical) relation between *theory and practice*, which logically flows from the dialectical nature of thought, the value of practice should first be stressed. It is to be noted that the dialectical movement in knowledge is "from living intuition to abstract thought, and from thence to practice—that is the dialectical road to knowledge of objective reality,"⁵⁷ for the distinction of true and false images is given by practice,⁵⁸ and man advances from subjective idea to objective truth "by way of 'practice' (and technology)."⁵⁹

Technology, a sub-species of practice, is also very important in the development of knowledge. For the best refutation of the ungraspable Kantian thing-in-itself is practice, "namely experiment and industry," wrote Engels.⁶⁰ Citing as an example the new method of producing alizarin artificially from coal tar as compared with its previous natural extraction from madder roots, Engels maintained⁶⁰ that "the chemical substances produced in the bodies of plants and animals remained just such "things-in-themselves" until organic chemistry began to produce them one after another, whereupon the "thing-in-itself" became a thing for us." Marx was similarly adamant, and stressed the unity of all knowledge on a practical basis. "Industry," he wrote,⁶¹ "is the real historical relation of Nature, and thus of the natural sciences, to man. . . . One basis for life and another for science is *a priori* a falsehood."

Hence practice is vital. Fortunately, it is a psychological law that once the theoretical spirit has been liberated it turns to practical energy.⁶² In *practice* man must prove the truth, and "thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question."⁶³ It is very much to be regretted—the poverty of philosophy—that "the philosophers have only *interpreted* the world, in various ways; the

point, however, is to *change* it.”⁶⁴ Or as Engels⁶⁵ wrote to Sorge, the communist movement cannot succeed “by preaching alone. . . . England and America are not to be converted by lecturing, the pig-headed and conceited lot have got to experience it on their own bodies . . . and so they will only get quit of the old traditional mental rubbish by *practical experience*.” For the proof of the pudding is in the eating.⁶⁶

Yet all this emphasis on the importance of practice is not in the least intended to belittle the importance of theoretical knowledge. To the contrary, Marx firmly believed⁶⁷ that “theory becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses,” and scorned the anarchist Bakunin as “a man devoid of theoretical knowledge” and “a nonentity as a theoretician,” whose “programme was a superficially scraped together hash of Right and Left” and “rubbish.”⁶⁸

Because Lenin too was convinced that “ideas become power when they seize hold of the masses” and that Marxism was the “ideology of the proletariat,”⁶⁹ he determined that his “leaders must aspire to elevate spontaneity to consciousness,”⁷⁰ realizing that “socialism can never proceed out of the economic or social developments without the directive aid of men who have grasped the theoretical implications.”⁷¹ So deeply did Lenin feel the power of correct theory, that he pronounced⁷² that “it is *impossible* to become an intelligent, *real* communist without studying, precisely *studying*—all that Plekhanov wrote on philosophy”; for “without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement.”⁷³

The real key to knowledge is, of course, the combination of both theory and practice. Hence “one of the greatest evils,” felt Lenin,⁷⁴ “one of the greatest plagues which the old capitalist society has left behind, is the deep chasm between the book and practical life.”

Just as theory must reinforce practice, so too must relative knowledge contribute towards *absolute truth*.

The progress towards absolute truth is gradual. This is because “all boundaries in nature are arbitrary, relative, moveable, and

express the gradual approximation of our reason towards the knowledge of matter," remarked Lenin.⁷⁵ Leaving aside individually unobtainable absolute truth, one should, advised Engels,⁷⁶ rather pursue "attainable *relative* truths along the path of the positive sciences, and the summation of their results by means of dialectical thinking."

By thinking dialectically, "incomplete, inexact knowledge becomes more complete and more exact,"⁷⁷ according as "man advances from subjective idea to objective truth by way of 'practice.'" ⁷⁸ Even though "man is unable to grasp—reflect—copy—Nature as a *whole*," he can nevertheless "approach *eternally* closer to it,"⁷⁹ in the knowledge that to acknowledge objective truth, *i.e.*, truth not dependent on man and mankind, is, in one way or another, to recognize absolute truth.⁸⁰

According to Lenin,⁸¹ the only correct way of theoretically posing the question of relativism has been expressed by the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels, namely "that absolute truth results from the sum-total of relative truths in the course of their development, . . . that in each scientific truth, irrespective of its relativity, there is an element of absolute truth," whereas "human thought . . . is capable of giving, and does give, absolute truth, which is compounded of a sum-total of relative truths,"⁸² and this is so because there is an absolute within the relative.⁸³

According to Lenin, true knowledge can only be gained by *partisan bias*. For partisanship is unavoidable. Even in bourgeois society, absence of partisanship merely signifies "a hypocritical, wrapped-up, passive expression of membership of the party of the well-fed, the party in power, the exploiters' party."⁸⁴ In fact, non-partisanship in philosophy is only "a contemptible cloak of servility to idealism and fideism," to religious faith, under which cloak professors of economics are nothing more than "scientific salesmen of the capitalist class," and professors of philosophy are "scientific salesmen of theology."⁸⁵ True philosophy, namely materialism, "includes partisanship within itself as it were, as it demands, in every evaluation of an occurrence, *direct and open adoption of the standpoint of a specified social group*."⁸⁶ And so without a solid philosophical

foundation no kind of natural sciences and no kind of materialism will be able to resist in the fight against the pressure of the bourgeois world outlook. "To be able to resist the fight and wage it to the end with complete success, the natural scientist must be a modern materialist, a conscious adherent of the materialism represented by Marx."⁸⁷

But this is no less than what Engels taught long beforehand, when he wrote⁸⁸ that "only in the working class does the German theoretical mind persist unstunted," and that "the more regardlessly and disinterestedly science proceeds, the more it finds itself in unison with the workers' interests and strivings."

Absolute truth as such, then, is unattainable.⁸⁹ The only eternal truths, final and ultimate truths, are those which are so securely based that any doubt of them seems to amount to insanity, such as "that twice two makes four, . . . that Paris is in France," and that "all men are mortal."⁹⁰

All other kinds of knowledge contain "a contradiction which can only be solved in the infinite progression, . . . the endless succession"; for the knowledge which has an unconditional claim to truth can never be fully realized except through an endless eternity of human existence, and never in individual human beings with their extremely limited thought.⁹¹ And if ever a stage *is* reached where "all contradictions are once for all disposed of, [and] we shall have arrived at so-called absolute truth—[then] world history will be at an end."⁸⁹ But even then, history would still have "to continue, although there is nothing left for it to do—hence, a new, insoluble contradiction."

F. *Critique of above*

How then should this rather motley Marxist theory of knowledge be evaluated?

Firstly, as regards the *origin* of knowledge, it must be remarked that the Marxists' doctrine of knowledge is just as much in a state of contradictory dialectical motion as is the universe according to their view. This is at least consequential, but it makes it very difficult to pinpoint precisely what they believe about epistemology even at

one particular stage in their development, and makes a general characterization of their views very difficult indeed.

Marx the ex-Hegelian, for example, was at pains to stress the active element of the human spirit in his early writings. He insisted that "the most beautiful music has no meaning for the non-musical ear," and that music can only sound musical "in so far as my faculty exists for itself as a *subjective* capacity," because "the *senses* of social man are *different* from those of non-social man."⁹²

This view has empirical and realistic elements, of course, but the dominant role of the subjective capacity makes it more rationalistic or perhaps even existentialistically phenomenalist than anything else. Again, Marx's determination to change the world rather than merely to interpret it⁶⁴ evidences anything but a placid reflection of the outside world and raises the problem as to where the desire to *change* the world comes from.

The Marxist reply that this desire is a dialectical reflection of the dialectical outer world only makes the issue more problematical—for why should the desire to change the world be reflected in the Marxist mind, rather than the equally dialectical contradiction of such change which is reflected in the non-Marxist mind? This is clearly at variance with Marx's own view that "the ideal is *nothing* other than the *material* when it has been transposed and translated inside the human head."⁹³

An almost semi-phenomenalist element is introduced by Marx's view of society as "the realized naturalism of man and the realized humanity of Nature."⁹⁴ This view is of course eschatological, but it ultimately proceeds from a pre-capitalist genesiological era when there was but a single "*essence* of man and of Nature, man as a natural being and Nature as human reality."⁹⁵ Hence Marx could also write that "thought and being are indeed *distinct*, but they also form a unity."⁹⁶ This is, of course, true to the extent that thought is itself a real being, really exists, for existent thought cannot be non-existent. In this sense it is not true that "thought and being are indeed *distinct*." But on the other hand, thought is only *part* of the whole of being; being other than thought-being is independent

of thought, and in this sense it is untrue that "they also form a unity." But where Marx simultaneously stresses both the distinctness and the unity of thought and being, together with his views as to the genesiological and eschatological human quality of nature (being) and natural quality of humanity, he must be held to have departed from realism, and to have confused and equated subject and object and knowledge and being.⁹⁷

As regards Engels, he started off as a naive realist, but by 1892 he had adopted an essentially pragmatic, critical realism, which went some of the way towards accommodating the redactive element found in Marx;⁹⁸ and by 1895 Engels was declaring⁹⁹ that although "a concept has the essential nature of a concept and cannot therefore *prima facie* (i.e., at first sight—N.L.) directly coincide with reality, from which it must first be abstracted, it is still something more than a fiction."

Lenin, however, ignored Engels' later views, and accepted Engels' initial empirical realism instead, even though he attempted the hopeless task of trying to claim that Marx and Engels held the same views on epistemology.¹⁰⁰ To Lenin in his first period, all sensations were reflections and independent of consciousness. However, in his later stage after scientific discoveries had shed new light on the nature of the atom, the mechanism of color, and particularly the speed of light,⁴¹ Lenin too realized the importance of the mind and moved towards Hegelian rationalism, ending up even by denying the truth of all knowledge except that gained by a biased partisanism. Clearly, he had moved a long way from his original photographic and naive¹⁰¹ realism.

However, there is still some degree of unity in all these views, which, although showing a steady progression from naive empiricism to a moderate rationalism, nevertheless remain more or less realistic throughout, avoiding both absolute idealism and particularly solipsism, all of which is to be appreciated. For, in spite of abstruse rationalistic, idealistic or phenomenalist objections, it is rather difficult to demonstrate that realism is not true, particularly the critical form of realism (or rather "Christian onticism")¹⁰² advocated

by Christian philosophy, which makes allowance for both the rational and the empirical element,¹⁰³ as the Marxists too ultimately did when their naive realism yielded to a more mature view which accommodated the rational element too. On the other hand, Marxism advocates a deplorable equation of materialism with realism, perhaps on account of the Marxists own self-admitted scientific and philosophical limitations,¹⁰⁴ which equation is in fact at the same time a denial of realism in that it apriorically denies the existence of non-material reality, on the ground that it had not yet been observed by themselves.

Secondly, it is open to question whether, as Engels suggests,¹ it is altogether true that the great basic question of all philosophy is that concerning thinking and being. It is indeed true that one cannot have any knowledge of being without thinking of being. Yet, particularly to the realist, thinking presupposes external being, and even to the rationalist, thinking presupposes the being of thinking. Important as epistemology is, it is surely not primary. If it was, it would logically lead to the hated idealism. If thinking were inseparable from being, phenomenalism would result. But from any basically realistic viewpoint, Marxist or not, the great basic question of all philosophy concerns not epistemology, but ontology.¹⁰⁵ As Marx and Engels themselves elsewhere admitted:¹⁰⁶ “Consciousness [*das Bewusstsein*] can never be anything else but conscious being [*das bewusste Sein*].”

Thirdly, Lenin's definition of knowledge as “the reflection of Nature on the part of man”⁴ can only be accurate if material Nature is congruent to being. But this is not the case, as demonstrated in chapters II and III.

And fourthly, the Marxist view of mind as a form of matter cannot be accepted either. Apart from too closely associating the mind with the material brain, the Marxists are driven to absurd lengths to account for the presence of consciousness in the mind, for if the mind is only matter yet is nevertheless conscious, a proto-consciousness is implied in non-mental matter too. This was readily admitted by Haeckel,¹⁰⁷ and even Lenin conceded that “there still

remains so much to investigate . . . about how matter, devoid of sensation, is related to matter which, though composed of the same atoms (or electrons), is yet endowed with a definite faculty of sensation.”¹⁰⁸ And clearly, the problem will remain insuperable as long as the ultimately and immutably qualitative difference between conscious mind and non-conscious matter is ignored and both are subsumed in terms of a materialistic monism.

Even Engels’ distinction of dialectical human thought from non-dialectical animal thought^{7,8} is unintelligible. If dialectical movement is everywhere, one would expect to find it in the mind of the animal too. If both animal and man merely reflect the outside world, it is not too clear why they, or even two men, react differently to one another. But even more fundamentally: If mind is only a form of matter, it is not clear wherein it differs from non-mental matter, and why thought should then not be secreted from the mind like bile,¹⁸ for both thought and bile can hardly be devoid of the omnipresent dialectical movements.

To the Christian philosopher, the Marxists¹¹ appear to be right in their views that human sensation presupposes a material outer world and a material inner brain which it connects with one another; but that the outer world is sensorily perceived to be systematically interconnected¹² is empirically unverifiable (and admitted to be so by Engels¹⁰⁹) and is in fact a matter of non-sensory perception or faith both to the Marxist and to the Christian.¹¹⁰ As Engels remarked: “The ‘naive’ *belief* of mankind is consciously taken by materialism as the basis of its theory of knowledge.”¹¹¹

As regards the *nature* of knowledge, one would only add to the above critique that the “photographic reflection theory” ultimately abandoned by the Marxists was contradicted by two of their own examples even while they held it. When Lenin claimed¹¹² that “things-in-themselves are transformed into things-for-us, through the intermediation of those of our sense-organs which are subjected to *bombardment* by emanations from external objects,” he seemed to have forgotten the mind’s capacity to concentrate on a specific project and selectively *exclude* such bombardment, e.g., a student

immersed in a book, not hearing nearby traffic, and the mind's capacity to concentrate and *extract* such objects not immediately sensorily apparent, e.g., a spy searching for a well-camouflaged enemy in the jungle. Again, when Lenin gave his illustration of the red and blue light vibrations,³⁶ he seemed to forget that man does not visually *reflect* the vibrations at all, but actually believes he has empirically witnessed two different *colors*. Only a *further* rational process will enable man to arrive at the non-empirical *abstract concept* of vibrations. To the Christian philosopher, however, who neither absolutizes nor despises the empirical and rational aspects of the knowledge process, there is no problem. For to him God the Father Who created both the thing perceived and the perceiver and God the Son Who enlightens the one externally and the other internally and God the Holy Spirit Who supports the continuity of both as well as of the perception, is the Triune Guarantor that the human perception, although partial and improvable, is both adequate and true.¹¹³

Even in this first stage of the Marxists' development, it is also unaccountable how their anti-bourgeois theories could ever have come into being if they were but reflections of a rotten bourgeois society. Again, if society could be changed by the mere imparting of knowledge by means of material reflection, it is very strange that the Marxists resorted to propagating their *ideas* (rather than just drawing attention to material conditions) as much as they did, even though it must be conceded that the development of their concept of the omnipresent and dynamic dialectic could be offered as an (inadequate) explanation of the phenomenon.

Engels³⁷ and Lenin's¹¹⁴ realistic rejection of agnosticism and skepticism is highly commendable, as is Lenin's later incorporation of the rational element into his epistemology. However, in this respect, a difficulty arises in connection with his approval of the realization of the truth by the abstraction of the concrete "provided it is *correct*."⁴³ For it is not clear how Lenin can know that his abstraction is correct. Surely only by repeated practical verification of the *concrete* reflection of the phenomenon, unless the abstracting

ratio too has the capacity for arriving at the truth. But this clashes with his previous naive empiricism, which presupposes such a photographically correct reflection of reality that all further abstraction could only represent a departure from that reality. Even if such abstraction could be known to be correct, however, it would only destroy the primacy of the external object by accentuating the role and capacity of the abstracting subject.

Lenin keenly felt the burden and depression of a soul-deadening empiricism. Small wonder he complained that “dreams . . . (“as an instigation to work”), . . . are all too rare in our movement.”⁴⁵ It is a pity that this realization did not lead him to a further revision of his epistemology in an attempt to incorporate such “dynamic dreams” into his system (even if it may be argued that—though Lenin apparently did not—the Marxist-Leninist ideology itself is such a “dynamic dream”); but it is submitted that his fixed materialistic monism prevented such a development.

To some extent the dialectical principle—“a complicated, disagreeing, zigzag-like deed”⁴⁴—infused some life into an otherwise inert epistemology, but it also reinforced the irrational element by explaining “analysis and synthesis even by *blunders*” as “the *essence* of thought.”⁴⁷ The dialectic was not only used to excuse the irrational, but was in fact itself a product of the purely ideal. For having abstracted the gist from the concrete reflection and broken it up into opposing fragments and forces, the Marxist mind then attributed an *objective* reality to this subjective concept and thus idealistically made its own materialism stand on its head. The result is utter confusion—the “identity of thinking and being” of Engels,¹¹⁵ with distinct phenomenalist implications. But now at least the mind is no longer, in fact never was, merely statistically and faithfully reflecting outside reality; for the mind too is in contradictory dialectical movement, and the result must surely be chaotic. For even if impressions are present in the mind, it is difficult to see how they can be understood if even the very process of understanding is dialectical or contradictory; and if, as Engels maintained,¹¹⁶ “that

which is recognized now as true has also its latent false side which will later manifest itself."

The dialectic was seen to permeate even the laws of logic. Here too, Aristotle is inverted, contradicted. His law of identity ($x = x$) is contradicted by the dialectical law of the unity of opposites ($x = x$ and $= \text{not-}x$); his law of non-contradiction ($x = \text{not not-}x$) is contradicted by the Marxist law of transformation from quantity to quality ($x \rightarrow \text{not-}x$); and his law of the excluded middle ($X = \text{either } Y \text{ or not-}Y$) is threatened by the dialectical law of the negation of the negation ($X \rightarrow Y \rightarrow Z$, when X , Y and Z are all three different).¹¹⁷

How rational thought is possible on such an irrational dialectical basis remains a mystery. For the issue is not whether objects *ultimately* change their ontical value, but whether they change appreciably and *in the same way* and to the same extent as does the thing logically analyzed during a rapid logical or epistemological operation. After all, logic is basically an epistemological and not an ontological discipline, even though epistemology too is ultimately an ontical subdivision of ontology in Christian philosophy. Logic does not require the ontical immobility of what it analyzes, but it does require epistemological consistency with its own fixed premises. A moving stone or a changing meaning can both be logically analyzed, but the logical analysis must not and does not move or change in the same way and at the same speed as does the moving stone or the changing meaning. Music too moves, but its movement can only be measured in terms of fixed musical notes and standards. If the latter are abandoned, harmony degenerates into monotony and even cacophony. The molecules in a yardstick are also in motion, but because they do not move in the same way and in the same direction and at the same speed as the thing to be measured, the yardstick is by no means useless.

As regards the *value* of knowledge, it is to be appreciated that the Marxists correctly stressed the necessity both of theory and of practice and their correlation and mutual influence upon one another, although Lenin forgot that Marx and Engels were quite real

communists even though they had never read Plekhanov.⁷² But there is insufficient appreciation of the fact that theory is in fact the *practical* use of the mind, and there is too much pragmatic trust in the success of practice as a guide to the truth. For the very observation of the result of practice again depends on yet another theoretical evaluation, and even if a hundred years of practical verification of a theory, e.g., that of Marxism, should appear to be epistemologically satisfactory even to one favorably predisposed towards the theory, two thousand years of verification may prove the opposite.

For example: According to Engels,¹¹⁸ “the history of *early* Christianity has notable points of resemblance with the modern working-class movement,” which former, “in spite of all persecution, . . . forge[d] victoriously, irresistibly ahead,” so that “three hundred years after its appearance Christianity was the recognized state religion in the Roman World Empire.” Yet according to Marx¹¹⁹ “the social principles of Christianity have now had eighteen hundred years to develop and need no further development,” and “the social principles of Christianity are sneakish, but the proletariat is revolutionary.”

The Marxists’ realization of the relativity of all human knowledge should have made them a little less inclined to seek to attain such “*relative* truths along the path of the positive sciences”;⁷⁶ but having rather *absolutely* restricted their truth-seeking to the positive scientific path, they should have remembered that these were still only “*relative* truths.” Or having got their relative scientific truths, it is a pity they could not have made an irrational and dialectical leap and arrived at absolute religious truths. This should have been possible if their dialectically moving minds had only dialectically reflected on their own origin, essence, and goal. Yet seriously, it is hardly true that there is an “element of absolute truth” in every “scientific truth, irrespective of its relativity.”⁸¹ Truth is either universally valid, or only relatively valid; if universally, then the whole truth, and not merely an element thereof, must be present in every scientific truth. But if truth is only relatively valid, it cannot be

correct that "there is an absolute within the relative,"⁸³ for if it was, the relative would no longer be relative.¹²⁰

In the Leninist theory of the partisan character of all true knowledge, Marxism clearly advertises itself as a dogmatistical idealism. To Marx and Engels truth could still be found in the proletarian ranks,¹²¹ but to Lenin, it could only be found in the select party, and to Stalin, only in his own mind. Realism had travelled a long distance along the road to solipsism, even by Lenin's day.

Yet we are told⁹⁰ that eternal truths remain: simple things like "twice two makes four," in spite of contradictory dialectics; and "all men are mortal," in spite of the allegedly "immortal" Marx¹²² and his Marxism.

But Christian philosophy denies that even these truths are eternal. Only the Triune God is eternal, and His infinite oneness and threeness is incapable of multiplication, as opposed to His finite creation with its created mathematical laws of finite multiplication like "twice two makes four."

Similarly, although He alone is essentially immortal,¹²³ it is not true that "all men are mortal" in the sense that they always possessed and necessarily possess a created mortality, for before the fall man had losable, created immortality (*posse non mori*), and in Christ elect men already possess unlosable immortality (*non posse mori*).

So such "eternal truths" and "undeniable facts" as "twice two makes four" and "all men are mortal" are not even simple and undeniable "facts." They are only undeniable facts when viewed *sub specie aeternitatis*, beneath the sphere of eternity, for they are only "facts" (or "things which have been made") to the extent that they have been manufactured and are sustained by the Prime Factor, the Manufacturer and Sustainer of heaven and earth.¹²⁴

A final word of criticism is perhaps necessary regarding the Marxists' naturalistic epistemology. Naturalism has difficulty in bridging the gaps between the lifeless and the living, the mechanical and the teleological, the material and the mental. It underestimates the vital role of the human subject in the epistemological process, and it has never bothered to examine critically the tenability of its

own methodology. It does what it accuses the idealists of doing when it *abstracts* the rational perception *after* empirical observation and then objectifies that perception as if it were merely a purely empirical reflection of extra-human reality.¹²⁵

G. Summary

Summarizing, as regards the *origin* of knowledge it has been seen that the Marxists regarded mind as having been derived from matter, but were unable to account for the absence of consciousness in non-mental matter or its presence in mind.

Next it was seen that they originally adopted a naive realistic epistemology, but were progressively forced to move from an exclusive empiricism towards a more critical realism with phenomenalist-existentialist rational, ideal, and ultimately even partisan elements. All these could be attempted to be accounted for in terms of the ever-present dialectic, but it was seen that this only led to irrationalism and chaos, particularly when applied to the field of logic.

An attempt to bring about order was seen in the Marxist doctrine of the interrelation between theory and practice. The importance of both was correctly stressed, particularly the guiding hand of practice, but in the latter connection it was not appreciated that the duration of the human observation of the practical experiment necessarily affects the outcome of the latter, and that such outcome must necessarily be theoretically evaluated.

Then it was pointed out that all knowledge is relative, but that, according to Marxism, a study of the relative truths in the *positivistically* interpreted so-called “exact” sciences would somehow yield elements of the absolute truth, even though man “can only approach *eternally* closer to it.”⁷⁹

Paradoxically, the Marxists were seen to believe that there are also some simple eternal truths which are readily knowable—yet here again it was shown that these truths are not “eternal,” but merely exist *sub specie aeternitatis*, and that they are only “facts” because manufactured by the divine Prime Factor.

H. *Christian view of knowledge*

The Christian philosophical viewpoint with regard to epistemology will have to be set out rather fully to provide a sharp critique to that of Marxism.

Because God is essentially distinguishable from His creation, and because the pre- and non-human creation is essentially distinguishable from man, Christian philosophy can in this respect be called a real(istic) philosophy. However, it should perhaps rather be called an ontical philosophy as, unlike many realistic views, it insists that human subjectivity is also a part of this ontical reality. As such, Christian philosophy is equally opposed to rationalism and empiricism. It insists that the outside world really exists irrespective of man's recognition thereof, for non-human creatures had already been given an objective existence by God before the creation of man.¹²⁶ However, because Christian philosophy is constructed on the basis of a God-conscious critical realism (or rather "onticism") and makes due allowance for createdly-ontical rational and empirical factors upheld and guaranteed even after the fall by the trustworthy God and Source of all knowledge, it cannot share the initial naive realism of Marxism.

Before the fall, man as God's image could really know the universe,¹²⁷ although only in a sub-divine manner and to a sub-divine extent and hence never sovereignly (as teach the Marxists⁸), for God alone is sovereign.¹²⁸ Such supralapsarian human knowledge, although it was capable of both rational and empirical extension,¹²⁹ was real and trustworthy because it was mediated by the divine reality, the Word of God, the Wisdom of God, the Mediator Who enlightens every man.¹³⁰

After the fall and the resulting curse on extra-human creation as well as the darkening of man's inner understanding, critical elements were introduced into the question of knowledge.¹³¹ Although God the Son and God the Holy Spirit continue to enlighten both external objects as well as man's inner-mind, thus explaining how even unbelievers are often capable of true if superficial insights into

reality, nevertheless the *harmony* of knowledge was now shattered.¹³² So that if man now seeks *of his own accord* to reconstruct such harmony, he necessarily absolutizes some or other aspect of creation at the expense of others as the fulcrum for his forced monistic synthesis. This is what Marxism does in its fundamental doctrine of materialistic monism.

However, the Christian philosopher, who *recognizes* God the Son and God the Holy Spirit as the enlightening Principle in this sin-darkened universe, is in a much better position epistemologically. Although his true insight into reality is right now only restored in principle—yet this insight into reality, albeit only in principle, is nevertheless truly restored.¹³³ The Christian's knowledge is not as unbroken as was the unfallen Adam's, for the Christian is still hampered by sin, whereas the unfallen Adam was not.¹³⁴ Yet the Christian's knowledge is greater in scope than was the unfallen Adam's and has progressed from Eden towards the knowledge which Adam would ultimately have attained had he not sinned.¹³⁵ This is because God the Son, the Wisdom of God, incarnated Himself as the Second Adam. Through His shattered body He substitutionarily restored the harmony of the shattered body of the cosmos, and thenceforth leads His elect descendants through His divine Spirit into all true knowledge.¹³⁶

Although God the Son mediated knowledge to man both before and after the fall, and finally in His own incarnation gave man the greatest insight into true knowledge, yet man's darkened mind continually misinterpreted the true knowledge which God revealed to him in nature, in history, in conscience, and in religion.¹³⁷ Moreover, man even misinterpreted the radical nature and cosmic scope of God's restorative incarnation.¹³⁸ To act as the primary permanent epistemological criterion to fallen man, then, God inscripturated His dealings with man, culminating in the Word of God made book about the Word of God made flesh.¹³⁹ The spectacles of Holy Scripture can now largely correct short-sighted man's epistemological construction of the sin-blurred outer world. Marxism, in rejecting

this Biblical criterion, thus remains short-sighted and consequently operates epistemologically in a relative darkness.

* * *

Communism versus creation. "If you are not in a position to maintain that the proposition 'Napoleon died on May 5, 1821' is false, then you are practically acknowledging that it is true," declared Engels.¹⁴⁰ "If you do not assert that it can be refuted in the future, then you are acknowledging this truth to be eternal. . . . To think that this truth can possibly be refuted in the future is absurd."

Here then is a fixed point in knowledge. Both Christian and communists are agreed that at least *this* truth is irrebuttable: "Napoleon died on May 5, 1821." 1821, *anno Domini!*

CONCLUSION

At the end of this study the Marxists' beliefs can in conclusion be *summarized*, and the Bible too would enjoin us: "Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter" (Eccles. 12:13).

If one must select only one single factor which dominates the entirety of the Marxists' doctrine of the origin of all things, that factor must be their positivistic natural scientific methodology—their positivism leading to their materialism and their naturalism—and their consequent utter rejection of the independent realm of the spirit. This is not really surprising, considering the immediate naturalistic and positivistic forerunners of the Marxists such as Strauss, Bauer, Feuerbach, Darwin, and others—as outlined in our first chapter on the *sources* of Marxism.

This was also seen in our second chapter on *God*. There it was shown how the confining of their fact-collecting largely to the natural sciences (and applying the methods of the latter to the humanities, where dealt with) led them to deny categorically even the possibility of the existence of God. They sought the origin of the idea of God in immanent categories such as the diseased minds of the clergy, the reflection of human impotence, the quintessence of numerous tribal gods and/or the isolation of the individual from his fellow man and from nature, and apriorically excluded the idea of a divine revelation. This led them to assert that man as the highest form of nature created himself, which again resulted in their humanistic naturalism and naturalistic humanism, in their deification of man and in the ultimate canonization of all the Marxist scriptures as the product of the best of humanity.

In the third chapter on *matter*, the Marxists' naturalism was seen

in their proclamation of the independence of what from the Christian viewpoint is only dependent created being, and their subsumption of the entire created universe with all its manifold diversities under the common denominator of a materialistic monism. Their rejection of vulgar materialism in favor of autodynamic or dialectical materialism again evidenced their naturalistic desire to exclude all extra-material motion from humanly observable matter, to exclude the Creator from His creation, and their definition of matter as "the property of being objective reality" only revealed their own subjective limitation of that objective reality to that which they themselves and others of like positivistic mind had been able to perceive. Their attempts to explain the autodynamism of matter in terms of the four dialectical laws of the unity of contradictory opposites, of transformation from quantity to quality, of the negation of the negation and of upward movement, not only all presuppose order and fixed behavior and a constituting Lawgiver, but also create more problems than they solve in not being able to account for the fact why one law should sometimes operate rather than the other, etc.

The Marxists' view of the *universe* was examined in chapter four. Here their positivism and determination to exclude the Creator led to their denial of an absolute cosmogonical beginning in favor of an eternal "reincarnation" of the successive universes. This in its turn (falsely) led them to question the essential continuity of cosmic being and to assert the eternity of time and the spatiality of all phenomena. A miraculous origin of the cosmos was apriorically and naturalistically discounted, and Kant's nebular hypothesis, a hypothesis itself quite acceptable to the Christian, was employed by the Marxists to attempt to explain the allegedly non-divine origin both of this present universe and of its solar system, the proto-gaseous earth being held to have first liquefied and then solidified. The Marxist geological account of this solidification involving their enthusiastic rejection of catastrophism and their absolutization of uniformitarianism, together with their admissions as to the "extremely meagre" value of geology as a whole, can best be

interpreted as an unconvincing naturalistic desire to eliminate the geological "moods of the creator."

Chapter five dealt with the Marxist interpretation of *life*. Just as they were previously seen to have defined motion as the mode of existence of matter, so too did they now define life as the mode of existence of albuminous matter. In both cases, however, the motivation was the same naturalistic desire to exclude all non-material reality (namely motion and life respectively) from the absolutized realm of nature. This desire was further seen to result in an inability to determine the origin of life, the origin of genera, and the observable fixity of basic genera.

In chapter six, the Marxist doctrine of *man* was analyzed. Here the naturalistic influence was clearly seen in the Marxist insistence on man's animal descent. Naturalism was also implied in the Marxists' view of man's original estate as one of savagery; and their denial of his creation as God's image in true holiness, righteousness and knowledge led to their inability to give a clear account of the unique essence of man.

In chapter seven an account was given of the Marxists' doctrine of *labor*. Their characterization of man as a tool-making animal, his self-creation by labor, their materio-economic determinism and their views as to the primordially of communal property can also be attributed, at least in part, to their naturalistic apriori; and their anti-spiritualism, their materialistic opposition to the realm of the spirit, can clearly be seen in their opposition to the division of labor.

In chapter eight the Marxist theory of *society* was examined. There it was seen that particularly the naturalistic anthropologist Lewis Morgan and the naturalistic evolutionist Charles Darwin influenced Marx and Engels to invert their initial doctrine of the primordially of the family in relation to the community. It is also conceivable that their views as to the unnaturalness of nationality and the state played some part in correctly rejecting the primordially of these institutions.

The Marxists' view of *religion* was analyzed in chapter nine, and

found to be thoroughly naturalistic in that it attributed the origin of religion either to man's natural animality or to the rise of the unnatural state, and in that it attributed the essence of religion to man's alienation from nature and from both himself and his fellow man as part of nature.

The Marxist theory of *knowledge* was dealt with in chapter ten. Here their naturalism was evidenced in their view of mind as a mere species of matter and a derivative of nature, and to a lesser extent in their initial naive realism, in their underestimation of the role of the subject in the epistemological process and in their uncritical faith in the correctness of their own methodology.

The lines of division between Christian philosophy and Marxist naturalism in the above pages have been drawn sharply of necessity, for this issue of naturalism is absolutely basic. The naturalistic influences of Marx's early thesis on "The Natural Philosophy of Democritus and the Natural Philosophy of Epicurus" and of Engels' early polemic against "Schelling on Revelation" stamped itself indelibly on all their later writings, and it is this influence which must be firmly resisted on all fronts.

* * *

In *conclusion* then, how does this Marxist naturalism bear on the basic issues of philosophy?

Firstly, it bears on the realm of *ontology*, that is, the scientific study of being. The Triune God, the heart of Christian ontology, is dogmatically rejected. In the place of the independent God, in the place of the perfect harmony between unity and plurality and between particularism and universalism which prevails between the divine Father and Son and Holy Spirit, the Marxists assert the independence of what is in fact dependent created reality and impoverish it further by reducing all plurality therein to a materialistic monistic denominator.

Secondly, Marxist naturalism bears on the realm of *genesiology*, that is, the philosophic study of cosmic origins. In Christian genesiology, God the Father began to objectify His eternal counsel of creation when He created the universe in and with time, time being

the first of all other creatures and their essential presupposition and dimension. Then God the Holy Spirit "moved upon the face of the waters" and brought form into the void, while God the Son enlightened the world and commenced its primordial ordination, creating each lifeless and each living creature according to its own kind. In the place of all this, Marxist naturalism antihistorically denies an absolute and once-and-for-all beginning of the cosmos and of time, denies its intelligent design, denies the essential individuality of each part of the universe, and monistically reduces all to ever-changing forms which it believes are constantly being annihilated in unwilled and never-ending cycles.

Thirdly, Marxist naturalism also bears upon the scientific study of *anthropology*, the realm of man. Christian anthropology represents man as a creature *sui generis*, genealogically totally unrelated to any other created being in spite of considerable morphological resemblances to many other creatures, which resemblances merely evidence a common Creator of them all. Man is monophylogenetic in his origin, the image of God in his essence, and pluriform in his later development. The individual is the root of the family and the family is the root of all other societal structures such as nationality and the state which only came into being at a later stage. Marxist anthropology, however, represents man as "a graduate animal," primordially brutal and communistic, the monistic herd being the basic unit of society and all individualization being regarded as part of the degenerative process of man's estrangement or alienation from nature and from his fellow man as part of nature.

Fourthly, the naturalism of Marxism also has *epistemological* implications, that is, it bears on the scientific study of knowledge. Christian epistemology basically embraces a realism, or rather a "Christian onticism," which allows full scope for rational and empirical factors, and which maintains the essential difference between mind and matter. It recognizes the impact of sin on the knowledge process without falling into skepticism, for it connects Jesus Christ the faithful Wisdom of God, the Light that enlightens every man, to every operation in the human knowledge process. Marx-

ist epistemology, however, adopts an untenable naive naturalistic photographico-realism in its first phase, and hardly explains the knowledge process adequately even in its second, more rational phase. It cannot clearly account for the phenomenon of mind nor elucidate the relationship between its admission of the falseness of some human perceptions and its own confident rejection of skepticism, neither can it account for the qualitative and essential difference between animal consciousness and human self-consciousness.

Finally, Marxist naturalism also bears on the realm of *axiology*, i.e., the scientific study of values. Christian axiology unhesitatingly acknowledges God as the *summum bonum* or highest good and God's laws in the realms of nature and spirit as criteriological; it stresses the great worth of the individual and the necessity of testing all moral values against the unalterable standards of the decalogue or God's Ten Commandments. Marxist axiology, however, rejects God and His standards, exalting man in His stead. Yet even here, the value of man as an individual is sacrificed to the flexible values of proletarian society, so that in actual fact values as such, which must necessarily be fixed to be measurable, greatly suffer.

* * *

Our conclusion, then, drawn up from the Christian viewpoint, is that a great chasm separates Marxism from Christian philosophy. Ontologically, Marxism denies the non-material and divine ground of all being; genesiologically, it is at variance with the essentially once-and-for-all historicity of the cosmos; anthropologically, it tends to obscure the essential uniqueness of man; epistemologically, it plays down the importance of the knowing subject; and axiologically, it blurs and ultimately leads to the obliteration of values. It is indeed nothing less than a naturalistic hodgepodge and a philosophical farce.

Communism versus creation. A fight to the finish. Which of the two will *you* believe in? Which will you serve: matter in dialectical motion, or the Lord God Omnipotent? In the words of Joshua of old: “. . . choose you this day whom ye will serve; . . . but as for me and my house, we will serve the LORD.”

EPILOGUE

Then the LORD answered Job out of the whirlwind, and said: "Who is this that darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge? Gird up thy loins like a man; for I will demand of thee, and answer thou me!

Where wast thou when I laid the foundation of the earth? Declare, if thou knowest understanding! Who hath laid the measures thereof, if thou knowest? Or Who hath stretched the line upon it? Whereupon are the foundations thereof fastened? Or Who laid the corner stone thereof; when the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy?

Or Who shut up the sea with doors, when it brake forth as if it had issued from the womb, when I made the cloud the garment thereof and thick darkness a swaddlingband for it, and established My decree upon it and set bars and doors, and said: 'Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further; and here shall thy proud waves be stayed!'

Hast thou commanded the morning since thy days; and caused the dayspring to know his place; that it might take hold of the ends of the earth, that the wicked might be shaken out of it? . . .

Hast thou entered into the springs of the sea? Or has thou walked in the search of the depth?

Have the gates of death been opened unto thee? Or hast thou seen the doors of the shadow of death?

Hast thou perceived the breadth of the earth? Declare, if thou knowest it all!

Where is the way where light dwelleth? And as for darkness, where is the place thereof, that thou shouldest take it at the bound

thereof, and that thou shouldest know the paths to the house thereof? Knowest thou it, because thou wast then born?!

Shall he that contendeth with the Almighty instruct Him? He that reproveth God, let him answer it!"

Then Job answered the LORD, and said, "Behold, I am vile; what shall I answer Thee? I will lay my hand upon my mouth. Once have I spoken; but I will not answer: yea, twice; but I will proceed no further. . . . I know that Thou canst do every thing, and that no thought of Thine can be hindered. Therefore have I uttered [things] that I understood not; things too wonderful for me, which I knew not. . . . Wherefore I abhor myself, and repent in dust and ashes" (Job 38-42).

* * *

By the Word of the LORD were the heavens made; and all the host of them by the breath [or: Spirit] of His mouth. He gathereth the waters of the sea together as an heap: He layeth up the depth in storehouses. Let all the earth fear the LORD: let all the inhabitants of the world stand in awe of Him. For He spake, and it was done; He commanded, and it stood fast (Psalm 33).

* * *

In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.

And God said, "Let there be light!" And there was light. And God saw the light, that it was good: and God divided the light from the darkness. And God called the light "Day," and the darkness He called "Night." And the evening and the morning were the first day.

And God said, "Let there be a firmament [or: expansion] in the midst of the waters, and let it divide the waters from the waters!" And God made the firmament, and divided the waters which were under the firmament from the waters which were above

the firmament: and God called the firmament "Heaven." And the evening and the morning were the second day.

And God said, "Let the waters under the heaven be gathered together unto one place, and let the dry land appear!" And it was so. And God called the dry land "Earth"; and the gathering together of the waters called He "Seas"; and God saw that it was good. And God said, "Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, and the fruit tree yielding fruit after his kind whose seed is in itself, upon the earth!" And it was so. . . . and God saw that it was good. And the evening and the morning were the third day.

And God said, "Let there be lights in the firmament of the heaven to divide the day from the night; and let them be for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and years . . .!" And it was so. . . . and God saw that it was good. And the evening and the morning were the fourth day.

And God said, "Let the waters bring forth abundantly the moving creature [or: creeping soul] that hath life, and let fowl [or: flying creatures] fly above the earth in the face of the firmament of heaven!" And God created great whales [or: water-monsters]. and every living creature that moveth which the waters brought forth abundantly after their kind, and every winged fowl after his kind: and God saw that it was good. And God blessed them, saying, "Be fruitful, and multiply, and fill the waters in the seas, and let fowl multiply in the earth!" And the evening and the morning were the fifth day.

And God said, "Let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind, cattle, and creeping thing, and beast of the earth after his kind!" And it was so. And God made the beast of the earth after his kind, and cattle after their kind, and every thing that creepeth upon the earth after his kind: and God saw that it was good.

And God said, "Let Us make man in Our image, after Our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth!" So God created man in His Own image, in the image of God created He him; male

and female created He them. And God blessed them, and God said unto them, "Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth!" . . . And God saw every thing that He had made, and, behold, it was very good. And the evening and the morning were the sixth day.

Thus the heavens and the earth were finished, and all the host of them. And on the seventh day God ended His work which He had made; and He rested on the seventh day from all His work which God created to make it (Genesis 1-2).

* * *

These are the generations of the heaven and of the earth when they were created, in the day that the LORD God made the earth and the heavens and every plant of the field before it was in the earth and every herb of the field before it grew: for the LORD God had not caused it to rain upon the earth, and there was not a man to till the ground, but a mist which went up from the earth watered the whole face of the ground.

And the LORD God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath [or: spirit] of life; and man became a living soul.

And the LORD God planted a garden eastward in Eden; and there He put the man whom He had formed. . . . And a river went out of Eden to water the garden; and from thence it was parted, and became four heads. . . . And the name of the third river is "Hiddekel" [or: "Tigris"]: that is it which goeth eastward to Assyria. And the fourth river is "Euphrates."

And the LORD God took the man, and put him into the garden of Eden to dress it and to keep it. And the LORD God commanded the man, saying, "Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat: but of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die!"

And the LORD God said, "It is not good that the man should be alone; I will make him an help meet for him!" And out of the ground the LORD God formed every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air; and brought them unto Adam [or: the man] to see what he would call them: and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof. And Adam gave names to all cattle, and to the fowl of the air, and to every beast of the field; but for Adam there was not found an help meet for him.

And the LORD God caused a deep sleep to fall upon Adam, and he slept: and He took one of his ribs, and closed up the flesh instead thereof; and the rib, which the LORD God had taken from man, made He a woman, and brought her unto the man. And Adam said, "This is now bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh: she shall be called 'Wo-man,' because she was taken out of 'Man.' Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife: and they shall be one flesh." And they were both naked, the man and his wife, and were not ashamed (Genesis 2).

* * *

. . . by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for all have sinned: . . . death reigned from Adam. . . . by one man's offence death reigned . . . [and] . . . they which receive abundance of grace and of the gift of righteousness shall reign in life by one, Jesus Christ (Romans 5).

* * *

In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by Him; and without Him was not any thing made that was made. In Him was life; and the life was the Light of men. And the Light shineth in darkness; and the darkness comprehended it not.

There was a man sent from God, whose name was John. The same came for a witness, to bear witness of the Light, that all men through him might believe. He was not that Light, but was sent

to bear witness of the Light. That was the true Light, Which lighteth every man that cometh into the world. He was in the world, and the world was made by Him, and the world knew Him not. He came unto His Own, and His Own received Him not. But as many as received Him, to them gave He power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on His name: which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God. And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, (and we beheld His glory, the glory of the only begotten of the Father,) full of grace and truth!

John bare witness of Him, and cried, saying, "This was He of Whom I spake: 'He that cometh after me is preferred before me: for He was before me.' And of His fulness have we all received, and grace for grace. For the law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ. No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, Which is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him" (John 1).

* * *

. . . the Father . . . hath delivered us from the power of darkness, and hath translated us into the kingdom of His dear Son: in Whom we have redemption through His blood, even the forgiveness of sins: Who is the Image of the invisible God, the Firstborn of every creature: For by Him were all things created that are in heaven and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones or dominions or principalities or powers: all things were created by Him and for Him: and He is before all things, and by Him all things consist (Colossians 1).

* * *

Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory and honour and power: for Thou hast created all things, and for Thy pleasure they are and were created (Revelation 4).

ABBREVIATIONS USED

- A-D* : *Anti-Dühring* (Engels).
B.&N. : Bochenski & Niemeyer: *Handbuch de Weltkommunismus*.
B.&R. : Bottomore & Rubel: *Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and Philosophy*.
Cap. : *Capital* (Marx).
CC : *Een Christelijke Confrontatie met Marx, Lenin en Stalin* (Kraan).
CCHPR : *Contribution to Hegel's Philosophy of Right* (Marx).
CCPE : *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Marx).
CGP : *Critique of the Gotha Program* (Marx).
DM : *Dialectical Materialism* (Wetter).
DoN : *Dialectics of Nature* (Engels).
EPM : *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* (Marx).
18th : *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (Marx).
FLPH : Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow.
GI : *The German Ideology* (Marx and Engels).
HF : *The Holy Family* (Marx and Engels).
HM : *A Handbook of Marxism* (Burns).
Kap. : *Kapital*, German ed. of *Capital* (Marx).
KMEW : *Karl Marx—Early Writings* (Bottomore).
L.&W. : Lawrence & Wishart.
LFe : *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (Engels).
MCP : *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (Marx and Engels).
MEC : *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (Lenin).
MEGA : *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe* (various editions).
MER : Marx and Engels: *On Religion*.
MLL : Martin Lawrence Ltd.
OJQ : *On the Jewish Question* (Marx).
OoF : *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (Engels).
PN : *Philosophical Notes* (Lenin).
PNSU : *Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft in der Sowjetunion* (Wetter).
PoC : *Principles of Communism* (Engels).

- PoP* : *The Poverty of Philosophy* (Marx).
PPL : *The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man* (Engels).
S. & R. : *The State and Revolution* (Lenin).
SC : *Selected Correspondence* (of Marx and Engels).
Speech : "Speech at the Graveside of Karl Marx" (Engels).
SUS : *Socialism—Utopian and Scientific* (Engels).
SW : *Selected Works* (of Marx and Engels OR of Lenin).
THQ : *The Housing Question* (Engels).
ToF : *Theses on Feuerbach* (Marx).
UC : *Understanding Communism* (Bales).
UR : *Ueber die Religion* (Lenin).

CHAPTER NOTES*

CHAPTER I

1. Marx: *18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (18th)*, 1852. In Burns: *Handbook of Marxism (HM)*, Victor Gollancz Ltd., London, 1956.
2. Engels: *The Conditions of the Working Class in England in 1844*.
3. Marx and Engels: *On Religion (MER)*, Foreign Languages Publishing House (FLPH), Moscow, 1955.
4. Engels: *Social Relations in Russia 1874-5*. In Marx-Engels: *Selected Works (SW)*, II, FLPH., Moscow, 1951.
5. Marx: *Kritik der Hegelschen Staatsrecht, (KHS)*, in *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe (MEGA)*, I/3, pp. 156. In Bottomore and Rubel (B.&R.): *Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy*, Watts and Co., London, 1956, p. 1. Cf. Wetter: *Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft in der Sowjetunion (PNSU)*, Rowohlt, Hamburg, 1958, p. 140f. "Idealism" is that false philosophic theory that all being basically consists of ideas rather than of matter. The opposing false theory is that of "materialism." "Dialectic(s)" is, in this context, the philosophic concept of progress through the struggle and synthesis of contradictory elements.
6. 1760-1831. B.&R., p. 9.
7. 1771-1858. Cf. Marx: *Capital (Cap.)*, I, p. 522. In Ryazanoff: *The Communist Manifesto of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels*, Martin Lawrence Ltd., London, 1930.
8. 1772-1837. Cf. Engels: *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific (SUS)*.
9. 1809-1865. Cf. Marx: *Poverty of Philosophy (PoP)*.
10. Cf. Kraan in *Denkers van Deze Tijd*, III, Wever, Franeker.
11. 1772-1823. Cf. Lenin: *Teaching of Karl Marx*, Martin Lawrence, London, 1914, p. 14.
12. 1808-1874. Cf. Engels: Ludwig Feuerbach, etc. (LFe)
13. 1809-1882. Cf. Engels: *Bruno Bauer and Early Christianity*.
14. 1809-1882. Cf. LFe. Cf. *The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man (PPL)*.
"Evolution" is that false biological theory that one basic genus of living beings may gradually develop into another essentially different one.

* The reader will note that the note references in the text are not necessarily in numerical sequence. The author preferred to save space by referring back to previous notes, rather than repeating the references.

15. 1804-1872. Cf. Engels: *LFe*.
Behind all these factors, the Christian of course discerns the hand of the devil. Cf. II Th. 2 and Rev. 13.
16. Engels: *SUS*, 4th ed., p. 5. In Wetter: *Dialectical Materialism (DM)*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1964, p. 3.
17. Lenin: *Teaching of Karl Marx*, p. 14.
18. Thus Schaff-Herzog: *Realencyclopädie*, art. "Hegel."
19. Ryazanoff: *op. cit.*, appendix.
20. Or Treves. Cf. Mayo: *Introduction to Marxist Theory*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1960, p. 4.
21. Hecker: *Religion and Communism*, Chapman and Hall Ltd., London, 1933, p. 174.
22. Cf. Wilson: *To the Finland Station*, Martin Secker and Warburg Ltd., London, undated, p. 130; cf. too n. 24.
23. Hecker: *op. cit.*, p. 174.
24. Cf. Mayer: *Friedrich Engels: A Biography*, Chapman and Hall Ltd., London, 1936, pp. 12-13.
25. Ryazanoff: *op. cit.*, appendix.
26. Cf. Wilson: *op. cit.*, p. 131. Cf. Engels: *LFe*.
"Rationalism" is that false philosophic theory which makes the *ratio* or human reason (rather than human emotion, experience, will or divine revelation, etc.) the supreme factor in the acquisition of knowledge.
27. Marx and Engels: *MEGA*, sec. 1, Vol. I(2), p. 218. Cf. McFadden: *The Philosophy of Communism*, Benziger Bros., Inc., New York, 1939, p. 98.
28. Mayo: *op. cit.*, p. 5.
29. McFadden: *op. cit.*, pp. 16-21.
30. Wetter: *DM*, p. 41.
31. Engels: *LFe* in *MER*, p. 224.
32. Wilson: *op. cit.*, p. 134f.
"Communism" is that false and socialistic system primarily characterized by the abolition of private enterprize and the introduction of communal property.
33. Wilson: *op. cit.*, p. 134f.
"Chauvinism" is exaggerated and fanatical patriotism. "Anthropology" is the philosophic doctrine of man.
34. By "bourgeois(ie)" communists mean the anti-communists in general and the petty middle class in particular.
35. Mayo, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
36. "Anarchism" is that false political doctrine which would permanently abolish all government.
37. Wetter: *DM*, p. 42.
38. Marx and Engels: *Selected Correspondence, 1841-95 (SC)*, Martin Lawrence Ltd., London, 1934.
39. Hunt: *The Theory and Practice of Communism*, the MacMillan Co., New York, 1954, p. 10.
40. Engels: *Speech at the Graveside of Karl Marx (Speech)*, in *SW*.

41. Engels: *LFe*, Preface, p. 1. Cf. *SUS*, p. 54 and n.
42. Federn: *The Materialistic Concept of History*, MacMillan and Co., London, 1939. Cf. Wetter: *DM*, p. 32.
43. *B.&R.*, p. 1.
44. Acton: *The Illusion of the Epoch: Marxism-Leninism as a Philosophical Creed*, Cohen and West Ltd., London, 1962, *in loco*.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 223-224.
46. Mayo: pp. 10-14.
47. Ryazanoff: *op. cit.*, *in loco*.
48. In Mayo: *op. cit.*, p. 147.
49. Cf. Mayo: *op. cit.*, p. 15; cf. Hunt: *op. cit.*, p. 10.
50. Mayo, *op. cit.*, p. 19.
51. "Uniformitarianism" is that false geological doctrine that holds that changes in the earth's strata always take place at the same rate.
52. By "ideological," communists mean any view, especially in philosophy and religion, at variance with their own.
53. Engels: *MER*, pp. 161, 191; Marx to Lasalle, 16th Jan., 1861: *SC*, p. 125.
54. "Historical materialism" is that false communistic doctrine that man is always primarily, if not exclusively, influenced by economic considerations alone.
55. Cf. Mayo: *op. cit.*, p. 20.
56. Wetter: *DM*, p. 33.
57. Lunn: *Revolutionary Socialism*, Right Book Club, London, 1939, p. 221.
58. A. H. Murray: *Why Be Pessimistic?* in: "The Challenge of Our Time," South African Broadcasting Corporation, Johannesburg, 1963.
59. By "proletarian" communists mean that impoverished class of men which possesses no property.
60. Mares: *Know Your Enemy: From Marx to Malenkov*, Banks Upshaw and Co., Dallas, 1955, p. 36.
61. Nihilism" is that attitude which would destroy everything.
62. Dobb: *On Economic Theory and Socialism*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1956, pp. 158-160; Mares: *op. cit.*, p. 36.
63. Engels: *Introduction to the Civil War in France*. In Burns: *HM*, pp. 170-171.
64. Lenin: *The Paris Commune*, Lawrence, London, 1920, pp. 1-53.
65. "Eschatology" is that theological or philosophical doctrine which deals with the end of all things.
66. Lenin: *State and Revolution (S.&R.)*, *FLPH*, Moscow, undated, pp. 1-53. Cf. Mayo: *op. cit.*, p. 165.
67. Cf. ch. III, n. 5, *infra*.
68. In Burns: *HM*, p. 13.
69. *MER*, index.
70. "Genesisiology" is that theological or philosophical doctrine which deals with the beginning of all created things; "cosmogony," a sub-branch of genesisiology, deals with the origin of the cosmos or orderly world, which study is also simultaneously a sub-branch of "cosmology," which deals

- with the study of the orderly world in general, particularly as regards its structure.
71. Engels: *MER*.
 72. Engels: *SW*.
 73. Federn: *op. cit.*, p. 51, n. 2.
 74. The terms "thetic" (positive position), "antithetic" (opposite negative position), and "synthetic" (combination of the two above positions), are taken from Hegel's dialectic too.
 75. Engels to J. Bloch, 21st Sept., 1890: *SC*, p. 477.
 76. Mayo: *op. cit.*, p. 22f.
 77. Mayer: *op. cit.*, p. 300.
 78. *SC*, p. 534n (ed.).
 79. Hunt: *op. cit.*, p. 130; Dobb: *op. cit.*, pp. 158-160.
 80. "Epistemology" is the philosophical doctrine of knowledge.
 81. Lenin: *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (MEC)*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1927, p. 205.
 82. "Realism" is that philosophical theory which presupposes the objective existence of things, irrespective of whether they are humanly known or not.
 83. By "phenomenalism" is meant that false philosophical doctrine which holds that objects have no subjective or objective reality, but only a reality as phenomena perceived by man. This is not to be confused with "phenomenology," which is best used to refer to that philosophical discipline which investigates phenomena (or things as they truly appear to be).
 85. The "Economists" believed that communist workers should confine their weapons to the use of the strike, rather than engage in political violence as well.
 86. Hunt: *op. cit.*, p. 130f; Dobb: *op. cit.*, pp. 158-160f.
 87. Mayo: *op. cit.*, p. 134.
 88. Schwartz: *Communism: Diagnosis and Treatment*, Box 890, Long Beach, Calif.
 89. Wetter: *DM*, p. 116.
 90. "Utopia" was a fantastic "communistic" state of future bliss invented by Sir Thomas More and rejected by later Marxian communists as unrealistic.
 91. "Doctrinaire" communism or "dogmatism" is generally rejected by official party communism in favor of a more adaptable "party line" opportunism.
 92. Mares: *op. cit.*, p. 73.
 93. Lenin: *Ueber die Religion (UR)*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1965.
 94. "Totalitarian" is any political party which seeks to gain all control for itself and ban all political and other opposition.
 95. Fetscher: *Von Marx zur Sowjetideologie*, Verlag Moritz Diesterweg, Berlin, 1957, p. 78.
 96. Zenkovsky: *A History of Russian Philosophy*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1953, Vol. II, pp. 747-748.
 97. Lenin: *Philosophical Notes (PN)*, p. 234. In Lenin: *MEC*, pp. 321f.

98. Cf. Engels: *Introduction to Wage, Labour and Capital*. In *SW*, II, pp. 5, 6, 13. Cf. Engels to Conrad Schmidt, 5th Aug., 1890: *SC*, p. 472. Fetscher: *op. cit.*, p. 117. Marx and Engels: *Manifesto of the Communist Party (MCP)*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, undated, pp. 14, 80.
99. Cf. Marx: *Theses on Feuerbach (ToF)*, in *MER*, p. 69f; cf. Marx to the editor of the Russian writing *Otyecstvvenniye Zupisky* (Notes on the Fatherland), end of 1877: *SC*, p. 354.
100. Cf. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 22. McFadden: *op. cit.*, p. xvii. Stalin (and Lenin): *What Is Leninism?* Lawrence and Wishart, London, undated, p. 12. Khrushchev: *The Road to Communism*, *FLPH*, Moscow, 1961, pp. 321, 356.
101. Mao Tse-tung: *On Practice*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1964, p. 15.

CHAPTER II

1. Ps. 14:1.
2. Lenin: *UR*, p. 48.
3. By "positivism" is meant that false scientivistic doctrine which makes all knowledge depend on empirical (i.e., experimental) observation to the exclusion of reason, intuition, and revelation.
4. By "methodology" is meant that philosophical or scientific discipline concerned with the system of methods employed for a particular purpose in a particular field.
5. The term "Marxists" is, of course, also claimed by non-communist socialists (Bebel, Kautsky, Plekhanov, etc.) and by the Trotskyites, but for want of a better term we restrict the expression for the purpose of this work to the three founders of mainstream orthodox (party) Communism, viz., Marx, Engels, and Lenin.
6. See ch. X, n. 124, *infra*. Engels: "Dialectics of Nature," (*DoN*), in *MER*, p. 191, 192: "The first breach: Kant and Laplace. The second: geology and palaeontology (Lyell, slow development). The third: organic chemistry, which prepares organic bodies and shows the validity of chemical laws for living bodies. The fourth: 1842, mechanical [theory of] heat, Grove. The fifth: Darwin, Lamarck, the cell, etc. (struggle, Cuvier, and Agassiz). The sixth: the *comparative element* in anatomy and climatology (isotherms), animal and plant geography (scientific travel expeditions since the middle of the eighteenth century), physical geography in general (Humboldt), the assembling of the material in its interconnection. Morphology (embryology, Baer)."
7. Engels: *SUS*, p. 21.
8. By "dogmatic(al)" is meant having a strong aprioric conviction, not necessarily in the bad sense; by "dogmatistic" we mean revealing an aptitude for seeing everything absolutely dogmatically, and thus closing the mind in the bad sense to all further knowledge.
9. Engels: *A-D*, p. 18.
10. Engels: *LFe*, in *MER*, p. 218.

11. Marx, in Kraan: *CC*, pp. 96, 97.
12. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 298.
13. *Ibid.*, p. xxiii.
14. Lenin: *UR*, p. 24.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
17. E.g., Marx to Engels, 13th July, 1851, in *SC*, p. 40: "Mon Dieu! [i.e., "My God!"]—N.L.] This is more than anyone can stand!" Cf. too Marx in "The Communism of the Paper *Rheinischer Beobachter*," in *MER*, p. 84: "The social principles of Christianity declare all vile acts of the oppressors against the oppressed to be either the just punishment of original sin and other sin or trials that the Lord in his infinite wisdom imposes on those redeemed." Cf. too Lenin in *MEC*, p. 303: ". . . others whose names God only knows. . .," and p. 136: "God knows from what sources Bogdanov took this reference."
18. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 152.
19. Marx: *Cap.*, I. In Hecker: *op. cit.*, p. 177.
20. Engels: *LFe* in *MER*, p. 230.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 241.
22. Marx: *EPM*, in *Bottomore*: "Karl Marx—Early Writings," (*KMEW*), pp. 156, 165-166.
23. Engels: *DoN* in *MER*, p. 192.
24. Lenin, quoting Engels, in: *MEC*, p. 168.
25. Engels: *LFe* in *MER*, pp. 251, 250; cf. *A-D*, pp. 99-100.
26. By "supranatural" is merely meant that other realm (e.g., culture, God, aesthetics, etc.) which is not confined to the natural realm (e.g., biology, geology, etc.), with the methods of which latter alone the Marxist is well acquainted. The word is in no sense employed to suggest a tension between nature and grace as in the Romanist scholastic connotation. In a moment of truth Engels correctly wrote (*SUS*, p. 50): ". . . unless we believe in supranatural revelation, we admit that no religious tenets will ever suffice to prop up tottering society."
27. "Naturalism" is that false doctrine which absolutizes the natural, and either denies or otherwise subsumes the supranatural and cultural orders under the natural.
28. Marx: *EPM*, in *MEGA* I/3, p. 123, in Acton: *op. cit.*, p. 111.
29. Marx: Preface to *CCPE*, 2nd ed. Kautsky (1859), Stuttgart, 1907, pp. iv-vi (in Acton: *op. cit.*, pp. 128-129).
30. "Pietism" is that one-sided sort of Christianity which is anti-intellectually and exclusively concerned with the salvation of the soul (to the exclusion of the body and the mind). The term "Pietism" should not be confused with piety, which is a Christian virtue.
31. "Monism" falsely maintains that the entire universe can be reduced to one substance (e.g., matter; or spirit).
32. Cf. II Chron. 2:6.
33. Engels: *DoN*, p. 279, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 139.

34. Engels. In his Introduction to *DoN*, in *MER*, pp. 152-153.
35. Cf. Engels: *Anti-Dühring (A-D)*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1934, p. 52.
36. Engels: *LFe*, in *MER*, p. 235.
37. Lenin: *MEC* in *SW*, XI, p. 287, in *Zenkovsky*: op. cit., p. 747: Transcendentalism is "a philosophy of the priest pure and simple."
38. Marx and Engels: *MCP*, p. 77: "The charges against Communism made from a religious, a philosophical, and, generally, from an ideological standpoint, are not deserving of serious examination."
39. See n. 25 and cf. Engels: *A-D*, p. 11: "It was not my fault that I had to follow Herr Dühring into realms where at best I can only claim to be a dilettante. . . . this applies to jurisprudence and in many instances also to natural science. . . . I am aware of the inadequacy of my knowledge of physics and chemistry. . . ." Marx to the editor of the Russian publication *Otyecestvenniye Zupisky* (Notes on the Fatherland), end of 1877: in *SC*, p. 354: ". . . my critic . . . feels himself obliged to metamorphose my historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe into a historico-philosophic theory of the *marche generale* [general path] imposed by fate upon every people. . . . But I beg his pardon. (He is both honouring and shaming me too much)." Lenin: *MEC*, xi: "I recognize my backwardness in philosophic matters. . . ." (in 1899).
40. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 86: "There are no other perceptions, besides human ones." Marx and Engels: "*German Ideology (GI)*, in Burns: *HM*, p. 212: "In direct contrast to German philosophy, which descends from heaven to earth, here the ascent is made from earth to heaven."
41. "Ontical" means "essential" or that which relates to being as such, and "ontology" is that branch of philosophy which deals with actual existence, generally as opposed to epistemology, the science of knowledge, although the latter is in fact ultimately a sub-branch of the former.
42. Cf. Marx: Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (CCPE)*, in Burns: *HM*.
43. Cf. Rom. 1:18-28; 2:14-16.
44. Cf. Gen. 1:26.
45. Cf. Engels: *SUS*, p. 54 and n.
46. Cf. Du Noüy: *Human Destiny*, Longmans Greens & Co., London, 1949, p. 179. Koppers: *Primitive Man and His World Picture*, Sheed & Ward, London, 1952, pp. 166-168. Skousen: *The Naked Communist*, Ensign Pub. Co., Salt Lake City, Utah, 1961, pp. 362f. Cf. too esp. ch. IX, n. 87 *infra*, and the text to which that note refers.
47. Marx and Engels: *GI, MEGA*, I/5, p. 21, in *B.&R.*, p. 92.
48. Marx: *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts (EPM)*, *MEGA* I/3, pp. 125-126, in *B.&R.*, p. 246.
49. Gen. 2:7; 3:19b, 23b.
50. Gen. 1:26-28; 2:15; Eccl. 3:11.
51. Rev. 1:6; Matt. 5:5b.
52. Acts 17:27-28.

53. Engels: *The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man (PPL)*, in *SW II*.
54. Mal. 3:6; cf. Acts 15:18.
55. Marx: *EPM*, in *MEGA I/3*, pp. 115-116, 125-126, in *B.&R.*, pp. 245-246.
56. "Pantheism" is that false doctrine which deifies creation by identifying it with the Creator.
57. Engels: *SUS*, p. 21.
58. God's "transcendence" is His quality of being above and altogether over against His creation.
59. God's "immanence" is His quality of being within and altogether inside His creation.
60. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 207 (quoting with approval from Dietzgen, *Das Wesen der menschlichen Kopfarbeit*, Hamburg, Miessner, 1869, p. 222).
61. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 222.
62. Lenin: *EPM*, in *MEGA I/3*, p. 169, in *B.&R.*, p. 6.
63. Marx to Sorge, 27th Sept. 1877: in *SC*, p. 348.
64. Marx: *On the Jewish Question (OJQ)*, in Bottomore, *KMEW*, p. 37.
65. Marx: *EPM, MEGA, I/3*, pp. 147-148, in *B.&R.*, p. 173.
66. Cf. Engels: *A-D*, p. 100: "Are there then nevertheless *eternal* truths, final and ultimate truths? Certainly there are."
67. *Ibid.*, pp. 63, 64, 70, etc.
68. Cf. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 192.
69. Engels: footnote to *LFe*, in *MER*, p. 248n. See ch. X n. 122 of this present work, and especially the paragraphs below the reference to that note in the text of this work itself.
70. Engels: *Speech*, in *SC*, p. 414.
71. Engels to Becker, March 1883: in *SC*, p. 416.
72. Engels to Liebknecht, March 1883: in *SC*, pp. 415-416.
73. Engels, *Speech*, in *SW, II*, p. 153.
74. Thus quoted in Nicolaevsky and Maenchen-Helfen: *Karl Marx Mens en Strijder*, Brill, Leiden, 1949.
75. Cf. II Thess. 2:3f.
76. Marx: *Forward to Thesis: The Difference Between the Natural Philosophy of Democritus and the Natural Philosophy of Epicurus*. In *MER*, p. 15.
77. Cf. Lunn: *op. cit.*, p. 221.
78. "Apriori(cally)" means with immediate, pre-experiential knowledge. The opposite is "aposteriori(cally)," which applies to knowledge gained as a result of experience, observation, etc.
79. "Pre-scientific" knowledge is knowledge gained without scientific analysis, such as naive knowledge (common sense), etc. The fact that even non-Christian scientists, looking at the same set of scientific data, are divided among themselves into mutually opposing schools (cf. the "behaviorists" vs. the "Gestalters" in psychology), surely evidences that their very approach to science itself is (religiously) predetermined by their prescientific or common sense life and world view.

80. Engels to Schmidt, 1895: in *SC*, p. 530f.
81. Engels: *SUS*, p. 28.

CHAPTER III

1. Heb. 11:3.
2. Engels. In Burns: *What Is Marxism?* Gollancz, London, 1943, p. 50.
3. Engels: *A-D*, p. 52, in Acton: *op. cit.*, p. 53.
4. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 266; cf. Engels: *A-D*, p. 84, etc.
5. By "autodynamism" is meant that false doctrine that things move and have power of themselves. "Autodynamic materialism" holds that all matter moves of its own accord without non-material impulses from elsewhere.
6. Engels: *A-D*, p. 70.
7. Engels: *A-D*, p. 135, in Acton: *op. cit.*, p. 95f.
8. Lenin's sixteen points (Wetter: *DM*, pp 119-120) boil down to much the same thing.
9. Engels: *A-D*, p. 63.
10. Engels: *DoN*, esp. pp. 137 and 159, in Mayo: *op. cit.*, p. 43.
11. Engels: *A-D*, pp. 151, 153.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 151. Cf. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 77.
13. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 269, in Mayo: *op. cit.*, p. 46.
14. Lenin: *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*. Also quoted in Stalin: *Leninism*, p. 153; in Bolton: *The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism*, Committee of Foreign Affairs, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1948, p. 5.
15. Marx: *SW I*, 1942, pp. 180, 382, in Mayo: *op. cit.*, p. 194; cf. Marx: *PoP* in Burns: *HM*, pp. 352-353.
16. Lenin: *PN*, p. 241, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 338.
17. Engels: *A-D*, pp. 136 and 137.
18. Lenin: *PN*, p. 83, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 340.
19. Engels: *DoN*, p. 84, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 322.
20. Engels: *A-D*, p. 30, in Acton: *op. cit.*, p. 81f: "Chemistry can be termed the science of the qualitative changes of bodies as a result of changed quantitative composition."
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 141, 143. Cf. *SC*, p. 113; cf. *LFe* in *MER*, p. 252. Marx: *SC*, p. 223.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 152.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 151-154.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 152-153.
25. Thus Engels: *SUS*, p. 21.
26. At least the second part of this statement is untrue from the Christian philosophic viewpoint. For God is not matter but non-material Spirit (cf. John 4:23), and yet He is continually in motion (cf. Isa. 40:28; Ps. 121:41). Cf., as a small-scale analogy, the non-material yet always moving created angels too (Ps. 103:20; Heb. 1:13-14; Rev. 4:8; cf. Isa. 6:2f).

27. "Deism" falsely maintains that the Creator is divorced from His creation. The opposite heresy is "pantheism," which confuses the two.
28. Cf. Engels: *A-D*, p. 70-71: "All rest, all equilibrium, is only relative. . . . A body, for example, may be on the ground in mechanical equilibrium, may be mechanically at rest; but this in no way prevents it from participating in the motion of the earth and in that of the whole solar system. transfer of motion is a somewhat complex process . . . it is possible to postpone the actual transmission to any moment desired. . . ."
29. The "Cartesian theory" of matter in motion of Rene Descartes holds that every "attribute" or essential property of every substance possesses "modi" (or ways of revelation), among which *modi* are form, weight, and movement, all material things being essentially the same.
30. Engels: *A-D*, p. 62.
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 52-53.
32. Lenin: *MEC*, pp. 220, 239f. Cf. p. 227, referring to the "idealistic" physicists: "They tell us that matter has disappeared, and wish to draw epistemologic conclusions therefrom. 'And has thought remained?' we ask. If not, if with the disappearance of matter thought also has disappeared, if with the disappearance of the brain and nervous system our ideas and sensations, too, have vanished, then it means that everything has disappeared. . . ."
33. It is altogether unclear why Engels should choose to give the square root of minus one as an example of this principle. For in *DoN* (in *MER*, p. 187) he himself admits: "The ordinary, metaphysical mathematicians boast with enormous pride of the absolute irrefutability of the results of their science. But these results include also imaginary magnitudes, which thereby acquire a certain reality. When one has become accustomed to ascribe some kind of reality outside of our minds to the square root of minus one, or to the fourth dimension, then it is not a matter of much importance if one goes a step further and also accepts the spirit world of the mediums."
34. There is no unity between absolute yellow and absolute blue (better: "non-yellow"!) but there is often a synthesis of opposites, such as green. Cf. Mayo: *op. cit.*, p. 220.
35. Cf. Engels: *A-D*, p. 78. "In spite of all intermediate steps, the transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a decisive change."
36. Lenin: *PN, SW, XI*, pp. 81-82 (in Acton: *op. cit.*, p. 91): ". . . dialectics is the study of the contradiction within that very essence of things." *Per contra*, Christian philosophy: "And God saw every thing that He had made, and, behold, it was very good," Gen. 1:31 (past); ". . . the creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but . . . the creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty. . . . For we know that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now," Rom. 8:20-22 (present); "And God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and there shall be no more death,

- neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain; for the former things are passed away," Rev. 21:4 (future).
37. Cf. Ps. 148 (esp. v. 6b): "He hath also stablished them [sun, moon, stars, waters, earth, fire, snow, vapor, etc.] for ever and ever: He that hath made a *decree* which shall not pass." Also Ps. 119:89-91 (esp. v. 91a): "They [heaven and earth] continue this day according to Thine *ordinances*."
 38. Marx to Engels. In *MEGA*, II/2, pp. 326-327, in McFadden: *op. cit.*, p. 50.
 39. Lenin: *S.&R.*, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 323: "Democracy, introduced as fully and consistently as is generally conceivable, is transformed from bourgeois democracy into proletarian democracy; from the state . . . into something which is no longer really a state."
 40. See ch. II.
 41. Lenin: *SW*, in Mayo: *op. cit.*, p. 45.
 42. Engels: *A-D*, p. 25, in Acton: *op. cit.*, p. 96f.
 43. Cf. Gen. 1:11f: ". . . yielding fruit after his kind. . . ."
 44. Engels: *A-D*, p. 158. Such pluriformity is, of course, clearly confessed by the Christian philosopher. Cf. Gen. 1:11, 21, 25, etc.; I Cor. 15:39-41.
 45. By revelation the Christian philosopher, while anthropologically optimistic regarding the ultimate (eschatological) outcome of man's development, cannot ignore the *devolutionary* power of sin in the present world, and particularly at the end thereof: ". . . as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned" (Rom. 5:12); ". . . know also, that in the last days, perilous times shall come . . . evil men and seducers shall wax worse and worse. . . . (II Tim. 3:1, 13); ". . . when the Son of man cometh, shall He find faith on the earth?" (Luke 18:8); etc.
 46. Lenin, quoting Engels with approval, in *MEC*, p. 125.
 47. Col. 1:17.
 48. Ps. 119:89-91.
 49. Acts 17:28.

CHAPTER IV

1. Gen. 1:1.
2. Lenin, quoting Feuerbach and Engels with approval, in *MEC*, p. 63.
3. In ch. III.
4. Engels: *SUS*, p. 22 n.
5. With substitution of the word "deed" for "word," of course. Cf. John 1:1 cf. Gen. 1:1.
6. Engels: *DoN*, in *MER*, p. 164 (italics mine —N.L.).
7. Engels: *A-D*, p. 62.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
9. Engels: *DoN*, in *MER*, p. 158.
10. In his *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels*. Cf. Engels: *DoN*, in *MER*, p. 159.
11. Engels: *A-D*, p. 67.

12. Engels: *DoN*, in *MER*, p. 165.
13. Light, of course, being a form of heat and energy. Cf. Gen. 1:3: "Let there be light."
14. Engels: *DoN*, in *MER*, p. 166.
15. Marx: *EPM*, in *MEGA*, I, 3, p. 124. In Acton: *op. cit.*, p. 169. And cf. Bottomore: *KMEW*, p. 165.
16. Engels: *DoN*, in *MER*, p. 156: ". . . geology had not yet gone beyond the embryonic stage of minerology; hence palaeontology could not yet exist at all."
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 160-161.
18. Marx to Engels, 25th March 1868: *SC*, p. 236.
19. This was clearly seen by Lenin (*MEC*, p. 192): "If nature is derivative then it is self-evident that it can be derived only from something that is greater, richer, broader, mightier than nature. . . . It means that something exists outside of nature, which produces nature. In plain language this is what is meant by God."
20. Engels: *DoN*, in *MER*, p. 174: ". . . however often and however relentlessly this cycle is completed in time and space; however many millions of suns and earths may arise and pass away, however long it may last before, in one solar system and only on *one* planet, the conditions for organic life develop . . . we have the *certainty* that matter remains eternally the same in all its transformations, that none of its attributes can ever be lost, and therefore, also, with the same *iron necessity* that it will exterminate on earth its highest creation, the thinking mind, it *must* somewhere else and at another time *again produce it*." (Italics mine —N.L.)
21. See ch. III, n. 26, *supra*.
22. Cf. ch. X, *infra*.
23. Cf. note 7, *supra*. The Christian philosopher would regard space as the dimension of all material (created) being, and time as the dimension of all created being, including the non-material angels and the disembodied human spirits, as well as abstracts like love, beauty, etc. God, the Supreme Being, is, of course, above and under and in all dimensions.
24. Engels: *LFe* in *MER*, p. 233.
25. Engels: *A-D*, p. 59-60.
26. Cf. Jager: *Het Eeuwige Leven*, Kok, Kampen, 1962, pp. 463f.
27. Engels: *A-D*, p. 62.
28. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 143.
29. Engels: *A-D*, p. 60.
30. See ch. II, n. 25, *supra*.
31. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 162, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 305.
32. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 152.
33. Neither does much of modern physical science. Cf. Sir James Jeans: *The Mysterious Universe*, New York, 1930, pp. 154-155. Cf. too the Church Father who declared: "*Non in tempore, sed cum tempore, finxit Deus mundum*" ("Not in time, but with time, did God create the world").
34. Engels has also written (in *A-D*, p. 63): "If the world had ever been in

a state in which no change whatever was taking place, how could it pass from this state to a changing state? . . . A first impulse must therefore have come in from outside the universe, an impulse which set it in motion. But as everyone knows, the 'first impulse' is only another expression for God."

Only the mechanical or "vulgar" materialists have maintained that the world was ever in such a changeless state. The Christian philosophical position is that the world (universe), once created, is always in motion. For in God, Who is Motion, does the universe from moment to moment consist or hold together (cf. Col. 1:15-17). Time, motion, and createdness are interdependent in creation.

35. Cf. Engels: *A-D*, p. 57, and esp. *DoN* in *MER*, p. 171: "To say that matter during the whole unlimited time of its existence has only once . . . found itself able to differentiate its motion and thereby to unfold the whole wealth of this motion . . . is equivalent to maintaining that matter is mortal and motion transient." Why does Engels argue thus? On the next page (p. 172) he gives us the reason: ". . . either we must have recourse to a creator, or we are forced to the conclusion that the incandescent raw material for the solar systems of our universe was produced in a natural way by transformations of motion which are by *nature inherent* in moving matter. . . ."
36. Cf. Clausius: *Ueber den zweiten Hauptsatz der mechanischen Wärmetheorie*, Braunschweig 1867. Cf. Wetter: *DM*, p. 436, and *PNSU*, p. 158. Cf. Engels: *DoN*, p. 304 in *PNSU*, p. 158.
37. Cf. Engels: *DoN*, p. 303, in Wetter: *PNSU*, p. 158.
38. Job 38:4, 31, 33. Cf. Hooykaas: *The Principle of Uniformity in Geology, Biology and Theology*, Brill, Leiden, 1963, p. 228f.
39. Both Christian theology and Christian philosophy are theoretical sciences governed by pre-scientific faith and promoting a Christian outlook. But whereas Christian theology deals with God and His *Self-revelation* to man and restricts its field of enquiry to analysing and systematizing the Bible alone, Christian philosophy deals with God's *universe* and would attempt to give a comprehensive insight into *all* created reality (in harmony with the teachings of the Bible).
40. There is clearly no irreconcilability between the nebular hypothesis and Gen. 1:1: "In the beginning God created the heaven(s) and the earth." In fact, if during and after creation the heavens too were "without form and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep," as was the earth (Gen. 1:2), this would be an excellent description of the nebular theory, if that theory were or is correct. But other cosmogenical theories are equally reconcilable with Genesis too.
41. E.g., the "steady state theory," the "pulsating universe theory," and especially the "big bang theory," which latter holds that the universe began with a gigantic explosion. Cf. Bergamini: *The Universe*, Time-Life International, Neths., 1964, pp. 174-175. See too n. 40 *supra*.
42. Engels: *A-D*, p. 68.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

44. The "cigar hypothesis" of Jeans holds that a passing star drew a cigar-shaped filament of matter from the sun, which then slowly started rotating about the latter, and coalescing into planets. Cf. Wetter: *DM*, p. 440, n. 2.
45. E.g., cf. Ps. 19:4, 6, describing the sun's movement independently of the earth. Cf. too, incidentally, the Biblical evidence as to the roundness of the earth (Isa. 40:22) and its suspension in the void (Job 26:7). Note too the anti-geocentric implications of Matt. 5:34-35.
46. Engels: *A-D*, p. 68. Yet cf., *per contra*, Engels: *LFe*, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 509.
47. Cf. Gen. 1:2-3: "And the earth was without form and void. . . . And God said: Let there be light"; Gen. 1:9 and 10: "Let the waters under the heaven be gathered together unto one place, and let the dry land appear: and it was so. And God called the dry land Earth; and the gathering together of the waters called He Seas." Cf. Engels: *DoN*, in *MER*, p. 166: ". . . changing also with the consequent passage of part of the gaseous matter first to the liquid and then the solid state. . . ."
48. Cf. Gen. 1:7: "And God made the firmament, and divided the waters which were under the firmament from the waters which were above the firmament."
49. Cf. Gen. 1:9: "And God said: Let the waters under the heaven be gathered together unto one place"; Ps. 33:6-7: "By the word of the Lord were the heavens made. . . . He gathereth the waters of the sea together as an heap."
50. Gen. 1:9: "Let the dry land appear." Ps. 104:1-8: "Bless the Lord. . . . Who laid the foundations of the earth, . . . the waters stood above the mountains. At Thy rebuke they fled; at the voice of Thy thunder they hasted away. They go up by the mountains; they go down by the valleys unto the place which Thou has founded for them." Cf. too Job 38:1, 4-6, 8-11.
51. Engels: *LFe*, in *MER*, p. 232.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 157.
53. The earth's principal geological strata were formed: firstly, after the earth's primordial creation and prior to its six days' formation, Gen. 1:2 (" . . . the earth was without form, and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep"); secondly, during formation week, Gen. 1:9 (" . . . let the waters under the heaven be gathered together under one place, and let the dry land appear"—cf. n. 50, *supra*); and thirdly, during the diluvium or great flood, II Pet. 3:6 (" . . . the world that then was, being overflowed with water, perished"—cf. Gen. 6:19-24). The first two periods of stratification (Gen. 1:2 and Gen. 1:9) were of humanly immeasurable duration, as the solar days and years were only subsequently instituted (Gen. 1:4f). Cf. Ps. 90:2, 4: "Before the mountains were brought forth, . . . a thousand years in thy sight are but as yesterday."
54. Thus Hooykaas: *op. cit.*, p. 192.
55. Engels: *SUS*, p. 19.
56. Cf. Engels: *DoN*, in *MER*, p. 161: "Cuvier's theory of the *revolutions*

of the earth was revolutionary in phrase. . . . In place of a single divine creation, he put a whole series of *repeated* acts of creation . . . *sudden revolutions* due to the moods of the creator. . . .”

57. E.g., Engels: *DoN*, in *MER*, pp. 160-161: “The decision has to be taken to acknowledge that . . . the earth . . . possessed a history in time. . . . Lyell first brought sense into geology . . . the *gradual* effects of a *slow* transformation of the earth.” Cf. p. 191: “The first breach [with the old world view]: Kant and Laplace. The second: geology and palaeontology (Lyell, *slow development*)” Cf. ch. II n. 7, *supra*.
58. Engels: *A-D* (1878), p. 152.
59. Engels: *DoN* (1873-1886), in *MER*, p. 161.
60. Engels: *LFe*, in *MER*, p. 251.
61. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 104. As regards the age of the earth, cf. n. 53, *supra*.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 153.
63. Hooykaas: *op. cit.*, p. 148. Haug, Kober, Stille, Salomon accept geological cycles. Walther, Kaiser, Beurlen, Cayeux admit that new geological factors may occur at some particular epoch.
64. Engels: *A-D*, p. 104.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
66. By “revisionist,” communists understand one of their own number who attempts to change or “revise” the actual teachings of Marx and Engels (and later, of Lenin).
67. “Neptunism” is the geological theory that all the rocks of the earth’s crust were formed by the agency of water. “Plutonism” holds that the earth solidified from igneous fusion.
68. Gen. 1:1.

CHAPTER V

1. Job 33:4.
2. Lenin: in *MEC*, p. 52.
3. The atheistic, anti-miraculous Darwinist Preyer held the opposite hypothesis, fantastic yet not altogether illogical. He insisted that life has always existed, that the earth’s breath was perhaps once iron vapor, her blood liquid gold and her food meteorites. Inorganic matter today is merely the corpses of dead organisms! See Hooykaas: *op. cit.*, pp. 138-139.
4. Cf. ch. III, n. 26, and note that the non-material created spirits (angels) were already in existence before the creation of this present earth. See Job 38:7; cf. 1:6-7; Gen. 1:1; 2:1; 6:2.
5. Marx: *Pop*, in Burns: *HM*, p. 352.
6. Engels: *A-D*, pp. 93-94.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 92.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 94.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
10. Engels: *DoN*, in *MER*, p. 166f.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 167.

12. Engels: *A-D*, p. 84.
13. Marx: *EPM*, in Bottomore: *KMEW*, p. 165.
14. Engels: *DoN*, in *MER*, p. 167.
15. Engels: *A-D*, p. 91.
16. Ch. III.
17. E.g., of Engels: *A-D*, pp. 70, 135-136.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 94.
19. Some of these characteristics are also exhibited by lifeless objects (crystals) and crystalizable viruses too.
20. Engels: *A-D*, p. 95.
21. Engels: *DoN*, p. 273, in Wetter: *PNSU*, p. 70.
22. Cf. Job 33:4: "The Spirit of God hath made me, and the breath of the Almighty hath given me life"; Job 34:14-15: "... if He gather unto Himself His Spirit and His breath, all flesh shall perish together"; Gen. 2:7: "... God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul"; Gen. 6:3; 7:21-22: "My Spirit shall not always strive. . . . And all flesh died that moved upon the earth, both of fowl, and of cattle. . . . All in whose nostrils was the breath of life." Cf. too Ps. 104:29-30 and Job 12:7-10.
23. Moore: *Evolution*. Time-Life International, Netherlands, 1964, pp. 94f, 102f.
24. Lever: *Creation and Evolution*, Grand Rapids, Mich.: Kregel's, 1958, p. 47.
25. De Witt: *Die Evolucionisme*, Sacum, Bloemfontein, undated, pp. 10-11.
26. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 26. Cf. esp. n. 3 *supra* too!
27. Engels: *A-D*, p. 84.
28. Cf. Engels: *DoN* in *MER*, p. 167 with p. 354 n. 60: "Engels is probably referring to Haeckel's assertion that the simplest living beings he had investigated, and which he called Monera, were completely structureless particles of protein nevertheless carrying out all the essential functions of life. See Haeckel, *Generelle Morphologie der Organismen* . . . , Vol. I, Berlin, 1866, pp. 133-136."
29. Engels: *A-D*, p. 136.
30. Cf. Greenwood: *Biology and Christian Belief*, SCM, London, 1938, p. 50.
31. Cf. Rom. 8:20-22; Gen. 3:17f.
32. Cf. Greenwood: *op. cit.*, p. 150.
33. Matt. 10:28; Mark 9:43-48.
34. See ch. III nn. 7-15 and 30, *supra*.
35. Engels to Marx, 14th July 1858: *SC*, p. 113.
36. Cf. Engels: *A-D*, p. 89: "All organic bodies, *except the very lowest*, consist of cells, small particles of albumen. . . ."
37. Pfeiffer: *The Cell*, Time-Life International, Netherlands, 1965, p. 9.
38. Engels: *LFe*, in *MER*, p. 252.
39. Cf. Gen. 3:17f; Rom. 5:12f; 8:19f.
40. See ch. III, n. 24.
41. *MER*, p. 355 n. 61; cf. too *supra*, nn. 28 and 25.
42. Engels: *A-D*, p. 18.

43. Gen. 1:21 (cf. too vv. 11, 24-25); Lev. 11:22, 29, etc.
44. Engels: *A-D*, p. 101.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 18. Marx to Engels, 25th March 1868 (*SC*, p. 237), described Fraas (e.g.) as "a Darwinist before Darwin."
46. Engels: *A-D*, p. 79.
47. Concerning the first, see n. 43 *supra*; concerning the second, see Rom. 8:20-22, and see Isa. 11:6f as to its eschatological resolution.
48. Engels: *A-D*, p. 79-80: ". . . it is evident that in this struggle [for existence] those individual organisms which have some particular characteristic, however insignificant, which gives them an advantage in the struggle for existence will have the best prospect of reaching maturity and propagating themselves. *These individual characteristics have furthermore the tendency to be inherited.* . . . In this way a species is altered through natural selection, through the survival of the fittest."
49. Cf. Haldane: *Truth Will Out*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson Ltd., London, 1949.
50. See Wetter: *DM*, pp. 457f, for a refutation of the theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, generally. Cf. too ch. II, n. 80.
51. Engels: *A-D*, pp. 83-84. But *per contra*, see n. 14, *supra*.
52. Darwin: *Origin of Species*, 6th ed., penultimate page. Cf. n. 51, *supra*.
53. Haeckel: *The History of Creation*, p. 397. Cf. n. 51.
54. Engels: "Preface to the Condition of the Working-Class in England in 1844," in *SW*, II, p. 372.
55. Engels: *PPL*, in *SW*, II, p. 82.
56. Gide, C.: *Communist and Co-operative Colonies*, Harrap, London, 1930, p. 19.
57. Marx: *EPM*, in Bottomore: *KMEW*, p. 128.
58. Marx to Engels, 19th Dec. 1860: *SC*, p. 126.
59. Marx to Lasalle, 16th Jan. 1861: *SC*, p. 125.
60. The very (true Hegelian!) reverse of what Marx claimed to be happening in history. See his Preface to *CCPE*!
61. See ch. IV, n. 16f.
62. Engels: *DoN* in *MER*, p. 156.
63. Marx: *Cap.*, p. 172, in Acton: *op. cit.*, p. 168f (q.v.!).
64. Marx to Engels, 25th March 1868: *SC*, p. 235.
65. Engels: *A-D*, p. 85.
66. Cf. those authorities cited in *Potgieter*: "Weerspreek die Gedagtes van Skepping en Evolusie Mekaar?" in *Geref. Vaandel*, Stellenbosch, Sept. 1952.
67. E.g., Cambrian Strata on Cretaceous in Alberta and Montana. Silurian on Carboniferous in Georgia and Tennessee. Cf. in Glaurus, Switzerland, etc. See Hamilton: *The Basis of Christian Faith*, Doran, New York, 1927, pp. 81f.
68. Monophylogensis, i.e., the origin of all members of a genus from one original pair alone. The Bible teaches the monophylogensis of *homo sapiens* or man alone (cf. Gen. 1:27-28; 2:20-25; 3:20; 5:1f; Mal. 2:10, 14-15; Matt. 19:4-5; Luke 3:23-38; Rom. 5:12-21; I Cor. 11:7-12; 15:21-22, 45;

- II Cor. 11:3; I Tim. 2:11-15), but the polyphyllogenesis of all other living creatures (except the angels), i.e., that each basic genetic stock descended from many different pairs, cf. Gen. 1:11-14, and cf. 7:2. The asexual angels, of course, are each individual and separate creations of God.
69. Matt. 22:32.

CHAPTER VI

1. Gen. 1:27.
2. Engels: *DoN*, in *MER*, p. 167.
3. Marx: *Critique of the Gotha Program (CGP)*, in *SW*, II, p. 18.
4. Engels: *PPL*, in *SW*, II, p. 78.
5. Lenin: *S.&R.*, in Wetter, *PNSU*, p. 97.
6. Engels: *PPL*, in *SW*, II, p. 74.
7. Canby: *op. cit.*, p. 13, however, dates the Eocene as beginning 60 million years ago.
8. Stebbing: *Extinct Animals*, Penguin Books, New York, undated, pp. 4-5.
9. Engels: *PPL*, in *SW*, II, p. 74.
10. Bavink: *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, Kok, Kampen, 1928, II, pp. 489-490.
11. Marx: *Cap.*, I, Volksausgabe, I, pp. 82-84, in *B.&R.*, p. 105.
12. Engels: *A-D*, p. 187.
13. Engels to Marx, 19th Nov. 1869, in *SC*, pp. 266, 270.
14. Engels: *PPL*, in *SW*, II, p. 75.
15. Marx: *Cap.*, I, p. 152. Cf. too Kraan: *CC*, p. 62.
16. Engels: *A-D*, p. 197.
17. Engels: *PPL*, in *SW*, II, p. 76. Cf. too n. 18: "The formation of articulate speech was the main achievement of this period."
18. Engels: *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (OoF)*, FLPH, Moscow, undated, p. 34.
19. Engels: *PPL*, in *SW* II, p. 79.
20. Engels: *DoN*, p. 297, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 544.
21. Engels: *A-D*, p. 129.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 203.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 130.
24. Engels to Marx, 14th July 1858, in *SC*, p. 114.
25. Engels: *A-D*, p. 114.
26. Marx: *EPM*, in Bottomore: *KMEW*, pp. 127-128: "Conscious life activity distinguished man from the life activity of animals. . . . Of course, animals also produce. . . . But . . . Animals produce only themselves, while man reproduces the whole of nature. . . ."
27. Marx and Engels: *GI*, 1st sec., in Burns: *HM*, pp. 210-211.
28. Engels: *A-D*, p. 155f.
29. Engels: *DoN*, in *MER*, p. 168.
30. Marx, in Kraan: *CC*, p. 62.
31. Marx: *Cap.*, I, p. 325.

32. Marx: *EPM*, in *MEGA*, I/3, pp. 115-116, in *B.&R.*, p. 245.
33. Engels: *A-D*, p. 102.
34. Marx and Engels: *GI*, in *MEGA*, I/5, pp. 19-21, in *B.&R.*, p. 70.
35. Engels: *A-D.*, p. 155.
36. Marx and Engels: *The Holy Family (HF)*, in *MEGA*, I/3, pp. 307-308, in *B.&R.*, p. 243.
37. Engels: *A-D*, p. 110. Cf. n. 116: "In the oldest primitive communities equality of rights *exists* at most for members of the community: women, slaves and strangers were excluded from this equality as a matter of course."
38. *Ibid.*, p. 115: ". . . the entire equality of the two wills only exists so long as these two wills *will nothing*. . . as soon as they cease to be human wills as such, and are transformed into real, individual wills, into the wills of two real men, equality comes to an end. . . ." This can only mean that *real* men have *never* been equal!
39. *Ibid.*, p. 114: ". . . there are no two persons who are morally entirely equal."
40. Marx, in Burns: *What Is Marxism?* p. 44.
41. Engels: *A-D*, p. 111.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
43. *Ibid.*, pp. 120-121.
44. Marx: *HF*, in *MEGA*, I/3, pp. 307-308, in *B.&R.*, p. 243.
45. Marx to Annenkov, 28th Dec. 1846, in *SC*, p. 16.
46. Engels: *A-D*, p. 102.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 155.
48. Marx: *EPM*, in *MEGA*, I/3, pp. 125-126, in *B.&R.*, p. 246.
49. Marx: *EPM*, in Bottomore: *KMEW*, p. 165.
50. Engels: *PPL*, in *SW*, II, p. 82.
51. E.g., most Western evolutionists regard *Pithecanthropus*, the *Neanderthaler*, and *Homo sapiens* as contemporaries, whereas Russian evolutionists regard the *Neanderthaler* as pre-human and as the immediate ancestor of *Homo sapiens*, and South Africa's evolutionists Robert Broom and Raymond Dart regard *Australopithecus* as man's immediate ancestor. See Wetter: *PNSU*, pp. 97-98.
52. Cf. Canby: *Epic of Man*, Time-Life International, Netherlands, p. 13; Moore: *op. cit.*, pp. 155-156.
53. Cf. Ps. 94:9: "He that planted the ear, shall He not hear? He that formed the eye, shall He not see?"
54. Gen. 1:26: "And God said, 'Let us make man in Our image, after Our likeness. . . .'" Cf. too James 3:9.
55. Gen. 1:24: "And God said, 'Let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind.'" Cf. n. 54, *supra* and 56 *infra*.
56. Gen. 2:7: "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground. . . ." Cf. too Gen. 3:19, 23; Eccl. 12:7; I Cor. 15:47. Of course, to the Christian philosopher man is not only part *of* nature, but, as the image of God, he is also the lord *over* nature.

57. E.g., cf. Engels (*A-D*, p. 44): “. . . man himself is a product of Nature . . .”; cf. Lenin (*MEC*, p. 92): “. . . man himself is only a fragment of nature. . . .”
58. *Eoanthropus* was conclusively established to be a hoax in 1953, and to consist of a falsely combined jaw of a chimpanzee and fragments of a human skull. It is now accepted even by most evolutionists as a fraud. See Moore: *op. cit.*, p. 133. The skull of *Pithecanthropus* (the name means ape-man and was so called by its discoverer, Dubois), after being hidden by Dubois from scientific investigation for years, was finally declared by him on March 20, 1937, in Philadelphia to be that of a species of ape. See Potgieter: *op. cit.*, p. 165. Again, the modern Russian evolutionists reject Dart's and Broom's contention that *Australopithecus* (*Africanus*) is the immediate ancestor of man, and regard the *Neanderthaler* as rightly entitled to claim this distinction. Cf. Wetter: *PNSU*, pp. 97-98.
59. America—thus Romanes, Klaproth, de Gobineau and Browne; Greenland—thus Spiller; Germany—thus Geiger as well as modern Russian evolutionists (*Neanderthaler*); South Russia—thus Spiegel and Cuno; the North Pole—thus Warren; Africa—thus Darwin, Huxley, Broom, and Dart. See nn. 51 and 10, *supra*.
60. I.e., as many opinions as there are men.
61. After man's creation from the dust of the ground of an unknown locality (Gen. 2:7; 3:23), he was placed in “a garden eastward in Eden” (Gen. 2:8, 15), from which garden a river proceeded and was parted from thence into four heads, two of which heads, the rivers Hiddekel “towards the east of Assyria,” i.e., the Tigris, and the Euphrates, identify the land of Eden as being located somewhere in Mesopotamia. It must be remembered, however, that the whole topography of that area was considerably changed by the Great Flood (cf. Gen. 6-9, and esp. 8:4, 10:8-12 and 11:1-9). Cf. too the archaeologist Sir Leonard Woolley's: *Ur of the Chaldees*.
62. Marx: *EPM*, in Bottomore: *KMEW*, p. 166.
63. Cf. Engels: *A-D*, p. 102: “. . . in Geology . . . events . . . take place not only in our absence, but in the absence of any human being whatever.”
64. Cf. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 52: “Natural science positively asserts that the earth once existed in a state in which no man or any other living creature existed or could have existed.”
65. Engels: *A-D*, p. 110.
66. See ch. V, n. 68, *supra*.
67. Cf. Marx: *Sämmtliche Werke*, V, p. 403: “. . . even the natural differences within the species, like racial differences . . . can and must be done away with historically.” Cf. *Briefwechsel*, III, pp. 355-356, 361-363. See esp. Bloom: *The World of Nations: A Study of the National Implications in the Works of Karl Marx*, Columbia University Press, New York,

- 1941, pp. 14-18. Cf. Marx (in Engels: *OoF*, p. 59n): "In primeval times the sister *was* the wife, *and that was moral.*"
68. See ch. X, *infra*.
 69. Cf. Engels: *PPL*, in *SW*, II, p. 75: "The lowest savages, even those in whom a regression to a more animallike condition with a simultaneous physical degeneration can be assumed to have occurred, are nevertheless far superior to these transitional beings."
 70. See ch. III, *supra*.
 71. Cf. Gen. 1:28; 2:15.
 72. Gen. 1:26-28.
 73. Cf. Moore: *op. cit.*, p. 31.
 74. Engels: *DoN*, in *MER*, p. 167.
 75. See ch. III, n. 45, *supra*.
 76. Of course, this first estate did not last long (Gen. 2:17). It soon changed, as a result of sin, to one of misery and degeneration (Gen. 3:17f; 4:8f; 4:23-24; 6:4-5; 8:21; 10:8-12; 11:1-9; Rom. 1:18-32; Eph. 4:18f). Yet God continued to bless the heathen (Acts 14:15-17) who have consequently often produced noble figures and habits (Mal. 1:11; Acts 8:27f; 10:1-4, 34f; Rom. 2:14f).
 77. Gen. 1:26f; cf. Eccl. 7:29; Eph. 4:23-24 and Col. 3:10.
 78. Man's creation in God's image is his essence; and, just as the three Persons of the Triune God communicate with one another and, anthropomorphically, with man in speech, so too does man, as a consequence of being made in God's image, communicate with his fellow men and, animalomorphically, with animals in simplified sounds. Cf. Gen. 1:3, 6, 9, 14, 20, 24, 26, 28-30; 2:16-18; 2:19-20, 23; 3:2-22.
 79. Gibbons eat leaves, grass, fruits, insects, snails, frogs, and young birds' eggs and have a cranial capacity of 5.95 to 7.60 cu. in.; whereas gorillas are completely vegetarian, have a cranial capacity of 27.9 to 32.5 cu. in. and, incidentally, are proportionately much stronger and more long-lived (50 years) than are gibbons (30 years); and omnivorous man, cranial capacity 61 to 113 cu. in., averages 70 years. Cf. Moore: *op. cit.*, p. 185.
 80. Cf. Acts 10:11-15; Col. 2:16, 20-22; I Tim. 4:1-5.
 81. Perhaps, because God's command to Adam to "have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of the air" may possibly include fish and egg consumption, and, by extension, ultimate flesh consumption implied in his "dominion over . . . every living thing that moveth upon the earth," Gen. 1:28. Cf. the Second Adam's (I Cor. 15:22, 45) attitude towards eggs and fish (Luke 11:11-12; 24:42; John 21:8f).
 82. Gen. 1:29.
 83. Gen. 9:1-3.
 84. Cf. Gen. 4:1-4. Verse 4 implies fire wherewith to perform the animal sacrifice. Cf. too Gen. 8:20-21.
 85. Cf. Gen. 1:26; 2:19-20; 4:2; Ps. 8:4-8. Cf. too n. 81, *supra*.
 86. Engels: *A-D*, p. 110: ". . . the simplest elements of society . . . are not

two people, but a man and a woman, who found a family, the simplest and first form of association for the purpose of production.”

87. Gen. 2:7f.
88. Gen. 2:24.
89. Gen. 3:20; Eph. 3:15.
90. Gen. 1:27-28.
91. Gen. 1:26, cf. Matt. 28:19.
92. Gen. 1:26-27; Acts 17:27-29.
93. Gen. 3:7 (cf. 2:25); 4:8, 13-16; Eph. 2:11-19.
94. Gen. 2:16 (cf. 1:28).
95. Gen. 2:20.
96. Gen. 2:23 (cf. too n. 95).
97. Gen. 3:2f., cf. vv. 7, 20.
98. I Cor. 11:7-10; I Tim. 2:11-15.
99. Cf. Gen. 1:27; 2:18, 22.
100. Gen. 3:16; 9:22-26.
101. Cf. Eph. 4:24; Eccl. 7:29; Gen. 1:26, 31.
102. Rom. 3:23.
103. Engels. See ch. II, n. 74, *supra*.
104. Engels: *Speech*, in *SW*, II, p. 153.
105. Rom. 6:23.
106. Gen. 1:26, cf. I Tim. 1:17.
107. John 3:16, 36.
108. Cf. Gen. 2:7; 3:19, 23.
109. Gen. 1:26-28; Ps. 8.
110. Chs. II and III, *supra*.
111. Gen. 1:26-28.
112. Col. 3:10; Eph. 4:24.

CHAPTER VII

1. Eccl. 1:3.
2. Engels: *PPL*, p. 77.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 78.
4. Engels: *DoN*, p. 228, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 471.
5. Engels: *A-D*, p. 197.
6. Marx: *EPM*, in *MEGA*, I/3, p. 156, in *B.&R.*, p. 2.
7. Engels: *SW*, I, p. 402, in Mayo: *op. cit.*, p. 62f.
8. Marx: *SW*, I, p. 357; *Cap.*, I, p. 170, in Mayo: *op. cit.*, p. 68.
9. Engels: *Speech*, in *SW*, II, *in loco*.
10. Engels: *A-D*, p. 208, in Lunn: *op. cit.*, p. 222.
11. Marx: Preface to *CCPE*, in Burns: *HM*, pp. 371-372.
12. Marx: *EPM*, in *MEGA*, I/3, pp. 121-123, in *B.&R.*, p. 73.
13. Marx: *EPM*, in *MEGA*, I/3, p. 115, in *B.&R.*, p. 244.
14. Marx: *Cap.*, I, *Volksausgabe*, p. 185f, in *B.&R.*, pp. 88-89.
15. Marx: *CGP*, in *SW*, II, p. 17.

16. Engels to Marx, 19th Dec. 1882, in *SC*, pp. 409-411.
17. Marx: *EPM*, in Bottomore: *KMEW*, p. 127.
18. Marx: *Cap.*, I, p. 152.
19. Marx: *Cap.*, I, Volksausgabe, pp. 82-84, in *B.&R.*, p. 105.
20. Marx, in Kraan: *CC*, p. 62. *Homo faber* = "man the manufacturer"; *homo laborans* = "labouring man."
21. Marx: *Cap.*, I, Volksausgabe, p. 389, n. 89, in *B.&R.*, p. 64.
22. Marx: *Cap.*, I, Volksausgabe, p. 188, in *B.&R.*, p. 90.
23. Marx: *Grundrisse*, p. 594, in *B.&R.*, p. 91.
24. Cf. Marx: *EPM*, in Bottomore: *KMEW*, p. 128: "Of course, animals also produce. They construct nests, dwellings, as in the case of bees, beavers, ants, etc. But they only produce what is strictly necessary for themselves or their young. They produce only in a single direction, while man produces universally. They produce only under the compulsion of direct physical needs, while man produces when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom from such need. Animals produce only themselves, while man produces the whole of nature. The products of animal production belong directly to their physical bodies, while man is free in the face of his product. Animals construct only in accordance with the standards and needs of the species to which they belong, while man knows how to apply the appropriate standard to the object. Thus man constructs also in accordance with the laws of beauty."
25. Engels: *PPL*, in *SW*, II, p. 75.
26. Marx: *CCPE*, pp. 265-266, translation Stone, in Acton: *op. cit.*, p. 134.
27. *Ibid.*: "They are Robinsonades. . . ."
28. Marx: Preface to *CCPE*, in Burns: *HM*, p. 373.
29. Engels: *A-D*, p. 129: ". . . in spite of the gigantic and liberating revolution in the social world which the steam engine is carrying through . . . it is beyond question that the generation of fire by friction was of even greater effectiveness for the liberation of mankind. For the generation of fire by friction gave man for the first time control over one of the forces of Nature, and thereby separated him for ever from the animal kingdom."
30. Engels: *A-D*, p. 156: "For the poets it is gold and silver, for the philosophers iron and corn, which have civilized men and ruined the human race."
31. Engels: *OoF*, according to Acton: *op. cit.*, p. 136. But Engels felt monogamy was also a cause of slavery (*OoF*, p. 105: ". . . monogamy . . . appears as the subjection of one sex by the other").
32. Marx: *PoP*, in Burns: *HM*, p. 355.
33. Marx: Preface to *CCPE*, in Burns: *HM*, p. 371.
34. Marx and Engels: *GI*, in *MER*, p. 76.
35. Engels: *OoF*, pp. 106-107: "In an old unpublished manuscript, the work of Marx and myself in 1846, I find the following: 'The first division of labour is that between man and woman for child breeding.' And today I can add: The first class antagonism which appears in history coincides with the development of the antagonism between man and woman in

monogamous marriage, and the first class oppression with that of the female sex by the male.”

36. Engels: *OoF*, pp. 259, 261.
37. Engels: *A-D*, p. 202.
38. Marx: *Cap.*, I, pp. 369f, in Acton: *op. cit.*, p. 232.
39. Marx: *Cap.*, I, p. 384, in Acton: *op. cit.*, p. 232.
40. Marx: *Cap.*, I, p. 9.
41. Marx: Marginal note to *GI*, in *MER*, p. 76, footnote.
42. Engels: *A-D*, p. 216.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 208.
44. *Ibid.*, pp. 320-321. Engels continues: “. . . the labourers are made subject, through the division of labour, to the tool of their function; the empty-minded bourgeois to his own capital and his own thirst for profits; the lawyer to his fossilized legal conceptions, which dominate him as the power independent of him . . .,” etc.
45. Marx and Engels: *GI*, in *MEGA*, I/5, p. 21, in *B.&R.*, p. 92.
46. Cf. Acton: *op. cit.*, p. 256; and cf. n. 25, *supra*.
47. Marx: *PoP*, p. 125, in Kraan: *CC*, p. 62, n. 120.
48. Marx and Engels: *GI*, in *MEGA*, I/5, p. 21, in *B.&R.*, p. 92.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 40, in Acton: *op. cit.*, p. 138.
50. Marx: *Cap.*, I (Kerr. ed.), pp. 51-52; approvingly quoted by Engels: *A-D*, p. 221.
51. Cf. Engels: *DoN*, pp 297f, in *DM*, p. 544.
52. Marx: *EPM*, in *MEGA*, I/3, pp. 116-117, in *B.&R.*, p. 77.
53. Engels: *A-D*, p. 203.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 204.
55. Marx: *Cap.*, I, p. 1.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
57. Marx, quoted with approval in Engels: *A-D*, pp. 214-215; cf. too p. 224.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 217.
59. Marx: *Cap.*, I, pp. 6-7.
60. Marx, in *B.&R.*, p. 85.
61. Marx: *Cap.*, I, p. 61.
62. Marx: *Cap.*, I, Volktausgabe, I, pp. 96-97, in *B.&R.*, p. 176.
63. Marx: *Cap.*, I, Allen & Unwin, p. 66.
64. Engels: *A-D*, p. 156.
65. Marx: *EPM*, in *MEGA*, I/3, pp. 147-148, in *B.&R.*, p. 173.
66. Marx: *Cap.*, I (Kerr. ed.), pp. 163-164, quoted approvingly by Engels: *A-D*, p. 226.
67. Marx: *OJQ*, in Bottomore: *KMEW*, pp. 34, 37-38, 43: “What is the profane basis of Judaism? *Practical need, self-interest*. What is the worldly cult of the Jew? *Huckstering*. What is his worldly god? *Money*.
Very well, then in emancipating itself from *huckstering* and *money*, and thus from real and practical Judaism, our age would emancipate itself.
We discern in Judaism, therefore, an *antisocial* element of the *present time*, whose historical development, [is] zealously aided in its harmful

aspects by the Jews. . . . the *emancipation* of the Jews is the emancipation of mankind from *Judaism* . . .

Money is the alienated essence of man's work and existence . . . is the jealous god of Israel. . . . The bill of exchange is the real god of the Jew. . . . in the Jewish religion . . . even the species-relation itself, the relation between man and woman, becomes an object of commerce. Woman is bartered away. . . . The *chimerical* nationality of the Jew is the nationality of the trader, and above all of the financier."

68. Marx: *EPM*, in Bottomore: *KMEW*, p. 121.
69. Marx and Engels: *GI*, in *MEGA*, I/5, pp. 11-15, in *B.&R.*, p. 119: "The first form of property is tribal property. It corresponds to an undeveloped stage of production in which a people lives by hunting and fishing. . . ."
70. Marx: *Cap.*, I, p. 325.
71. Engels: *A-D*, p. 197.
72. Engels to Marx, 29th Nov., 1869, in *SC*, p. 275.
73. Engels: *A-D*, p. 102.
74. Marx to Engels, 7th Nov., 1868, in *SC*, p. 253.
75. Marx: *CCPE*, 1859, p. 9, n. 1, in *B.&R.*, p. 112.
76. Engels: *A-D*, p. 339.
77. *Ibid.*, 197.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 235.
79. Engels: *PPL*, in *SW*, II, p. 84.
80. Engels: *A-D*, p. 183, quoting Marx: *Cap.*, I.
81. Marx: *Cap.*, I, p. 59.
82. Engels: *A-D*, p. 182.
83. Marx: *Cap.*, I, p. 767.
84. Engels: *A-D*, pp. 218, 216-217; cf. *supra*, nn. 42-44.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 203; cf. *supra*, n. 51.
86. Marx: *PoP*, in Burns: *HM*, pp. 356-357. In a footnote, Engels, who edited a later publication of this work of Marx, realized Marx's prophetic error, yet sought to explain it away. See *ibid.*
87. Engels: *A-D*, pp. 180-181, cf. p. 187.
88. Engels: *Principles of Communism (PoC)*, in Ryazanoff: *op. cit.*, p. 322.
89. Marx and Engels: *MCP*, the last paragraph.
90. Marx and Engels: *GI*, in *MEGA*, I/5, p. 11.
91. Marx: *Historische Materialismus*, II, pp. 44, in Kraan: *CC*, p. 63.
92. Engels, quoting Marx with approval, in *A-D*, p. 255.
93. Marx: *Cap.*, I, pp. 452, 356, in Acton: *op. cit.*, p. 232.
94. Cf. *supra*, ch. VI, nn. 14f.
95. Engels to Marx, 19th Dec. 1882, in *SC*, p. 411.
96. Engels to Starkenburg, 25th Jan. 1894, in *SC*, pp. 516-517.
97. Engels to Bloch, 21st Sept. 1890, in *SC*, p. 477.
98. Marx: *PoP*, in Burns: *HM*, p. 368.
99. Gen. 1:27.
100. Cf. Lunn: *op. cit.*, p. 222.
101. Cf. Bober, in McFadden: *op. cit.*, p. 232.

102. Engels: *PPL*, in *SW*, II, p. 75.
103. Lenin: "Ueber den Staat," *SW*, II, p. 381f, in Bochenski und Niemeyer (B.&N.): *Handbuch des Weltkommunismus*, Karl Albert, Freiburg-München, 1958, p. 41.
104. Marx (and Engels): *MCP*, p. 43.
105. Cf. Gen. 1:27-28; Matt. 22:30; cf. Rev. 6:11.
106. Gen. 2:15, 18, 25; 3:16-19; 4:1f.
107. Cf. Gen. 1:27 - 2:3; cf. Heb. 4:3-4, 4:11.
108. Cf. Marx and Engels: *GI*, in Burns: *HM*, p. 211: ". . . production first makes its appearance with the *increase of population*. It in turn presupposes *intercourse* of the individuals among themselves. The form of this intercourse is again determined by production." Cf. Engels: *A-D*, p. 201: ". . . the increasing density of population creates at one point a community of interests, at another conflicting interests, between the separate communities, whose grouping into larger units brings about in turn a new division of labour. . . ."
109. *Ibid.*, in *MEGA*, I/5, pp. 11-15, in *B.&R.*, p. 119.
110. Engels: *A-D*, p. 318. Cf., however, Engels' contradictory opinion on p. 201 of the same book (*A-D*)—see n. 108, *supra*!
111. I Tim. 6:10.
112. Engels: *A-D*, pp. 200-201.
113. *Ibid.*, pp. 203-204.
114. In the progressive exercise of man's dominion over the land (Gen. 1:28a), man functioned firstly as an *individual* (cf. Gen. 2:15), thus as a possessor of private property (cf. Matt. 20:15) under stewardship to God (cf. Matt. 25:14f; 21:33f); secondly as a *family unit* (cf. Gen. 2:20-25), thus involving the right of inheritance (cf. Matt. 21:23f), yet still not eclipsing the private property of man and the wife respectively (cf. Gen. 16:3-6); thirdly as a *clan* (Gen. 4:16f); and fourthly as a *nation* (Deut. 32:8f; Acts 17:26). But throughout, the right to own private property is endorsed to the hilt (cf. Deut. 19:14; 27:17; I Kings 21:2-4; Prov. 22-28; 23:10-11). As man *left* his father and mother (Gen. 2:24) and *replenished* the earth (Gen. 1:28), individuality and private property would always and invariably reassert themselves. Cf. too Matt. 13:23 with Rev. 2:17, 23.
115. Marx: *Cap.*, I, pp. 597-598: "At first the rights of property seemed to us to be based on a man's labour. At least, some such assumption was necessary since only commodity owners with equal rights confronted each other, and the sole means by which a man could become possessed of the commodities of others, was by alienating his own commodities, and these could be replaced by labour alone."
116. Engels to Marx, 8th Dec., 1882, in *SC*, p. 406.
117. Engels: *A-D*, p. 255.
118. Marx: *EPM*, in *B.&R.*, p. 85.
119. Engels: *On Social Relations in Russia*, in Ryazanoff: *op. cit.*, p. 52: "In Western Europe, including Poland and Little Russia, at a certain stage in

the social development, this communal ownership became a fetter, a brake on agricultural production, and was more and more eliminated." Cf. *A-D*, p. 154: "All civilized peoples begin with the common ownership of land. With all peoples who have passed a certain primitive stage, in the course of the development of agriculture this common ownership becomes a fetter on production. It is abolished, negated, and . . . transformed into private property."

120. Marx: *GI*, in *MEGA*, I/5, pp. 11-15, in *B.&R.*, p. 119.
121. Cf. Gen. 4:17-22. Needless to say, the Bible discourages slavery, cf. I Cor. 7:21-23; Phm. 10:21.
122. I Cor. 10:31.
123. Col. 3:23.
124. Ex. 20:8-11.
125. Gen. 2:15-25; cf. n. 122 above.
126. Gen. 3:16-19.
127. Mark 6:1-3; Col. 4:14.
128. I Cor. 7:21.
129. Acts 13:2; 18:3.
130. Rev. 14:13.
131. Matt. 5:5.
132. Engels: *A-D*, p. 215.
133. Art. 12 of the Soviet Constitution, quoted in Kraan: *CC*, p. 290: "Wie niet werkt, zal niet eten."
134. II Thess. 3:10: ". . . if any would not work, neither shall he eat."

CHAPTER VIII

1. Gen. 1:28.
2. See ch. VI, and especially ch. VII, *supra*.
3. Marx: "Zur Kritik der pol. Oek." (*CCPE*), p. XIV, in Kraan: *op. cit.*, p. 97.
4. Engels: Preface to fourth (1891) ed. of *OoF*, p. 10.
5. Marx: Fragmentary Scheme of his *CCPE*, in *Neue Zeit*, 21st Year, 1st Vol., p. 711, in Cunow: *Die Marxsche Geschichts-, Gesellschafts, und Staatstheorie*, Vols. I and II, Buchhandlung Vorwärts, Berlin, 1920, p. 84.
6. Marx and Engels: *GI*, in *MEGA*, I/5, pp. 18-19, in *B.&R.*, p. 61.
7. *Ibid.*, in *MER*, p. 76.
8. Engels: *A-D*, p. 110.
9. Engels to Marx, 19th Nov. 1869, in *SC*, p. 266: "Now Ricardo's description of the process by which rent originates (Carey, p. 104) is just as unhistorical as all the similar detailed stories of the economists and as Carey's own great Robinson-Crusoeade about Adam and Eve (p. 96 seq). . . . when Carey, who wants to develop his own historical theory, proceeds to introduce Adam and Eve to us as Yankee backwoodsmen, he cannot expect us to believe him. . . . This wretched ignorant stuff can

- only be compared with the shamelessness which allows him to unburden himself of such nonsense." Cf. too n. 13, *infra*.
10. Marx, *Cap.*, I, *Volksausgabe*, I, pp. 514-516, in *B.&R.*, p. 254.
 11. Cf. Engels: *OoF*, pp. 6, 12.
 12. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
 13. Engels: *PPL*, in *SW*, II, p. 78. Cf. too n. 9, *supra*.
 14. Engels: *OoF*, p. 48.
 15. *Ibid.*, p. 55.
 16. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
 17. Marx, letter quoted with approval by Engels: *OoF*, pp. 58-59.
 18. Marx: *EPM*, in Bottomore: *KMEW*, p. 152. Speaking out against the tendencies of the crude non-Marxian communists, Marx declared that the tendency to contrast private property with communal ownership "is expressed in animal form; *marriage* (which is incontestably a form of *exclusive private property*) is contrasted with the community of women, in which women become communal and common property. One may say that this idea of the *community of women* is the *open secret* of this entirely crude and unreflective communism. Just as women are to pass from marriage to universal prostitution, so the whole world of wealth (i.e., the objective being of man) is to pass from the relation of exclusive marriage with the private owner to the relation of universal prostitution with the community. This communism, which negates the *personality* of man in every sphere, is only the logical expression of private property, which is this negation. Universal *envy* setting itself up as a power is only a camouflaged [sic] form of cupidity which re-establishes itself and satisfies itself in a different way."
 19. Lenin, quoted by F. Halle: *Women in Soviet Russia*, p. 112 (cf. Clara Zetkin): "You are doubtless acquainted with the capitalist theory that in Communist society the satisfaction of the instincts of the craving for love is as simple and unimportant as 'the drinking of a glass of water'. 'This 'glass of water theory' has driven some of our young people crazy, quite crazy. It has been the destruction of many young men and women. Its supporters declare that it is Marxist. . . . I consider the 'glass of water theory' to be utterly un-Marxian, and moreover un-social. . . . Of course, thirst cries out to be quenched. But will a normal person under normal conditions lie down in the dirt in the road and drink from a puddle? Or even from a glass with a rim greasy from many lips?"
 20. Cf. Miller, Roberts and Shulman: *The Meaning of Communism*, Silver Burdett Co., Morristown, N. J., 1963, p. 38.
 21. Marx (and Engels): *MCP*, pp. 75-76: "The Communists have no need to introduce community of women; it has existed almost from time immemorial. . . . Bourgeois marriage is, in reality, a system of wives in common, and thus, the most Communists might possibly be reproached with, is that they desire to introduce, in substitution for a hypocritically concealed, an openly legalized community of women."

22. Cf. Wiles: *The Political Economy of Communism*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1962, p. 364.
23. As to Engels' character, cf. ch. I, n. 33. Cf. too: Engels to Kautsky, 29th June, 1891, in *SC*, pp. 484-485: "Happy and content, I was just in the middle of [writing about] group-marriage, when I had the Party programme upon me and that *had to be taken up*"; cf. Engels to Marx, 2nd Dec., 1861, in *SC*, p. 128: ". . . one might also say, as many a Berlin philistine has in fact said: If I had known they would make divorce so difficult for me, I would never have married."
24. Engels to Marx, 8th Dec. 1882, in *SC*, pp. 405-406.
25. Engels: *OoF*, pp. 123-124.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 100-106.
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 106-107.
28. Engels: *A-D*, p. 110: "That two people . . . are as such *entirely* equal in relation to each other is . . . a great exaggeration . . . two people, even as such, may be unequal in sex, and this simple fact leads us at once to the fact that the simplest elements of society . . . are not two people, but a man and a woman, who found a *family*, the simplest and first form of association for the purpose of production."
29. Bebel, in *Die Frau und der Sozialismus*, Dietz Verlag, Stuttgart, 1911, declared that woman was the first slave and did not appear on the earth as a civilized being as the Bible suggests of the first human pair, but that man slowly evolved from the animals, and experienced changing attitudes between man and woman. However, the woman should be as free and unhindered as the man in her choice of love, as will be the case when class domination and the domination of man over woman reaches its end forever..
30. Cf., e.g., Engels: *OoF*, p. 122: ". . . the first premise for the emancipation of women is the re-introduction of the entire female sex into public industry; and that this again demands that the quality possessed by the individual family of being the economic unit of society be abolished."
31. Marx: *EPM*, in Bottomore: *KMEW*, p. 154.
32. Marx to Kugelmann, 12th Dec., 1868, in *SC*, p. 255; cf. too *MCP*, p. 75: ". . . the real point aimed at is to do away with the status of women as mere instruments of production."
33. Engels: *A-D*, p. 111.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 200-201.
35. Marx and Engels: *GI*, in Burns: *HM*, p. 211: "What individuals are . . . depends on the material conditions of their production. . . . This production first makes its appearance with the *increase of population*. It in turn presupposes *intercourse* of the individuals amongst themselves."
36. Engels: *A-D*, p. 202.
37. Marx and Engels: *GI*, in *MEGA*, I/5, pp. 11-15, in *B.&R.*, p. 119.
38. Engels: *OoF*, p. 58.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 60.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 139 cf. p. 67.
 42. *Ibid.*, p. 141.
 43. *Ibid.*, p. 146.
 44. Marx and Engels: *GI*, in *MEGA*, I/5, pp. 18-19, in *B.&R.*, p. 61.
 45. See *supra* nn. 5f and cf. Marx: *Cap.*, I, p. 344: "Within a family, and after further development within a tribe*, there springs up naturally a division of labour. . . ." In a footnote*, the editor of the 3rd ed. of *Cap.* comments here: "Subsequent very searching study of the primitive condition of man, led the author to the conclusion, that it was not the family that originally developed into the tribe, but that, on the contrary, the tribe was the primitive and spontaneously developed form of human association, on the basis of blood relationship, and that out of the first incipient loosening of the tribal bonds, the many and various forms of the family were afterwards developed."
 46. Marx. Thus Mehring: *Lit. Nachlass*, III, p. 226, in Cunow: *op. cit.*, II, p. 11.
 47. Engels: art. in the London *Commonwealth*, 31st March, 1866 in Cunow, *op. cit.*, p. 37.
 48. Marx: *CCPE*, pp. 246-247; *Briefwechsel*, IV, pp. 213, 215; "An die deutschen Sozialdemokraten," in *Der Vorbote*, July 1869, p. 105; "Zur Geschichte der Internationalen Arbeiter Assoziation," in *ibid.*, p. 109; all in Bloom: *op. cit.*, p. 19.
 49. Marx and Engels: *GI*, pp. 22-23, in Acton: *op. cit.*, p. 232.
 50. Engels to Starkenburg, 28th Jan., 1894, in *SC*, p. 517.
 51. Engels: *A-D*, p. 197.
 52. Lenin, *SW*, II, p. 164, in Wetter: *PNSU*, p. 97.
 53. Engels: *PPL*, in *SW*, II, pp. 74, 78.
 54. Marx. Bloom: *op. cit.*, pp. 15-19, writes that Marx "had been impressed by the view of Tremaux [in a book published in 1867] that distinctions between races (Marx added, between "nations" as well) should be traced to differences in the material environments rather than to differences in the blood stream. "Tartars" and "Russians" were not born but made by different soils (*Briefwechsel*, III, 355-6; 361-63) . . .
- From the point of view of biology, mankind seemed to Marx distinctly singular rather than plural. He spoke approvingly of Tremaux's view that biological crossings produced "the typical unity of the species" and not its variations (*Briefwechsel*, III, 355). The theory of evolution would therefore have reference to the development of "generic" or typical man and not to "historical" man, whether "national" or "racial". Marx seemed to have been as much interested in the negative proposition of Tremaux that races and nations were not biological phenomena, as in the positive proposition that they were products of environment."
55. Marx: *Sämmtl. Werke*, V, p. 403, in Bloom: *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.
 56. Engels: *PPL*, in *SW*, II, p. 80.
 57. Engels: *A-D*, p. 201.
 58. Marx. *Cap.*, I, p. 522.

59. Engels: *OoF*, p. 35.
60. Marx to Engels, 25th March, 1868, in *SC*, p. 235.
61. Marx: *Cap.*, I, p. 344.
62. *Ibid.*, pp. 59-60.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 61.
64. Engels: *PPL*, in *SW*, II, p. 80.
65. Marx to Kugelmann, in *Neue Zeit*, XX:2, p. 478, in Broom: *op. cit.* pp. 12f.
66. Marx: *Ausgewählte Briefe*, p. 235; *Kap.*, I, p. 673, in Broom, *op. cit.*, pp 12f.
67. Marx, in Broom: *op. cit.*, pp. 12f.
68. Marx: *Sämmtl. Werke*, III, p. 306, in Broom: *op. cit.*, p. 12.
69. Marx to Kugelmann, in *Neue Zeit*, XX:2, p. 477; *Kap.*, I, p. 368n, in Broom: *op. cit.*, pp. 12f.
70. Marx and Engels: *GI*, in *MEGA*, I/5 p. 21, in *B.&R.*, p. 92.
71. Marx and Engels: *GI*, in *MEGA*, I/5, p. 11, in *B.&R.*, p. 98.
72. Engels: *OoF*, p. 286.
73. Marx: *Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts*, 1843, in *MEGA*, I/1, i, pp. 405-408, in Acton: *op. cit.*, pp. 111f.
74. Marx and Engels: *GI*, in Burns: *HM*, p. 211.
75. Engels: *OoF*, p. 286.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 280.
77. Lenin: "The State," in *Soviet Legal Philosophy*, pp. 4-9, in Kelsen: *op. cit.*, p. 54.
78. Engels: *A-D*, pp. 200-201.
79. Engels: *OoF*, p. 145.
80. *Ibid.*, p. 163.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 278.
82. Engels: *A-D*, p. 203.
83. Engels to Schmidt, 27th Oct., 1890, in *SC*, p. 480.
84. Engels: *OoF*, pp. 280-282.
85. Engels: *LFe*, in *MER*, p. 262.
86. Engels: *OoF*, p. 283.
87. Engels: *Introduction to the Civil War in France*, 1891, in Burns: *HM*, pp. 170-171.
88. Engels: *The Housing Question (THQ)*, in Burns: *HM*, p. 347.
89. Engels: *OoF*, Chicago, 1902, p. 214, in McFadden: *op. cit.*, p. 115; cf. Engels: *A-D*, p. 203.
90. Engels: *SUS*, New York, 1935, p. 69, in McFadden: *op. cit.*, pp. 114-115.
91. Engels: *OoF*, p. 209, in McFadden: *op. cit.*, p. 215.
92. Lenin: *S.&R.*, New York, 1935, p. 22, in McFadden: *op. cit.*, p. 115.
93. Engels: *OoF*, p. 130, in McFadden: *op. cit.*, p. 215.
94. Lenin: "The State," in *Soviet Legal Philosophy*, p. 9, in Kelsen: *op. cit.*, p. 54.
95. *LFe*, in *MER*, p. 261.
96. *Ibid.*, p. 260.

97. Marx: *Vorwärts*, No. 60, in *Nachlass*, II, pp. 50-51, in Cunow: *op. cit.*, p. 270.
98. Marx: *Gothaer Programmkritik (CGP)*, in *Neue Zeit*, IX, Vol. I, p. 572, in Cunow: *op. cit.*, p. 326: "The German Labour Party—at least, when it adopts the Program as its own—shows how its socialistic ideas are simply not deeply imbedded, in that, instead of treating the existing society (and this applies to all future ones) as the foundation of the existing state (or of future ones for future society), it far rather treats the state as an independent being possessing its own spirited, moral and freedomlike foundations."
99. Engels: *OoF*, p. 280.
100. Engels: *A-D*, p. 205.
101. Engels: *PPL*, in *SW*, II, p. 80.
102. Engels: *LFe*, in *MER*, p. 262.
103. Engels: *A-D*, p. 201.
104. *Ibid.*, p. 203.
105. Marx and Engels: *GI*, in *MEGA*, I/5, pp. 52-53, in *B.&R.*, p. 223.
106. Marx: "Testimony before the *Kölner Geschworenen*," in Ryazanoff: *op. cit.*, pp. 159-160.
107. Cf. Engels: *A-D*, pp. 320-321.
108. Marx: "Capital Punishment," art. in *New York Daily Tribune*, Feb. 18th, 1853, in *B.&R.*, pp. 228-230: ". . . it would be very difficult, if not altogether impossible, to establish any principle upon which the justice or expediency of capital punishment could be founded, in a society glorying in its civilization. . . . there is history—there is such a thing as statistics—which proves with the most complete evidence that since Cain the world has neither been intimidated nor ameliorated by punishment. Quite the contrary. . . .
Now, what a state of society is that which knows of no better instrument for its own defence than the hangman, and which proclaims through the 'leading journal of the world' its own brutality as eternal law?"
109. Marx and Engels: *MCP*, pp. 61, 47.
110. The marital relationship: cf. Gen. 1:27; 2:18-25; 3:16b; Ex. 20:14; Col. 3:18-19; Eph. 5:22-33, etc. The parental relationship: Gen. 1:28a; 3:16a; 4:1f; Ex. 20:12; Col. 3:20-21; Eph. 6:1-4, etc.
111. Federn: *op. cit.*, p. 51, n. 2.
112. Cf. Engels: *OoF*, pp. 7-8. It is also interesting to note that Morgan held the extraordinary view that all future spiritual and cultural achievements are embryonically present in all human brains (Cf. Hooykaas: "Heeft de Natuur Geschiedenis?" in *Bulletin van die Suid-Afrikaanse Vereniging vir die Bevordering van Christelike Wetenskap*, May 1966, No. 6 Venter Str., Potchefstroom, Republic of South Africa.
113. Cf. Cunow: *op. cit.*, p. 138.
114. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
115. The old chestnut, "Where did Cain get his wife?" is not really a problem.

- He either married his sister or some other younger generation descendant of Adam and Eve *via* Abel or Seth or their other children (cf. Gen. 4:1-2, 16-17, 25-26; 5:1-5). Adam's position as federal head of the human race was unique, in that every possible genetic combination of all his descendants, including that of Eve (Gen. 2:21-23), was present in his body at his creation (cf. Rom. 5:12f). Clearly, Adam's relationship to Eve was even closer than that of Cain to his wife.
116. Gen. 2:22-25 cf. Mal. 2:10, 14-15 and Matt. 19:1-6.
117. Gen. 1:25; 2:18-22 cf. 6:19-20; 7:2, 9, etc.
118. Cf. Gen. 2:18; 3:16; 4:19f; 5:4f; 6:2f; I Cor. 11:7f; Eph. 5:22f; Col. 3:18; I Tim. 2:11f; 3:1, 4f; I Pet. 3:1f.
119. Cf. Masaryk: *Die philosophischen und soziologischen Grundlagen des Marxismus*, pp. 340f, in Cunow: *op. cit.*, p. 138.
120. Gen. 1:26-28; 2:23f; esp. 3:20 and cf. Rom. 5:12f.
121. Jer. 13:23; cf. too Gen. 10 and 11 (esp. 11:6-9).
122. Cf. Engels to an unknown correspondent, 19th Apr., 1890, in *SC*, pp. 469, 471: "Anti-Semitism is the characteristic sign of a backward civilization . . . , is nothing but the reaction of the mediaeval, decadent strata of society against modern society. . . . we owe much too much to the Jews. . . . Marx was of purest Jewish blood; Lasalle was a Jew. Many of our best people are Jews. . . . people of whose friendship I am proud, are all Jews! Have I not been turned into a Jew myself by the *Gartenlaube*? And indeed, if I had to choose, then rather a Jew than 'Herr von . . . !'"
123. Engels to Marx, 24th March, 1852, in *SC*, p. 60.
124. Cf. Marx: *ToF* I, in *MER*, p. 69: ". . . practice is conceived . . . only in its dirty-judaical form of appearance." Cf. too especially ch. VII, n. 67, *supra*.
125. Marx to Kugelmann, April 12th, 1871, in *SC*, p. 309, referring to the revolutionaries of the 1870 Paris Commune: "Compare these Parisians, storming heaven, with the wolves, swine and vile curs of the old society . . . the slaves to heaven of the German-Prussian, Holy Roman Empire, with its posthumous masquerades, reeking of the barracks, the Church, cabbage-Junkerdom and, above all, the philistine"; Engels to Marx, July 17th, 1851: ". . . the utterly low, gutter-snipe, stinkingly stupid Prussian style."
126. Marx to Engels, 24th March, 1870: "A funny position for me to be functioning as a representative of young Russia!" Engels to Marx, 25th July, 1866: ". . . the temporary separation of German Austria, which will result in an immediate advance of the Slav elements in Bohemia, Moravia and Carinthia. Unfortunately neither of these things can be helped"; Engels to Marx, 23rd May, 1851: ". . . the Poles as a nation are done for . . . have never done anything in history except play at brave, quarrelsome stupidity. . . . For all its baseness and Slavonic dirt, Russian domination is a civilizing element on the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. . . . Russia has absorbed far more civilizing and

- especially industrial elements than the Poles, whose whole nature is that of an idle cavalier. Even the Jews develop Slavonic cheek bones there.”
127. Lenin: *Coll. Works*, Russian ed., Vol. I, XXI, p. 345, in *SC*, p. 310: “. . . England and America . . . have slid completely into the general European, dirty, bloody swamp of bureaucratic military institutions. . . .”
 128. Marx to Engels, 1st Aug., 1877: “. . . we, as internationalists, are in no wise bound or pledged to attach ourselves to Germany, the beloved Fatherland.”
 129. Marx: *Nachlass*, III, 188; *Sämmtl. Werke*, III, 348, in Bloom: *op. cit.*, p. 79.
 130. Gen. 1:26-28; 3:16b.
 131. Gen. 9:5-6.
 132. Gen. 1:27, 31a, cf. Eccl. 7:29 and Eph. 4:24.
 133. Engels: *A-D*, p. 203.
 134. Rom. 13:1-7, esp. vv. 1b, 4a, 6b.
 135. Marx and Engels: *GI*, pp. 22-23, in Acton: *op. cit.*, p. 232.
 136. Cf. I John 3:4.
 137. Cf. Hab. 1:3-4.
 138. Cf. n. 110, *supra*; and cf. too ch. VII, n. 114, *supra*.
 139. Gen. 2:24.
 140. Gen. 1:26, 28; 2:24; 9:1.
 141. Gen. 11.
 142. Gen. 10.
 143. Acts 2.
 144. Rom. 11:1.
 145. I Cor. 9:22.
 146. Acts 17:26.
 147. Rev. 21:24-26; Matt. 8:11.
 148. Gen. 1:28; I Cor. 11:3, 9.
 149. Gen. 9:5-6.
 150. Rom. 13:4.
 151. Rom. 13:6-7.
 152. Ex. 18:21.
 153. Eccl. 7:29; Eph. 4:24.
 154. Cf. Ps. 119:89-91.
 155. Cf. Gen. 9:5-6.
 156. Tit. 3:13.

CHAPTER IX

1. Eph. 4:24.
2. Engels: *A-D*, p. 346.
3. Marx: *CCHPR*, in *MER*, p. 41.
4. Marx: *PoP*, in Burns, *HM*, p. 365.
5. Marx and Engels: *GI*, in *MER*, p. 74.
6. Engels: *LFe*, in *MER*, p. 263, (*italics mine—N.L.*).

7. Marx: *Cap.*, I, pp. 634-635.
 8. Marx and Engels: *GI*, in Burns: *HM*, p. 212.
 9. Engels to Marx, 8th Dec., 1882, in *SC*, p. 406.
 10. Marx (and Engels): *GI*, in *MEGA*, I/5, pp. 19-21, in *B.&R.*, p. 71.
 11. Marx and Engels: *GI*, in *MER*, p. 76, n. 1.
 12. *Ibid.*, p. 76.
 13. Marx: *CCPE*, in Burns: *HM*, p. 372.
 14. Lenin: *Religion*, Little Lenin Library No. 7, quoted in Bennett: *Christianity and Communism*, S.C.M. Press, London, 1950, p. 32.
 15. Engels: *A-D*, p. 201.
 16. Engels: *PPL*, in *SW*, II, p. 80.
 17. Engels: *LFe*, in *MER*, p. 262: "But once the state has become an independent power vis-a-vis society, it produces forthwith a further ideology . . . public law . . . and private law. . . ."
- Still higher ideologies, that is, such as are still further removed from the material, economic basis, take the form of philosophy and religion."
18. Marx, in *MEGA*, I/1, p. 607, in Kelsen: *op. cit.*, p. 23.
 19. Gen. 2:17; 3:6-24; Rom. 5:12f.
 20. Marx: *EPM*, in Bottomore: *KMEW*, p. 121.
 21. Marx: *Cap.*, I, p. 736: "This primitive accumulation plays in Political Economy about the same part as original sin in theology. Adam bit the apple, and thereupon sin fell on the human race. Its origin is supposed to be explained when it is told as an anecdote of the past. In times long gone by, there were two sorts of people; one, the diligent, intelligent, and above all, frugal elite; the other, lazy rascals, spending their substance, and more, in riotous living. The legend of theological original sin tells us certainly how man came to be condemned to eat his bread in the sweat of his brow, but the history of economic original sin reveals to us that there are people to whom this is by no means essential. Never mind! Thus it came to pass that the former sort accumulated wealth, and the latter sort had at least nothing to sell except their own skins. And from this original sin dates the poverty of the great majority that, despite all its labour, has up to now nothing to sell but itself, and the wealth of the few that increases constantly although they have long ceased to work. Such insipid childishness is every day preached to us in defence of property."
 22. Engels: *A-D*, in *MER*, p. 145.
 23. Marx: *Grundrisse*, pp. 504-505, in Kamenka: *The Ethical Foundations of Marxism*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1953, pp. 149-150: "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou labour! was Jehova's curse, which he gave to Adam. And it is thus as curse that A[dam] Smith regards labour. 'Rest' appears as the adequate condition, as identical with 'freedom' and 'happiness'. A. Smith seems far from seeing that the individual, "in his normal condition of health, strength, activity, capacity and skill," has also the need for a normal portion of work, for an end of rest. . . ."
 24. Engels: *A-D*, p. 113: ". . . it is always only a question of more or less,

of a difference in the degree of bestiality or of humanity. A division of mankind into two sharply differentiated groups, into human men and beast men, into good and bad, into sheep and goats, is only found—apart from the philosophy of reality—in Christianity, . . . in which the pious lambs themselves assume the office of supreme judge in relation to their mundane goat-neighbours, and discharge their duty with notorious success.”

25. Marx, in *MEGA*, III, p. 15, in Kelsen: *op. cit.*, p. 21.
26. Marx, in *MEGA*, I/1, p. 607, in Kelsen: *op. cit.*, p. 23.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 534.
28. Marx: *EPM*, in Acton: *op. cit.*, p. 232.
29. Cf. Marx: *Cap.*, I, in *MER*, p. 138, describes the “economic fall of man” as “the Adam’s apple.” Cf. Marx and Engels: *GI*, in Burns: *HM*, pp. 211-212: “Men may be distinguished from animals by consciousness, religion, or anything else. They begin to differentiate themselves from animals as soon as they begin to *produce* their means of subsistence. . . . By producing their means of existence, men indirectly produce their material life itself. . . . The fact is, therefore, that definite individuals who are productively active in a definite way, enter into . . . definite social and political relations. . . . The production of ideas, concepts, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material intercourse of men. . . . The same is true of mental production, as expressed in the language of the politics, law, morality, religion and metaphysics of a people.” Cf. too n. 21 *supra*, q.v.
30. Engels: *A-D*, p. 181: “The subjugation of man for menial work . . . presupposes the possession of a certain amount of property in excess of the average . . . it must have been obtained by labour before there was any possibility of its being robbed.”
31. Engels: *SW*, I, p. 447, in Mayo: *op. cit.*, p. 67.
32. Engels: *A-D.*, p. 156.
33. Marx: *EPM*, in *MEGA*, I/3, pp. 147-148, in *B.&R.*, p. 173.
34. Marx: *MEGA*, I/3, p. 148, in Acton: *op. cit.*, p. 226.
35. Marx: *EPM*, cf. *Cap.*, I, in Acton: *op. cit.*, p. 227. The quotation is from Shakespeare’s *Timon of Athens*.
36. Lenin: *Socialism and Religion*, *FLPH*, Moscow, undated, p. 13.
37. Engels: *A-D*, pp. 155-156.
38. *Ibid.*, pp. 202-203.
39. Marx and Engels: *GI*, pp. 22-23, in Acton: *op. cit.*, pp. 232f.
40. Marx: *EPM*, in *MEGA*, I/3, p. 91, in *B.&R.*, p. 169.
41. Marx: *Cap.*, III, p. 945f, in Nicholson: *The Revival of Marxism*, John Murray, Albermarle St., W. London, 1920, p. 127.
42. Marx: *EPM*, in *MEGA*, I/3, p. 83, in Acton: *op. cit.*, p. 226.
43. Marx: *EPM*, in Bottomore: *KMEW*, p. 121.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 169.
45. Engels: *LFe*, in *MER*, p. 227.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 226-227.

47. Engels: *A-D*, in *MER*, p. 148, n. 1.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 147-148.
49. Engels: *Bruno Bauer and Early Christianity*, in *MER*, p. 197.
50. Engels: *A-D*, pp. 346-347.
51. Marx: *Cap.*, I, in *MER*, p. 135.
52. Marx: *PoP*, in Burns: *HM*, p. 352.
53. Marx and Engels: *GI* (London, 1942, reprint, p. 14), in Acton: *op. cit.*, p. 11f: “. . . morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology.”
54. Marx: *Cap.*, I, *Volksausgabe*, I, pp. 82-84, in *B.&R.*, p. 105, writing of the legendary Robinson Crusoe, the classical economists’ example of *homo faber primus*, declared: “Of his prayers and the like we take no account, since they are a source of pleasure to him, and he looks upon them as so much recreation.”
55. Marx: “The Communism of the Paper *Rheinischer Beobachter*,” in *MER*, p. 83.
56. Engels: *SUS*, pp. 49, 48.
57. Engels: *SW*, I, p. 450, in Mayo: *op. cit.*, pp. 226f.
58. Marx: *CCHPR*, in *MER*, p. 41.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
60. Lenin: *Socialism and Religion*, p. 6.
61. Engels: *LFe*, in *MER*, p. 239.
62. Lunarcharsky, quoted in Wetter: *DM*, p. 91: “In contemplating the hand-work of genius, do we not say to ourselves: ‘What manner of man is this that even the winds and the waves obey him?’ . . . Do we not sense the nascent power of the newborn . . . God?”
63. Lenin to Gorky, Nov. 1913, in *SW*, IX, p. 675, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 91: “God-seeking no more differs from god-building or god-making or god-creating or the like than a yellow devil differs from a blue devil.” Cf. *MEC*, p. 55: “People can think and ‘project’ all kinds of hells and devils—Lunacharsky even ‘projected’ (to use a mild expression) a religious conception.”
64. Lenin: *Socialism and Religion*, p. 7.
65. Engels: *A-D*, p. 203: “. . . it is a fact that man sprang from the beasts, and had consequently to use barbaric and almost bestial means to extricate himself from barbarism. The ancient communes, where they continue to exist, have for thousands of years formed the basis of the most barbarous form of the state, oriental despotism, from India to Russia.”
66. Marx and Engels: *HF*, in *MEGA*, I/3, p. 355, in Acton: *op. cit.*, pp. 200f.
67. Lenin: *On Communist Morality*, in Hook: *Marx and the Marxists—the Ambiguous Legacy*, Van Nostrand, New York, 1955, pp. 195-196.
68. Marx and Engels: *HF*, in *MEGA*, I/3, pp. 307-308, in *B.&R.*, p. 243.
69. Engels: *A-D*, chs. IX, X, and XI, esp. pp. 106-108, in Acton: *op. cit.*, p. 190f.
70. Lenin: “Address to the 3rd Pan-Russian Congress of the Communist Youth League of Russia,” 2nd Oct., 1920, in Acton: *op. cit.*, pp. 190f.
71. Engels: *A-D*, pp. 105-106: “Really scientific works therefore avoid such

dogmatic and moral expressions as error and truth. If we have not made much progress with truth and error, we can make even less with good and bad. This antithesis belongs exclusively to the domain of morals, that is, a domain belonging to the history of mankind, and it is precisely in this field that final and ultimate truths are most sparsely sown. The conceptions of good and bad varied so much from nation to nation and from age to age that they have often been in direct contradiction to each other." Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 107-108: ". . . which then is the true one [i.e., the true morality—N.L.]? Not one of them, in the sense of having absolute validity, but certainly that morality which contains the maximum of durable elements is the one which, in the present, represents the future: that is, the proletarian. . . . We therefore reject every attempt to impose on us any moral dogma whatsoever as an eternal, ultimate and forever immutable moral law on the pretext that the moral world too had its permanent principles which transcend history and the differences between nations. We maintain on the contrary that all former moral theories are the product, in the last analysis, of the economic stage which society had reached at that particular epoch. And as society has hitherto moved in class antagonisms, morality was always a class morality; it has either justified the domination and the interests of the ruling class, or, as soon as the oppressed class has become powerful enough, it has represented the revolt against this domination and the future interests of the oppressed."

72. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 295.

73. Marx and Engels: *MCP*, p. 77.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

75. Marx: *Historische Materialismus*, II, pp. 270, 340, in Kraan: *CC*, pp. 96-97.

76. Marx: *CCHPR*, in *MER*, p. 42.

77. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 298.

78. Lenin: *UR*, p. 20.

79. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

80. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

81. As to the blasphemy of the Marxists, cf. ch. II, n. 17, *supra*.

82. Marx: *Cap.*, I, p. 51.

83. Engels: *SUS*, p. 50: ". . . unless we believe in supernatural revelation, we must admit that no religious tenets will ever suffice to prop up a tottering society."

84. Marx and Engels: *MCP*, p. 86.

85. Engels to Marx, about 18th May, 1853, in *SC*, p. 64.

86. Engels: *A-D*, p. 84.

87. Marx: *The Communism of the Paper RHEINISCHER BEOBACHTER*, in *MER*, pp. 83-84.

88. Marx and Engels: *GI*, in Burns: *HM*, pp. 210-213.

89. Engels: *A-D*, p. 197: "As men emerged from the animal world . . . so they made their entry into history; still half animal, brutal. . . ."

90. Marx: See n. 24, *supra*.

91. Engels: *A-D*, p. 129.
92. McFadden: *op. cit.*, pp. 277-279; cf. Koppers: *Primitive Man and His World Picture*, Sheed and Ward, London, 1952, pp. 177f.
93. Cf. Koppers: *op. cit.*, pp. 114f; *Dyauspitar* = the prominent Vedic God; *Deus-pater* = "God-Father."
94. Marx: *The Leading Article of No. 179 of KÖLNISCHE ZEITUNG*, in *MER*, p. 26: "Must it [philosophy—N.L.] believe in one country $3 \times 1 = 1$, in another that women have no soul and in yet another that beer is drunk in heaven?"
95. Ex. 3:14; cf. Matt. 28:19.
96. Cf. Gen. 2:7; 5:23.
97. I Cor. 1:23; Rom. 1:7; 12:2 17-21f.
98. Engels: *A-D*, Handbook, pp. 299-300, in Mayo: *op. cit.*, p. 239.
99. *Ibid.*, and cf. Marx: Preface to *CCPE*.
100. Cf. Jas. 1:27; Acts 6:1f.
101. E.g., Eph. 6:1f; Col. 3:17f.
102. Marx: *Historische Materialismus*, II, p. 210, in Kraan: *CC*, p. 96, n. 230.
103. *Foreword to D.Phil. Thesis: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE NATURAL PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRITUS AND THE NATURAL PHILOSOPHY OF EPICURUS*, in *MER*, p. 15.
104. Marx: *OJQ*, (*Zur Judenfrage in Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*, Feb. 1844) in *B.&R.*, p. 236.
105. Engels: *A-D*, in *MER*, p. 145.
106. In Acts ch. 2: a) the community of "things" was not absolute—wives were obviously excluded; b) the possessions were sold to realize *money* rather than just re-distributed (v. 45), and the basis of redistribution was personal *need*, not equality; c) the sale and surrender of the possessions was completely *voluntary*, and the Christians were under no obligation to do so (cf. 5:1-4); d) those that used things in common continued to possess *personally* (cf. 4:32); e) the difference between *poorer and richer Christians* was in nowise obliterated (cf. 6:1).
107. Hab. 2:14.
108. Rom. 1:25.
109. John 5:24.
110. Cf. Marx: *CCHPR*, in *MER*, p. 42.

CHAPTER X

1. Engels: *LFe*, in *MER*, p. 226.
2. Job 32:8.
3. In fact, both of Lenin's two chief books, *MEC* and *PN*, are epistemological works. Apart from his revolutionary writings, his non-epistemological philosophical writings are meager in the extreme.
4. Lenin: *PN*, p. 156, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 504.
5. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 118.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 63, quoting Engels: *LFe*, p. 64.

7. Engels: *DoN*, pp. 245-246, in Wetter: *DM*, pp. 492-493.
8. Engels: *A-D*, p. 99.
9. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 31.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 129.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 138.
12. Engels: *A-D*, pp. 45-46.
13. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 29; cf. p. 63: "Avenarius rejects this materialist viewpoint saying that 'the thinking brain' is a 'fetish of natural science' (*Der menschliche Weltbegriff*, p. 70).
14. *Ibid.*, p. 63, quoting Engels: *A-D*, p. 56 (cf. p. 44).
15. Engels: *A-D*, p. 44.
16. Marx: *Cap.*, p. 25, in Bales: *Understanding Communism (UC)*, Baker, Grand Rapids, Mich., 1962.
17. Marx: in Mayo: *op. cit.*, p. 42.
18. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 27.
19. Engels: *DoN*, p. 328, in Wetter: *DM*, pp. 493-494.
20. Engels: *LFe*, p. 35, in Lunn: *op. cit.*, p. 228.
21. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 118.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
23. Marx and Engels: *HF*, in *MEGA*, I/3, p. 296, in *B.&R.*, p. 220.
24. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 90f, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 500.
25. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 54.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 281, cf. p. 265.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 102.
29. Engels: *DoN*, p. 153, in Mayo: *op. cit.*, p. 43.
30. Engels: *LFe*, in *MER*, p. 249.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 228.
32. Marx: *EPM*, in *MEGA*, I/3, p. 123, in Acton: *op. cit.*, p. 111.
33. Engels: *A-D*, p. 109.
34. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 240.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 278, 281.
36. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 285f, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 503.
37. Engels: *SUS*, pp. 21-23.
38. Lenin: *MEC*, pp. 81-83.
39. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 117, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 512.
40. Lenin: *PN*, p. 156, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 504.
41. Lenin: *PN*, p. 199, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 505.
42. Lenin: *PN*, p. 152, in Fetscher: *op. cit.*, p. 117.
43. Lenin: *PN*, p. 146, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 505.
44. Lenin: *PN*, p. 299, in Fetscher: *op. cit.*, p. 117.
45. Lenin: *What Must Be Done?* in *SW*, I, p. 315, in Fetscher: *op. cit.*, p. 118.
46. Lenin: *PN*, p. 261, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 505.
47. Engels: *A-D*, pp. 50-51.
48. Lenin: *PN*, pp. 329 and 215, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 518, cf. pp. 520, 522: "dialectics, as understood by Marx, and in conformity with Hegel, includes

what is now called the theory of knowledge, or epistemology, which, too, must regard its subject matter historically, studying and generalizing the origin and development of knowledge, the transition from *non-knowledge*" (Lenin: *Karl Marx, SW, XI, p. 17*).

49. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 77.
50. Lenin: *PN*, in Fetscher: *op. cit.*, p. 117.
51. Cf. Engels: *DoN*, p. 280, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 521.
52. Trotsky, in *New International*, March, 1940. Cf. Mayo: *op. cit.*, p. 50. and Hunt: *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.
53. Engels: *DoN*, pp. 58f (and cf. p. 296), in Wetter: *DM*, p. 527 (and cf. pp. 368-369).
54. Engels: *DoN*, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 526.
55. Engels: *A-D*, p. 151.
56. Engels: *DoN*, pp. 282, 286, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 527.
57. Lenin: *PN*, pp. 146f, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 501.
58. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 83.
59. Lenin: *PN*, p. 174, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 513.
60. Engels: *LFe*, in *MER*, pp. 228-229.
61. Marx: *EPM*, in *MEGA*, I/3, pp. 121-123, in *B.&R.*, p. 73.
62. Marx: Doctoral Dissertation, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 257.
63. Marx: *ToF*, II, in *MER*, pp. 69-70.
64. Marx: *ToF*, XI, in *MER*, p. 72.
65. Engels to Sorge, 8th Feb. 1890, in *SC*, p. 466.
66. Engels: *SUS*, p. 22.
67. Marx: *Selected Essays*, New York, 1926, p. 26, in Mayo: *op. cit.*, p. 125.
68. Marx to Bolte, 23 Nov., 1871, in *SC*, pp. 316-317.
69. Lenin: *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, SW*, Moscow, 1950, I, p. 618. Cf. Kelsen: *The Communist Theory of Law*, Stevens and Sons Ltd., London, 1955, p. 59.
70. Lenin: *Towards the Seizure of Power*, New York, 1932, *SW*, II, p. 83, in Mayo: *op. cit.*, p. 125.
71. Lenin: *The Iskra Period*, New York, 1929, II, p. 27, in Mayo: *op. cit.*, p. 125.
72. Lenin: *Once Again on the Trade Unions*, in *SW*, IX, p. 66, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 100.
73. Lenin: *What is to be Done?* p. 28, in *Collected Works*, Vol. III, Book 2, pp. 102-111, in Lenin and Stalin: *op. cit.*, p. 102.
74. Lenin: *UR*, p. 62.
75. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 240.
76. Engels: *LFe*, in *MER*, pp. 221-222.
77. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 77.
78. Lenin: *PN*, p. 174, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 513.
79. Lenin: *PN*, p. 157, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 513.
80. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 120, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 513.
81. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 258.
82. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 122, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 514.

83. Lenin: *PN*, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 514.
84. Lenin: *Sochineniya*, X:4, p. 61, in Wetter: *DM*, p. 268.
85. Lenin: *MEC*, pp. 296, 308, in Mayo: *op. cit.*, pp. 32-33.
86. Lenin: *Der Oeken. Gehalt des Volkstümlertums und seine Kritik im Buche des Herrn Struwe*, (*W.W.*, Bd. I, p. 380f) in Fetscher: *op. cit.*, p. 78.
87. Lenin: *Ueber die Bedeutung des streibaren Materialismus*, March 1922, in Fetscher: *op. cit.*, p. 116.
88. Engels: *LFe*, 5th ed., Stuttgart, 1910, p. 58, in Von Mises: *Socialism*, Jonathan Cape, London, 1951, p. 357.
89. Engels: *LFe*, in *MER*, p. 221.
90. Engels: *A-D*, pp. 100, 102.
91. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
92. Marx: *EPM*, in Bottomore: *KMEW*, p. 161.
93. Marx: Preface to 2nd ed. of *Cap.*, 1873, in *B.&R.*, p. 8.
94. Marx: *EPM*, in *MEGA*, I/3, pp. 115-116, in *B.&R.*, p. 245.
95. Marx: *EPM*, in *MEGA*, I/3, pp. 125-126, in *B.&R.*, p. 246.
96. Marx: *EPM*, in *MEGA*, I/3, pp. 116-117, in *B.&R.*, p. 77.
97. Cf. Marx: *EPM*, in *MEGA*, I/3, p. 114, in *B.&R.*, p. 243: "Communism as a complete naturalism is humanism, and as a complete humanism is naturalism. It is the definitive resolution of the antagonism between man and Nature, and between man and man. It is the true solution of the conflict between existence and essence, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species. It is the solution of the riddle of history and knows itself to be this solution."
98. Cf. on this point Hook: *Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx*, Gollancz, London, 1933, pp. 32f.
99. Engels to Schmidt, 12th March 1895, in *SC*, pp. 527-528.
100. Lenin: *MEC*, and cf. Hunt: *op. cit.*, p. 168.
101. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 47: "The 'naive realism' of any healthy person, who is not an inmate of an insane asylum, or in the school of the idealist philosophers, consists in this that he believes reality, the environment and the things in it, to exist independently of his perception—independently of his conception of himself, in particular, and of his fellow men, in general. . . . The 'naive' belief of mankind is consciously taken by materialism as the basis of its theory of knowledge."
102. For the world existed (Gen. 1:3-25) before man did (Gen. 1:26f). See Job 38:4f. However, as "realism" often presupposes a distinction and even a dichotomy between thinking and being, which dichotomy is usually bridged epistemologically by the so-called correspondence theory of knowledge, it is better to speak of "Christian onticism," which insists that the knowing subject and the resultant knowledge are just as much a part of reality as is the known object, and that all three are only parts of that inferior section of reality known as created reality, which latter

- is moment by moment ontically dependent upon the only Creative Reality, the Triune God and the divine Lord Jesus Christ.
103. Even the unfallen Adam did not spontaneously know, but was also required to *acquire* knowledge both empirically (Gen. 2:16) and rationally (Gen. 2:19). Cf. too Eph. 1:17-18.
 104. Cf. ch. II, nn. 25, 39, *supra*.
 105. Thus too Christian philosophy; its basis: God *is* (cf. Ex. 3:14). And man only knows this, because God *is* and because He *is* a revealing God (Rom. 1:18-21).
 106. Marx and Engels: *GI*, in *MER*, p. 74.
 107. See ch. V, n. 26f, *supra*.
 108. Lenin, *MEC*, p. 27.
 109. Engels: *A-D*, p. 46: “. . . an adequate scientific statement of this interconnection . . . is impossible for us and will always remain impossible.” But this must mean that Engels’ conviction that this is so (cf. n. 12, *supra*) is unscientific—a deadly turn of events to the (pseudo-)“scientific” [= positivistic] Marxists, but quite acceptable to the Christian, who accepts both pre-scientific and extra-sensory knowledge as valid. Cf. n. 110, *infra*.
 110. Cf. Heb. 11:1, 3: “Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the *evidence of things not seen*. . . . *Through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the Word of God, so that things which are seen were not made by things which do appear.*”
 111. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 47.
 112. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
 113. This is so because God the Father, Who is faithful (II Tim. 2:13) created and God the Son (John 1:1) enlightens both the world (John 8: 12 cf. Col. 1:15-20; 2:2, 8-10) and every man (John 1:5, 9), whilst God the Holy Spirit comprehends both the world and man (Ps. 139:7f; Job 26:13; 27:3; 32:8; 33:4; 34:14-15; I Cor. 2:10f; I John 2:20), both non-human creation as the objectification of His Own divine thoughts (cf. Acts 15:18) and man as His own image (Gen. 1:26f).
 114. Lenin: *MEC*, p. 108, in McFadden: *op. cit.*, p. 82: “To make relativism the basis of the theory of knowledge is inseparably to condemn oneself to absolute scepticism, agnosticism and sophistry, or subjectivism.”
 115. Engels: *LFe*, p. 31, in McFadden: *op. cit.*, pp. 59-60.
 116. Engels: *LFe*, p. 55, in McFadden: *op. cit.*, p. 78.
 117. Somerville: *Soviet Philosophy*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1946, pp. 163f.
 118. Engels: *On the History of Early Christianity*, I, in *MER*, p. 316.
 119. Marx: *The Communism of the Paper* RHEINISCHER BEOBSACHTER, in *MER*, pp. 83-84.
 120. Christian philosophy solves the problem thus: Christ alone is the Truth (John 14:6 cf. 1:1 and 17:17); but in Him the Truth, all things consist (Col. 1:15-17); hence Christ, the Truth, is all, and in all (Col. 3:11).
 121. Engels: *SUS*, p. 19: “. . . to find people who dared use their own in-

tellectual faculties with regard to religious matters you had to go amongst the uneducated, the 'great unwashed' as they were then called, the working people." Cf. n. 86, *supra*.

122. See ch. II, nn. 69-76, *supra*.
123. I Tim. 6:16.
124. See ch. II, E. *supra*.
125. Cf. Murray: *The Philosophy of James Ward*, Cambridge University Press, 1937, pp. 54f.
126. Job: 38:4f.
127. Gen. 1:26-28.
128. Rom. 11:33-36.
129. Cf. Eph. 1:17f.
130. John 1:19.
131. Cf. Col. 2:4, 8; I Tim. 6:20.
132. Eph. 4:18.
133. Col. 2:2.
134. Rom. 5:14; 8:22-24.
135. Gen. 3:22; Heb. 4:4-10.
136. John 16:13.
137. Ps. 19; 78; Rom. 2:15; Acts 17:23f.
138. Col. 1:20.
139. John 17:17.
140. Engels: *A-D*, p. 104.

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(See also list of "Abbreviations Used" on pp. 197, 198, *supra*.)

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